Dynamic accident sequence analysis using dynamic flowgraph method and Markov/cell-to-cell mapping technique by Zeliang, Chireuding
 
 
Dynamic Accident Sequence Analysis 
using Dynamic Flowgraph Method  






A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment  
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Master of Applied Science in Nuclear Engineering 
 
 
The Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology 









THESIS EXAMINATION INFORMATION  
Submitted by: Chireuding Zeliang 
 
 
Master of Applied Science in Nuclear Engineering 
 
Thesis Title:  
Dynamic Accident Sequence Analysis using Dynamic Flowgraph Method and Markov/Cell-to-
cell Mapping Technique  
 
An oral defense of this thesis took place on July 24, 2018 in front of the following 
examining committee:  
 
 
Examining Committee:  
 
 
Chair of Examining Committee 
 
 






Prof. Akira Tokuhiro  
 
 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 






Dr. Salam K. Ali, Ontario Power Generation 
 
The above committee determined that the thesis is acceptable in form and content and that 
a satisfactory knowledge of the field covered by the thesis was demonstrated by the 
candidate during an oral examination. A signed copy of the Certificate of Approval is 





In the recent years, numerous concerns have been raised regarding the capabilities and 
adequacy of classical probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques (fault/event tree) to 
account for dynamic system interactions and time-dependent accident sequence evolution. 
Subsequently there is an interest within the PSA community to complement the classical 
techniques with dynamic methodologies; driven in addition by a goal to eventually develop 
a framework for integrated safety assessment. The first phase of this research investigates 
and addresses the limitations of classical techniques and performs a methodological 
comparison between classical and dynamic PSA techniques. The dynamic flowgraph 
method (DFM) and Markov model coupled with cell-to-cell mapping technique (Markov-
CCMT) were the two dynamic methodologies selected for this research. These methods are 
ranked as the top methodologies with favorable and minimal uncertainties as determined 
by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The capabilities and limitations of 
the techniques are demonstrated by applying it to a benchmark liquid level control system 
exhibiting dynamic characteristics and interactions. Reliability analysis of the system using 
ET/FT are performed using the CAFTA code. DFM model of the benchmark system is 
developed using the DYMONDA code and coupling of Markov-CCMT model is performed 
using Fortran95 and MATLAB code. Classical techniques were found to overestimate the 
predicted top event frequencies by more than one order of magnitude depending on whether 
or not dynamic interactions among the units through the state variable is accounted for. The 
study shows that DFM focuses more on sequential probabilistic system evolution, whereas 
Markov-CCMT emphasizes the exact timing of a failure event. The second phase involves 
the development of a novel approach for integrated reliability assessment of passive safety 
systems in small modular reactors. A stochastic model of a passive Isolation Condenser 
System (ICS) was developed, and its state transition probabilities are computed using finite 
element method. The analysis predicts high system reliability, with the ICS most likely to 
fail by pressure boundary breach followed by condensate return and venting unit failure.  
Key words: Dynamic and classical PSA; DFM; Markov-CCMT model; SMRs; passive 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Background 
Nuclear energy provides a viable option in contributing towards a reduced carbon world, and to 
meet the ever-increasing global energy demand in a safe, reliable and sustainable way. In nuclear 
power plants (NPPs), safety assurance is achieved through the application of defense-in-depth 
strategy and a robust regulatory framework in the process of design, commissioning, operation 
and decommissioning. Since the inception of nuclear power technology, safety analysis has been 
performed to demonstrate and understand the safety of an NPP as well as to meet the stringent 
regulatory requirements. An overall safety assessment of a NPP includes deterministic safety 
analysis (DSA), hazard analysis and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) [CNSC-REGDOC-
2.5.2 (2014)]. This thesis focusses on the application of PSA techniques to estimate the risk 
associated with an NPP. To assist in the process of an integrated risk-informed decision making, 
PSA strive to answer some of the fundamental questions possessed by the application of nuclear 
technology, including, “what can go wrong?” “how likely is it?” and “what are its consequences?” 
[WASH-1400 (1975)]. Thus, a comprehensive PSA considers the likelihood of a failure event, 
accident progression, and consequences resulting from the failure event. Here, failure event may 
include equipment failure, human error or any event that challenges the plant normal operation. 
This approach provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the design and operation of 
an NPP as well as give confidence in the design alignment with fundamental safety objectives 
[CNSC-REGDOC-2.4.2 (2014)]. Due to the specific features of nuclear installation, PSA is 
categorized into three (3) levels: Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. A Level 1 PSA estimates the 
frequency of accidents leading to a core damage, i.e., an estimation of core damage frequency 
(CDF). Level 2 PSA estimates the frequency of accidents that release radioactivity from an NPP. 
The results obtained from Level 1 forms the basis for Level 2 analysis. Finally, Level 3 PSA starts 
with the results obtained from Level 2 i.e., the radioactivity release accidents, and estimates the 
accident consequences in terms of injury to the public and environmental damage [IAEA-INSAG-
6 (1992)].  
This research focus on Level 1 PSA which models the various plant response to an initiating event 
(IE) that challenges the normal plant operation. The plant response implies the 
activation/operation/failure of several safety and mitigation systems (also called frontline 
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systems) following an initiating event. These sequence paths (i.e., success or failure of frontline 
systems) is called the accident sequence and may include several sequences for an IE which can 
result in a safe reactor state or can lead to a reactor core damage. Historically, the modelling of 
such accident sequences in nuclear industry is visualized graphically with the event tree (ET) 
technique, in which, the frontline systems are represented as top events that are required to 
respond to an IE. Accident sequence modelling with ET can be called as a system level analysis. 
In order to determine the root cause of a failure event, the frontline systems are modelled 
individually with the graphical fault tree (FT) technique. The FT method constitute a component 
level analysis. Finally, an integrated risk assessment model of a plant and an estimate of the 
frequency of core damage is accomplished by linking the ET and FT model [WASH-1400 (1975), 
NUREG/CR-2300 (1983)]. Besides the FT technique, there exist several other methodologies for 
individual system analysis such as the discrete space-time Markov model which is a major part 
of this research. In this thesis, risk estimation with the fault tree, Markov model and event tree 
methodologies will be categorized under the term classical PSA techniques. The classical 
approach is widely accepted and recognized as a standard tool for licensing, regulation and safety 
analysis within the nuclear industry. Most of the current existing NPPs PSA model are based on 
the classical approach (ET/FT) substantiated with sensitivity, importance and uncertainty analysis 
to add credit and increase confidence in the model.  
While a high level of safety is maintained with a conservative and an integrated safety assessment 
process, the nuclear industry nevertheless has experienced major accidents including, Three Mile 
Island accident (1979), Chernobyl accident (1986) and the recent Fukushima Daiichi accident 
(2011); all three accidents resulting from human error. The nuclear community has been 
incorporating the lessons learned from these major accidents and the practical countermeasures 
to cope with such an accident, resulting into an evolving rigorous and stringent regulatory/safety 
requirements. This has further led the PSA community to re-examine and question the capabilities 
of classical PSA techniques to model human error and adequately account for risk-significant 
accident sequence occurring from dynamic system behavior and interactions. In the past decades, 
numerous concerns have been raised in several reviews regarding the capabilities of classical PSA 
techniques, including: [Sui et al. (1989, 1994); Marzio et al. (1998); Aldemir et al. (2007, 2013); 
Devooght et al. (1992(a), 1996; Acosta et al. (1991); Marseguerra et al. (1998); NUREG/CR 
6901 (2006); Kirschenbaum et al. (2009)]. In brief summary, the classical PSA techniques lack:  
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1. Treatment of time element [Devooght et al. (1992(a)); Marseguerra et al. (1996); Marzio 
et al. (1998); NUREG/CR-6901 (2006)];  
2. Dependencies arising from dynamic interactions [Hassan et al. (1990); Belhadj et al. 
(1992)];  
3. Limited capability in modelling system/components with multi-states [Acosta et al. 
(1991)];  
4. Treatment of event sequence ordering [Aldemir (1987)];  
5. Inadequate treatment of human interactions/error [Acosta et al. (1993)].  
 
The lack of treatment of the above-mentioned factors arising from dynamic interactions means 
that the classical PSA approach may not identify or properly quantify potentially risk-significant 
sequences and dependencies between the failure events. Furthermore, such interactions may lead 
to coupling between stochastic logical events (e.g., valve openings, pump startups) during an 
accident scenario, which can significantly impact the predicted system failure probabilities 
[Belhadj et al. (1992)]. These limitations of classical PSA techniques entailed the development 
of an advanced class of methodologies commonly called dynamic PSA (DPSA) methodologies 
or integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety assessment (IDPSA) techniques. Dynamic 
PSA methodologies are defined as those which use a time-dependent phenomenological model 
of system evolution along with its stochastic behavior to account for possible dependencies 
between failure events [Aldemir (2013); NUREG-6901 (2006)]. The use of the term “dynamic” 
in this thesis implies an approach that combines explicit modeling of system deterministic 
evolution with stochastic modeling. Dynamic methods explicitly model the time element, state 
ordering and the mutual interactions among state variables, system components, and operators. 
Furthermore, an adequate assessment of the overall risk requires accounting for aleatory 
uncertainties arising from the stochastic nature of component failures as well as epistemic 
uncertainties arising from limited knowledge of the physical phenomenon relevant to the system. 
Dynamic PSA provide an integrated framework to account for both the uncertainties 
simultaneously [Zio (2014)]. Thus, treating the deterministic and probabilistic approach in an 
integrated fashion, unlike the classical approach where the two are treated separately. Several 
dynamic methodologies have been proposed with most of the methodologies in the developing 
phase including and have been reviewed in the literatures [Sui (1994); Labeau et al. (2000); 
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Aldemir (2013); NUREG-6901]. In this thesis, DFM and Markov-CCMT model is selected for 
further research, and demonstration of the features, advantages and limitations of the 
methodologies. Figure 1 presents a flowchart of the research approach and methodology 
selection.  
 
Figure 1: Flowchart of the research approach 
 
Before further detail discussion into the specific methodologies, the five (5) factors mentioned 
earlier will be described briefly in context to the classical approach. It should be noted that this 
research is bounded within the first four (4) elements. First, the ET/FT methodologies are based 
on static logic approach. Neither does it capture the time of occurrence of a failure event nor the 
time distribution before an undesired event is reached, i.e., the time available for the subsequent 
failure event following an IE. Due to its static nature, it assumes a system failure as soon as a 
minimal cut-set (MCS) occurs; this may lead to overestimating the failure probability. Of course, 
time is a significant factor in shaping the system dynamics, i.e., the state variables (e.g., reactor 
coolant system pressure) are time-dependent. Second, the classical techniques are neither 
developed nor intended to model integrated system dynamics and probabilistic accident 
evolution. An accident scenario is simply described by a set of success or failure events, where a 
risk-significant accident sequence lead to a single core degraded state. The identification and 

















analysis of these accident sequence can be performed with ease using the well-known logic based 
approach and the laws of probability. Thus accounting for dependencies emerging from dynamic 
interactions using the classical approach does not arise. This can lead to an inaccurate estimate of 
risk when quantifying risk associated with scenarios for which the system dynamic behavior is a 
significant factor [Marseguerra et al. (1998)]. Since this research attempts to model and 
adequately account for dependencies, a clear distinction between static and dynamic 
dependencies will be discussed along with the dependencies covered by classical PSA techniques.  
The principle of defense-in-depth design characteristics in nuclear power plants implies that a 
risk-significant accident scenario must involve a failure of multiple barriers, which includes 
protection, safety and containment systems. Thus, in order to accurately estimate a plant risk, it 
is essential to determine the probability of multiple barrier failures. In probability theory, the joint 
occurrence of any two failure events A and B is given by: [Vesely et al. (1981)]  
𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵). 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) 
Where, 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) and 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) quantifies the dependencies between event A and B. An overly 
conservative or optimistic estimate of the dependencies can result in an error of the estimated risk. 
Much effort has been put in to adequately identify and quantify these dependencies between 
failure events. Acosta et al. (1991) discuss three type of dependencies treated by classical PSA 
techniques: (a) Dependencies arising due to common cause failures; (b) Dependencies due to 
functional coupling; and (c) Multiple top events sharing the same basic events or shared 
equipment (well treated in the fault tree analysis). However, dependencies outside of these 
categories arising due to the dynamic interactions are not well treated by the classical techniques 
[Sui et al. (1989)]. These three dependencies are briefly described:  
1. Direct dynamic dependencies  
These types of dependencies arise from direct interaction between two safety systems through 
state variables. A failure of one safety system results in a deviation of the state variables, which 
in turn, affects the performance of the other safety system. For example, the sequence of events 
that occurred at Hatch 1 plant in 1985 involving a safety relief valve (SRV) and vessel integrity 
with the reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature as the state variable.  
2. Indirect dynamic dependencies  
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These dependencies are similar to the direct dynamic dependencies except that there is an 
intermediary between the demanded safety systems. The event sequence is as follow: failure of 
the first safety system causes a deviation in the state variables, which lead to the intermediate 
system to affect the operation of the second safety system. For example, this sequence of events 
occurred at the Three Mile Island-II accident, 1979; the failure of a pilot-operated relief valve 
(first demanded system) to reclose resulted in a high pressurizer level (the state variable) which 
led the operator (intermittent) to throttle the high pressure injection (HPI) system (second 
demanded system). The state of HPI is affected by the operator action, which was influenced by 
the pressurizer level. The classical approach does not have the feature to account for pressurizer 
level-operator interaction.  
3. Cyclical dynamic dependencies  
These types of dependencies involve the multiple occurrence of certain events. For example, 
multiple opening and closing of safety relief valves at Davis-Besse plant, 1985 with the RCS 
pressure as the state variable. The affected functions in these sequence of events was the demand 
for safety relief valves to open and subsequent demand to reclose due to the variation in RCS 
pressure (the state variable). Standard event tree typically models these event sequence (opening 
and reclosing) just once in the tree.  
Third, the classical approach is based on binary logic (normal or failure), and there exist no well-
defined approach to modelling system/components having multiple states or top events and may 
not yield satisfactory result [Hassan et al. (1990); NUREG/CR-6942 (2007)]. For example, 
modelling a control valve having the states; normal, fail-closed, fail-open, fail in 50% position, 
fail in 80% position, etc. Fault tree tend to model the failure modes independently, rather than 
taking into account the competing failure modes. This is especially true while computing the 
reliability of a system having several components with multiple failure modes. This phenomenon 
is well explained and demonstrated using the FT and Markov model in Chapter 3, Section 3 with 
a simple redundant system with two (2) components having three failure modes. We illustrate 
how FT approach overestimates the failure probability.  
Fourth, in the classical approach, the order in which the frontline system operates following an 
IE is normally predefined by the analyst. In the event tree method, the sequencing of failure events 
is fixed. For instance, given a demanded system that operates successfully, the sequence is 
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terminated, i.e., leading to a successful reactor state. However, event sequence can be generated 
wherein the system is demanded multiple times due to the system dynamics. Additionally, the 
order of occurrence of failure events can lead to a different undesired system state. This is 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 where the order of unit failure leads to a system overflow or drained. 
As for the fault tree technique, it is not intended to model ordering of failure event, rather it 
represents the top event in terms of combinations of basic events (minimal cut-sets) without any 
particular ordering index. In contrast, the sequencing of events is not predetermined in dynamic 
methodologies but rather is derived from the time-dependent system model solution (system 
code) as the system evolves.  
Dynamic PSA methodologies thus have features and capabilities to overcome the limitations 
encountered in classical PSA techniques. This is especially pertinent when modelling passive 
systems where epistemic uncertainties are significant due to lack of knowledge of physical 
phenomenon and operating experience, as compared to active systems which have been employed 
in most current operating NPPs and have a vast operating experience. This may be especially true 
for SMRs with either different forced or free convective systems. The IAEA defines passive 
safety systems as “a system that is composed entirely of passive components and structures or a 
system, which uses active components in a very limited way to initiate subsequent passive 
operation”. [IAEA-TECDOC-626]  
Passive safety systems (PSSs) have been employed in several (Gen-III and Gen-III+) reactor 
designs [AP1000, ESBWR, NuScale, mPower, SMART] to meet the increasing safety 
requirements, to take advantage of natural forces (e.g., gravity), less dependence on active 
systems/components (e.g., emergency diesel generators), design simplicity, increased reliability 
and economic competitiveness. However, due to their reliance on a small driving force, lack of 
data and significant uncertainties; passive safety systems reliability, model development and 
performance under normal and accident conditions still remains an open issue [Burgazzi (2009)]. 
Also, the implementation of passive systems in NPPs is challenging the state-of-the-art safety 
analyses (classical PSA/DSA) due to the additional uncertainties rendering a difficult a priori 
judgement of the conservative scenarios selected for DSA and PSA [Zio (2014)]. These elements 
necessitate for the development and demonstration of consistent methodologies and approaches 
for evaluating the reliability of passive safety systems. [Burgazzi (2007, 2009, 2011, 2017); 





There still exist no consensus on a standardized dynamic PSA technique, unlike the classical 
techniques (FT/ET), which are universally accepted all around the world. Rather, most of the 
dynamic PSA methodologies are still in the developing and validating stage [Labeau et al. 
(2000)]. Furthermore, there is no agreement on the specific application and under what scenario 
dynamic PSA methodologies might be appropriate. The motivations for this research thus include:  
1. Limitations in classical PSA techniques to account for time element, system interactions, 
dynamic dependencies, multistate modelling and state ordering;  
2. Dynamic PSA techniques provide an integrated framework by unifying the system 
stochastic model as well as its dynamic evolution; thus are anticipated to overcome the 
limitations encountered in classical PSA techniques. This is expected and envisioned 
within the PSA community to contribute significantly in providing a realistic accident 
progression scenario by capturing risk important interactions;  
3. Currently there exist no standardized or universally accepted dynamic methodology as 
well as a lack of consensus within the PSA community on the applicability and the context 
to which dynamic methodologies are required;  
4. NUREG/CR-6901 identified and ranked DFM and Markov-CCMT as the top two dynamic 
methodologies with the most positive features and least negative or uncertain features;  
5. NUREG/CR-6942 recommended thorough research to resolve the challenges for practical 
implementation of dynamics PSA methods. The report further went on to state that 
“resolving these challenges would involve a stand-alone reliability modeling of full 
benchmark system using DFM, Markov/CCMT and classical ET/FT approach”;  
6. Dynamic PSA approach has not been applied for integrated reliability assessment of 
passive safety systems (to the author’s knowledge). The author was thus motivated to 
evaluate the possibility of modelling PSSs using dynamic methods;  
7. The supervisor’s experience at NuScale Power, and a full dynamic PRA using system 
code (RELAP5) coupling experience for light water reactors (LWRs) under a benchmark 




 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the research are:  
1. Formulate the coupling of the Markov model with Cell-to-cell Mapping Technique for 
dynamic probabilistic safety assessment;  
2. Demonstrate how DFM and Markov-CCMT model can be implemented for modelling 
stochastic dynamic system evolution and interactions. This can contribute in performing 
system reliability analysis using the two dynamic methodologies as well as uncover the 
advantages and disadvantages of the techniques;  
3. Illustration of the applicability of backtracking algorithm for timed-fault trees generation 
from DFM model;  
4. Methodological comparative assessment (qualitative and quantitative) of classical and 
dynamic PSA techniques;  
5. Development of a novel approach for integrated functional reliability assessment of 
passive safety systems in integrated small modular reactors (SMRs).  
 
 Scope of the Research 
This research consists of two independent areas that will cover the applicability of DFM and 
Markov-CCMT model for dynamic probabilistic safety assessment, and development of a novel 
approach for integrated functional reliability assessment of PSSs in integrated small modular 
reactors. First, the need for dynamic PSA techniques was explored, and two dynamic PSA 
methodologies, namely, DFM and Markov-CCMT model was selected for further research and 
demonstration purpose. Second, the Markov-CCMT model was selected for reliability modelling 
and performance analysis of a passive isolation condenser system (ICS) implemented in a generic 
integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) type SMRs.  
 
 Thesis Organization 
This thesis consists of six (6) chapters, and is organized as follow:  
Chapter 1: This chapter presents the background of the research, motivations for selecting 
the research topic, objectives of the research and the structure of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: This chapter presents the literature review performed during the course of this 
research. The review includes classical PSA techniques, their limitations; thus 
the need of dynamic PSA methodologies. A more extensive review of DFM and 
Markov-CCMT model is presented.  
Chapter 3: This chapter presents the methodologies implemented in this research in a 
sequential fashion, which includes, FT/ET analysis, classical Markov model, 
DFM and coupled Markov-CCMT model.  
Chapter 4: This chapter demonstrate application of methods to a simple liquid level control 
system. First, reliability analysis of the benchmark system was performed using 
ET/FT and time-dependent Markov model. These form the classical techniques. 
Then, DFM and Markov-CCMT model are applied for dynamic reliability 
analysis of the benchmark system using DYMONDA and Fortran95 software 
and programming tools.  
Chapter 5: This chapter presents a novel approach for dynamic reliability assessment of 
PSSs. A brief description of the ICS to be used as a benchmark system for the 
project is provided. A stochastic model of the ICS and computation of transition 
state probabilities is presented.  
Chapter 6: Finally, this chapter summarizes the research contributions and also suggests 
future research tasks.  
Appendix-I: Multi-state modelling with FT and Markov model  
Appendix-II: Fortran95 code for the benchmark liquid level control system  
Appendix-III: Benchmark system control space discretization in MATLAB using CCMT  
Appendix-IV: Benchmark system state vector trajectories results from MATLAB  
Appendix-V: Fortran95 code for the passive isolation condenser system  





 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a literature review that was performed during the course of this research. 
Literature review starts with the well-known classical PSA methodologies, their application in 
the nuclear industry and available algorithms for minimal cut-set (MCS) computation. A review 
of literatures to address limitations of classical methods and currently available dynamic PSA 
methods was performed, of which, DFM and the Markov model coupled with CCMT are selected 
in this thesis for further research and finally application/demonstration. The literature review is 
provided in a sequential order from classical PSA techniques, limitations in classical techniques 
and thus, the need for dynamic PSA techniques, and finally a comprehensive review of the 
selected methodologies is provided. Literature review during the course of this research was 
focused on dynamic methods. Note that in this thesis, usage of the term dynamic PSA and 
Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) is synonymous.  
 
A. Classical Probabilistic Safety Assessment Techniques 
The classical PSA techniques discussed in this thesis mainly consist of the well-known and 
commonly used risk assessment techniques in current NPPs, i.e., the fault tree and event tree 
(FT/ET) analysis. The application of classical PSA techniques in NPPs was introduced by the 
WASH-1400 (1975) “The Rasmussen Report”, with the objective to identify possible accident 
scenarios following an initiating event, and to quantify the likelihood of a reactor core damage 
and its consequences by observing the response (success/failure) of the frontline mitigating and 
safety systems. WASH-1400 demonstrated the usefulness and practicality of classical techniques. 
The risk assessment review group report to the USNRC through NUREG/CR-0400 summarized 
that:  
“The fault-tree/event-tree methodology is sound, and both can and should be more widely used 
by NRC. Proper application of the methodology can therefore provide a tool for the NRC to 
make the licensing and regulatory process more rational, in more properly matching its 
resources to the risks provided by the proper application of the methodology”. 
A comprehensive and systematic approach to the construction, qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of fault trees is provided in “Fault tree handbook” by Vesely et al. (1981) and 
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Stamatelatos et al. (2002). The authors described FTA as an analytical technique whereby an 
undesired event or top event is pre-defined by an analyst, and system analysis is performed 
backward to uncover the root cause of the top event. The methodology basically consists of three 
steps: (1) construction of the tree; (2) qualitative analysis of the tree; and (3) quantification of 
minimal cut-sets. A detail guideline to performing a PSA for NPPs via classical techniques is 
provided in NUREG/CR-2300 (1983). Fault tree construction (Fussell, 1973) can be done 
automatically, for instance, Salem et al. (1976, 1977) developed a new methodology based on 
decision tables and implemented in the code Computer Automated Tree (CAT) for automatic 
construction of FTs. The analysis of a FT is performed using Boolean algebra, and the top event 
is entirely described by an equivalent set of Boolean equation. There exist several algorithms for 
computing and quantifying the MCS for a top event, such as the method of obtaining cut sets 
(MOCUS) and minimal cut-sets upward (MICSUP) [Rasmussen (1978); Kumamoto et al. (2000); 
Ruijters et al. (2015)]. Furthermore, there are several advanced computer codes for automated 
construction of FT/ETs, and subsequent generation of MCS/accident sequence including, CAFTA 
and FaulTree+ code.  
 
B. Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment Techniques  
While classical PSA techniques are accepted as standard safety analysis technique in the PSA 
community, numerous concerns have been raised in the recent years regarding its capability to 
adequately account for the time element, multistate modelling, state ordering and stochastic 
system interaction that shapes the dynamic probabilistic evolution of an accident sequence [Sui 
et al. (1989, 1994); Marzio et al. (1998); Aldemir et al. (2007, 2013); Zio (2014); Devooght and 
Smidts (1992(a)); Acosta et al. (1991, 1993); Marseguerra et al. (1996)]. The behavior of the 
plant state variables resulting in a coupling of failure events, with the failure events being 
probabilistically dependent, in contrast to the logical dependencies caused by direct systems 
interaction have been debated within the PSA community for several decades [Aldemir et al. 
(1987); Sui et al. (1989); Devooght and Smidts (1992(a)); Belhadj et al. (1992); Labeau et al. 
(2000)].  
Sui (1989) characterized these dependencies into three classes by reviewing the licensee events 
reports (1969-1979 and 1985) for incidents that occurred at the US operating commercial light 
water reactors, namely: (1) Direct physical dependencies; (2) Indirect physical dependencies; and 
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(3) Cyclical physical dependencies. Sui underlined the importance of dynamic dependencies and 
how it played an important role in the Three Mile Island (TMI-2) accident. Classical PSA 
techniques lack the ability to capture these dependencies, and hence may fail to identify risk-
significant scenarios. Four (4) potential dynamic methodologies and their attributes were 
discussed for incorporating dynamic behavior of the plant into the accident sequence analysis, 
which includes, Expanded Event Tree, Logic Flowgraph Method, Markov model and Dynamic 
Logical Analytical Methodology (DYLAM) (Sui et al. (1989)). Sui (1994) further attempted to 
address the limitations of classical techniques in accident sequence modelling and suggested 
possible dynamic methodologies for explicit treatment of time dependency.  
The need for dynamic PSA for accident sequence modelling to account for evolution of the state 
variable, operator state of mind and scenario history was further reinforced by Acosta et al. 
(1991). The author showed how an overly conservative or optimistic assumptions of failure events 
could result in an inaccurate risk estimate. The coupling among the mentioned factors was 
demonstrated by applying the Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method to a SG tube rupture accident 
and concluded that the dynamic method can uncover risk-significant scenarios and better define 
dependencies between failure events as compared to the classical methods, Acosta et al. (1993). 
Marzio et al. (1998) discussed the specific field of application of the dynamic PSA methods, and 
the viability of the Monte Carlo technique as a tool to model the stochastic part of the analysis to 
reduce computation time. The importance of dynamic methods in PSA modelling of the passive 
safety system was underscored and demonstrated with two simple examples (Aldemir (2013)).  
On the other hand, Devooght and Smidts (1992(a)) took an analytical approach and formalized 
the concept of probabilistic reactor dynamics by providing a rigorous mathematical framework 
of continuous event tree in which the deterministic aspect of the reactor state variable trajectories 
in state-space is supplemented by the stochastic nature of the reactor configuration (e.g., random 
component failure, human error, etc.). The system dynamics is described by a set of partial 
differential equations from the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation assuming a Markovian system. 
Smidts and Devooght (1992) demonstrated the methodology by applying it to a realistic accident 
transient in a fast reactor primary coolant system. The capability of the method to model complex 
interaction between operators and the reactor during a transient is present in [Devooght and Smidts 
(1992(b)); Smidts (1992)]. However, the applicability of the method to realistic systems is limited 
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due to its computational demand and continuous time-dependent plant data requirements. A 
review of the achievements of the theory of probabilistic dynamics and its adjoint formulation to 
determine the outcome of a transient is presented in Devooght and Smidts (1996).  
A comprehensive review of the state of dynamic PSA methodologies for reliability analysis of 
digital systems in NPPs is reported in NUREG/CR- 6901 (2006). DFM and dynamic event tree or 
Markov model approach was ranked as the top two methodologies with the most positive features 
and least negative or uncertain features, meeting most of the requirements, and with each 
methodology having some advantages as well as limitations. For a proof of concept, a benchmark 
digital feedwater control system is analyzed using DFM and Markov-CCMT in the reports 
NUREG/CR-6942 (2006) and NUREG/CR-6985 (2009) as a follow-up of NUREG/CR-6901 
(2006). A detail review of currently available dynamic PSA techniques, and a modular approach 
to the development of high-level and user-friendly tools to implement dynamic methods in 
industries is proposed by Labeau et al. (2000). The literature underlined some important issues, 
which includes, a significant amount of research is required for the development of the 
computational algorithm and the determination of an optimal computational engine. Zio (2014) 
laid out the concept, challenges and research directions for industrial application of IDPSA. The 
author also noted that, IDPSA should be consider as a complement to the existing DSA and PSA 
and not as an alternative. Zio (2014) and Aldemir (2013) showed how IDPSA can explore a more 
complete scenario space and coverage of undesired events by integrating a system dynamic and 
stochastic aspect, and consistent treatment of uncertainties (aleatory and epistemic) in the 
analysis. Table 1 groups and summarizes dynamic PSA techniques into three (3) categories, 
namely, (1) Extension of classical methodologies; (2) Explicit state-transition methods; and (3) 









Table 1: A summary of dynamic PSA techniques 
Parameters 
Dynamic PSA Approaches 
Extension of classical 







All dynamic techniques require: (1) Time-dependent system model; (2) System 
configurations under normal/abnormal operating scenario; and (3) Transition 
probabilities among these system states  
Methodologies  Dynamic Flowgraph 
Method; Digraph-based 
fault tree; Expanded 
Event Tree; GO-FLOW  
Explicit Markov chain 
models; Markov-CCMT 
model; Event Sequence 
Diagrams  
Continuous Event Trees; 
Dynamic Event Trees; 
Discrete event (Monte 
Carlo) simulation  
Technique An extension of classical 
approach incorporating 
system dynamics  
Discretized version of 
Continuous Event Trees  




Limited capability  Explicitly account for 
system dynamics and 
control laws  
Explicitly account for 
system dynamics and 
control laws  
State ordering  Sequential top event 
ordering in tree structure  
A priori explicitly 
ordered system states  
Evolving sequence from 
probabilistic system 
dynamics  
Scenario history  Explicit representation 
of scenario history in the 
tree structure  
Markovian approach- 
memoryless  
Capability for treatment 





Reduction technique for 
component combinatory 
explosion  
State merging technique 
employed to counter 
state space explosion  
Truncation rule by 
probability or event 
type; intelligent 
sampling scheme to 
reduce run time  
Treatment of 
time element  
Limited treatment of 
time dependencies  
Explicit treatment of 
time element  
Explicit treatment of 





Limited  Limited  Enables treatment of 




platform exist, e.g., 
Dymonda, GO-GLOW.  
None. Requires code 
coupling  




Limited capability to 
model state variables 
and operator behavior  
Limited capability to 
model operator states  
Explicitly deals with 
operator states and 
dynamic man-machine 
interface systems  
Post-processing  Output similar to that of 
classical techniques  
Requires considerable 
post processing  
Requires considerable 
post processing  
Advantages  Phase mission scenario 
implementation  




Drawbacks No direct treatment and 
computation of common 
cause failure and 
importance measure  
Requires explicit 
evaluation of transition 
probability matrix; 
Difficult to envision the 
set of all possible system 
states prior to scenario 
development  
Requires significant 
computational time and 
resources to run realistic 
models; Requires 
algorithm development 
specific to system under 
analysis (e.g., situation 
specific rules for 
operator state transition)  
 
Note: All dynamic PSA methods encounter the phenomenon of state space explosion, however 
manifested in different ways for different approaches  
 
B.1. The Dynamic Flowgraph Method  
The DFM is a multi-valued logic (MVL) diagraph-based method that express the logical and 
dynamic behavior of a system in terms of causal relationships among system parameters, and a 
series of discrete state transitions [Garrett et al. (1995); Yau et al. (1995, 1998); Guarro et al. 
(1996)]. DFM is a three-step approach: model development, model analysis (qualitative) and 
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finally the quantitative analysis which includes uncertainty, sensitivity analysis, etc. All the above 
three steps can be performed in a single platform using the code DYMONDA (ASCA Inc., 2013). 
Once the model is developed, analysis or generation of prime implicants (PIs) can be performed 
via an inductive or a deductive algorithm. Modelling of a system involves the construction of 
decision tables, which is an extension of the well-established truth table. Application of decision 
tables to FT construction was introduced by Salem et al. (1979), and the application of MVL 
decision table for risk analysis was comprehensively discussed in Ogunbiyi (1981b). MVL rules 
implemented for analysis of critical transition table to obtain the complete base is discussed in the 
literatures Ogunbiyi et al. (1981(a), 1981(b)) and Yau (1997). The generation of PIs complete 
base can be performed using several methodologies, which includes [Garribba et al. (1985)]: (1) 
Tabular method; (2) Nelson method; and (3) Method of Generalized Consensus. Since the 
DYMONDA code is based on the Generalized Consensus method, the same methodology is used 
for the current thesis. Identification of failure events using PIs and the need for generation of 
complete base of PIs are presented in Yau (1997).  
A comprehensive and integrated framework for modelling and analysis of system reliability and 
safety assurance is captured in the literature [Garrett et al. (1995, 2002); Yau et al. (1995, 1997); 
Guarro et al. (1996)]. The integrated DFM approach was first applied for reliability assessment 
and verification purpose of a software-driven embedded system by Garrett et al. (1995). Early 
on, the methodology was mainly aimed at identifying an optimal testing strategy based on system 
behavior analysis, Garrett et al. (1995). A further demonstration of the methodology was 
performed using the Titan II space launch vehicle digital flight control system with the objective 
to complement classical PSA techniques, Yau et al. (1993). The authors showed how time-
dependent behavior and switching logic can be captured, and how certain postulated events 
(desired/undesired) that can occur in a system may be identified by the DFM model. Yau et al. 
(1998) then applied the methodology to a realistic PWR steam generator level control system, in 
which the author used a fault injection technique to check as to whether the failure event can be 
detected. The USNRC developed a full-scale DFM software tool to model, analyze, and test 
software design to provide a high level of safety assurance for software-based control systems, 
the details of which can be found in NUREG/CR-6465. This NRC report presented distinct 
features of the methodology and demonstrated by applying it to a generic process system as well 
as to a full scale SG level control system implemented in current NPPs. NUREG/CR-6942 report 
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(as a follow-up of NUREG/CR-6901) further applied the methodology to model a digital 
feedwater control system and to check the extent to which the methodology meets the 
requirements set-out in NUREG/CR-6901. The report also provided a framework on how PIs from 
DFM can be integrated into an existing PSA model. Finally, generation of timed-FTs from a DFM 
model is discussed in works by, [Guarro et al. (1996); Yau (1997); Zeliang et al. (2017)].  
Table 2: Summary of review of DFM for dynamic PSA 
Authors  Contributions Limitations 
Salem et al., 1979 Computerized automatic 
construction of fault tree using 
decision table  
Lacks the treatment of multistate 
variables; requires analyst 
judgement and significant 
amount of time for construction 
of component decision tables  
Ogunbiyi et al. 
[1981(a); 1981(b)] 
Extended the binary Boolean 
algebra to encompass multistate 
variables, and simplify consensus 
algorithm for non-coherent 
systems  
Only a theoretical framework; 
Applicability and efficiency of 
the approach to treat realistic 
systems remains an open issue  
Garribba et al., 1985 Provided a theoretical framework 
for treatment of critical transition 
table using Tabular method, 
Nelson algorithm and generalized 
consensus theory  
Lacks the discussion as to which 
systems these theories are 
suitable and applicable.  
Yau et al. 1993, 
1995 
Demonstrated the capabilities of 
DFM by applying it to a realistic 
Titan II space launch vehicle 
digital flight control system  
Focused mostly on the 
construction of decision tables 
for software subroutines using 
Newton-Raphson method  
Garrett et al. (1995, 
2002)  
Provided an integrated modelling 
framework for reliability 
assessment and verification of 
embedded control systems  
Focused only on risk assessment 
of software driven systems and 
its testing strategy  
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Guarro et al. (1996); 
Yau (1997); 
NUREG/CR-6942  
Provided a theoretical and 
systematic framework for 
generation of timed-fault tree 
from DFM model  
Limited discussion on specific 
application of dynamic and 
physical consistency rule, and 
treatment of logic loops  
Yau et al. (1997, 
1998)  
Applied the methodology to a 
realistic PWR software driven 
SG level control system  
Requires further inductive 
analysis to locate fault condition, 
i.e., backtracking must be 
employed even after obtaining 
the complete base 
USNRC- 
NUREG/CR-6465 
Developed a full-scale DFM tool 
for safety analysis of control 
software in advanced reactors  
Focused mainly on assurance and 
design verification of software 
driven closed loop systems, 




Dynamic reliability modelling of 
benchmark digital feedwater 
control system  
Only a proof of concept; 
acceptability of failure data; 
requires further research to 
validate the practicality of DFM  
Zeliang et al. (2017) Generated timed-fault tree from 
DFM model of a PWR SG level 
control system  
The approach requires significant 
amount of time for systematic 
post processing of critical 
decision tables; particularly 
inefficient in the treatment of 
logic loops, where an event can 
be backtracked to itself, and 
consistency rules must be 
checked in every steps.  
 
B.2. Coupled Markov/Cell-to-cell Mapping Technique  
Markov Chain: In 1907, A. A. Markov developed the Markov chain or the discrete Markov 
process that consisted of a simple chain with infinite sequence of random variables connected in 
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such a way that 𝑥𝑖+1 for any 𝑖 is independent of the past evolution if 𝑥𝑖 is known (Basharin et al. 
(2004)). The Markov chain is a well-established method and can be found in many standard 
references [Pukite (1998); Privault et al. (2013); Taylor et al. (2013), chapter-8, 9 and 10; 
Sheskin (2016)]. The modelling of dependencies and common cause failures between failures of 
component in redundant systems using a continuous time, four (4) state Markov chain was 
discussed and illustrated by Platz (1984). Practical application of the methodology to real systems 
was unrealized due to a very large transition matrix, or the phenomenon called state space 
explosion. Papazoglou (1977) laid down two novel approaches to deduce large transition 
probability matrices by systematic state ordering and merging of processes for system exhibiting 
symmetries respectively. Several algorithms were developed for systematic generation and 
treatment of structural properties of system transition matrix in a computer aided environment 
[Amoia et al. (1981); Cafaro et al. (1986); Lesanovsky (1988)].  
Cell-to-cell Mapping Technique: The theory of cell-to-cell mapping was first formulated by Hsu 
(1980a, 1980b) to describe global behavior of non-linear dynamic systems, in which, a state 
variable evolution is treated as the probability of transition among a collection of computational 
cells in the state-space. The theory was based on the idea of describing a dynamic system 
governed by ordinary differential equations (ODEs) with a finite number of computational cells. 
Hsu (1981) generalized the theory of cell-to-cell mapping to treat complex non-linear global 
behavior pattern by enabling a cell to have multiple transition probabilities or image cells. The 
generalize cell mapping was deduced to the well-known Markov chain in which, the dynamical 
properties of the system under analysis is entirely constituted in the transition probability matrix. 
The application and improvements of cell mapping technique for determination of global long-
term behavior of non-linear dynamic systems using several approaches such as, cell refinement 
and lumping can be found in [Mo-Hong (1993); Spek (1994); Chen (2004)].  
Coupling Markov model with CCMT: Markov-CCMT model describes a system dynamics as 
probabilistic evolution of state variables in discrete space-time conditioned on system 
configuration, Aldemir (1987). The multi-state system components and configuration is modelled 
by a Markov chain, and CCMT describes the system dynamics in terms of probability of transition 
among a finite set of computational cells in discretized state space and time [Hassan et al. (1990); 
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Belhadj et al. (1992); NUREG/CR-6942 (2007)]. A comprehensive theoretical basis of the 
methodology can be found in [Aldemir (1987); Dinca (1997)].  
The concept of coupling Markov model with CCMT was first formulated by Aldemir (1987) to 
describe the probabilistic evolution of system behavior in discrete space-time. The process of 
coupling with sets of ODEs and its simulation by a Markov chain was demonstrated by applying 
it to a hypothetical process control system failure. Aldemir (1989) further illustrated the 
limitations of static methods in failure modelling of process control systems and how the overall 
failure probability may be overestimated. Hassan et al. (1990) applied the methodology to a 
realistic closed loop control system i.e., the high-pressure injection system and SRVs in BWRs 
and observed the probabilistic behavior of the systems following a small loss of coolant accident 
(SB-LOCA). The authors demonstrated that cell-to-cell transition probabilities can be computed, 
provided a data base of system behavior under normal and abnormal operation. Belhadj et al. 
(1992) further demonstrated capabilities of the methodology in modelling time-dependent 
behavior by applying it to a feed-bleed cooling scenario in BWRs through intermittent operation 
of high pressure core spray system and SRVs following a SBLOCA. In an effort to reduce the 
computational time and computer storage requirements, Belhadj et al. (1995) developed two 
algorithms based on the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation. Accounting for uncertainties in system 
parameters and initial conditions was demonstrated by Aldemir et al. (1996). Tombuyses et al. 
(1997) performed a parametric study on computational efficiency of continuous CCMT and 
concluded that a fourth order Runge-Kutta and mid-point implicit scheme seems to be suitable 
for short and steady state system behavior simulation.  
A benchmark system analysis i.e., a typical SG feedwater control system in PWR to be used as a 
basis of the methodology was proposed in NUREG/CR-6942 (2007) and Kirschenbaum et al. 
(2009). Gomes et al. (2013) demonstrated the superiority of the methodology in capturing 
interactions and identifying possible failure events in digital systems by implementing it to a 
typical PWR digital SG level control system. Yang et al. (2016) developed an algorithm for 
deductive implementation of the model, and concluded that, the approach in principle is similar 




Table 3: Summary of review of Markov-CCMT model for dynamic PSA 
Authors  Contributions Limitations 
Aldemir (1987, 
1989) 
Coupled classical Markov model 
with CCMT for dynamic 
reliability assessment and failure 
modelling of process control 
system  
Computationally intensive and 
impractical with increasing 
failure modes and state variables; 
only for binary failure modes  
Aldemir et al (1996)  Theoretical framework for 
treatment of uncertainties in 
system parameters and initial 
conditions  
Considerable resource 
requirements, and a very fine 
partitioning of state space 
required for uncertainty analysis  
Hassan et al. (1990)  Observed that failure 
characteristic maybe dependent 
on the order of failure and exact 
timing of failure event  
The approach is useful only if 
there is an existing data base of 
state variable evolution  
Belhadj et al. (1992) Demonstrated that the predicted 
failure probability may 
significantly change depending 
on whether dynamic interactions 
is accounted for or not.  
Classical approach (FT) is used 
for state merging purpose, 
therefore not completely dynamic 
in nature  
Tombuyses et al. 
(1997)  
Computational efficiency of 
CCCMT maybe increased using 
4th order Runge-Kutta and mid-
point implicit scheme for short 
and long term system behavior 
respectively  
Predicted results are not validated 
or compared with CCMT space-
time discretization schemes; 
approach not suitable for 
increased step size as noted by 
the authors.  
Kirschenbaum et al. 
(2009)  
Applied the methodology to a 
realistic feedwater control system 
for operating PWR 
Quantification of top event 
probability was not performed  
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Gomes et al. (2013)  Applied the methodology to a 
realistic SG level control system 
in a typical PWR  
The study only focused on the 
main and backup computers, and 
not on mechanical components 
(e.g., control valves and pumps)  
Yang et al. (2016)  Proposed a theoretical framework 
for deductive implementation of 
the methodology  
The approach is applicable only 
when the transition probability 





 CHAPTER 3: PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
In this thesis, several PSA methodologies was studied, and are categorized into two parts- 
Classical PSA and Dynamic PSA methodologies. The classical methods consist of the well-
established static ET/FT analysis, whereas dynamic methods consist of DFM and Markov-CCMT 
model. More discussion is provided on dynamic PSA methodologies, and a detail theoretical basis 
of Markov-CCMT model was emphasized due to its nature of tight coupling between stochastic 
and dynamic model. Several examples are performed to get an intuitive understanding of the 
methodologies as well as to make a direct comparison among the methodologies. Sub-section 3.1 
and 3.2 discusses the FT/ET technique respectively; Sub-section 3.3 presents the DFM technique; 
Sub-section 3.4 discusses the classical Markov chain; Sub-section 3.5 provide a theoretical basis 
for CCMT, and Sub-section 3.6 provide a detail discussion of Markov-CCMT model.  
 
 Fault Tree Analysis  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a well-established logic method, and one of the most prominent 
probabilistic technique used in probabilistic safety assessment and reliability assessment of 
engineered systems in NPPs. FT is a logical, systematic and comprehensive approach for system 
safety analysis that is capable of uncovering design and operational weakness [Stamatelatos et 
al. (2002)]. The methodology starts by defining an undesired system state (top event) and is traced 
back to the basic events to determine the possible causes of the predefined top event. A basic 
event (BE) which normally is a failure event can be a failure of system components, human error, 
software error, or any other events which can lead to the top event. A FT thus depicts the logical 
interrelationships of BEs that lead to the top event of the FT, i.e., it models the propagation of 
failures through a system, and how these failure interactions can lead to a total system-failure 
mode. Thus, for a given FT, the top event is characterized by a set of BEs, in that, if all BE occurs, 
the top event is expected to occur. These set of basic events is called the “cut-set”. A cut-set can 
be further deduced to a “minimal cut-set (MCS)”, such that if any BE is removed from the set, the 
remaining BEs collectively are no longer a cut-set. There exist several approach for determination 
of MCS based on Boolean algebra, and the process of deduction is called the qualitative analysis. 
Thus, the objective of the methodology, or an extensive effort is put in to determine the MCSs 
and its corresponding probabilities that ultimately dictates the occurrence probability of a top 
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event. Propagation of MCSs given the BE failure probabilities through the tree for computation 
of top event probability is called quantitative analysis. It should be noted that the fundamental 
concept of the methodology is based on binary logic, i.e., a component can either be in normal or 
failed state only. Hence, the top event can only take two states since it is a function of BEs.  
For illustration and comprehension purpose, a generic FT taken from Vesely et al. (1981) and 
constructed in CAFTA [EPRI, 2013] is shown in Figure 2. The system consists of a pressure 
tank, pump and associated control system that regulates the tank pressure by controlling the pump. 
When the pressure setpoint is reached in the tank, the control system opens the pressure switch 
and thus removing power to the pump, causing the pump to stop operation. A failure of the 
pressure switch or relay contacts activates an alarm that enables the operator to manually switch-
off the pump. Of course, a combination of these failures will guarantee a system failure (tank over 
pressurized) as shown in the FT.  
 
Figure 2: Example fault tree (pressure tank) 
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The FT shown in Figure 2 is compose of the top event, intermediate events (1 to 4), logic gates 
(G1 to G4 including the TOP gate) and basic/primary events (BE1 to BE6). Firstly, the BEs are 
those that requires no further development and are represented by a circle in the fault tree which 
signifies the limit of resolution. Secondly, the logic gates establish a relationship among the basic 
events that is required for the occurrence of a higher event. The higher event being the output of 
the gate, and the lower events being the inputs of the gate. The gate symbol denotes the type of 
relationship of the input events required for the output event.  
 
3.1.1. Qualitative Evaluation of Fault Trees  
The qualitative evaluations transform the FT logic into logically equivalent forms that provide 
more focused information [Stamatelatos et al. (2002)]. There exist several methods for qualitative 
analysis of standard fault trees with the same objective of determining the MCS that establish a 
direct relationship between BEs and a predefined top event [Vesely et al. (1981)]. Qualitative 
analysis can be performed using inductive (Bottom-Up) as well as deductive approach (Top-
Down) once the tree is translated to its equivalent Boolean equations. Before going ahead with 
detail discussion of available algorithm for qualitative and quantitative analysis, it is necessary to 
depict some logic rules and Boolean algebra utilized in the algorithms (See Table 4).  
Table 4: Boolean algebra binary reduction rules 
Mathematical symbolism Laws 
∨ Logic OR gate  
∧ Logic AND gate 
𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 = 𝐵 ∨ 𝐴 Commutative Law 
𝐴 ∨ 𝐴 = 𝐴 Idempotent Law 
𝐴 ∧ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐶) = (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) Distributive Law 
𝐴 ∧ (𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) = (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∧ 𝐶 Associative Law 
𝐴 ∧ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵) = 𝐴 Law of Absorption 
(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵)′ = 𝐴′ ∨ 𝐵′ De Morgan’s theorem 
 
The MCSs for a top event can be obtained using the well-known and the most common ‘Top-
Down’ approach. The approach can be implemented with the method of obtaining cut-sets 
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(MOCUS) algorithm [Vesely et al. (1981); Kumamoto et al. (2000)]. It is based on the observation 
that logic OR gates increase the number of cut-sets, whereas logic AND gates enlarge the size of 
the cut-sets. MOCUS algorithm is demonstrated using the example FT.  
Step-1: Naming logic gates 
The logic gates are named as shown in the FT which includes, TOP, G1, G2, G3 and G4 gate.  
Step 2: Numbering basic events 
All basic events in the FT is named which includes; BE1, BE2, BE3, BE4, BE5 and BE6.  
Step 3: Expansion of TOP  
The uppermost logic gate “TOP” is identified, which forms the first element of the matrix. This 




Here, only G1 can be further expanded since BE1 is already a basic event.  
Step 4: Expansion of G1 
It may be noticed that G1 is a logic ‘AND’ gate, and thus G1 is replaced by a horizontal array of 
input (G2 and G3) to the gate:  
BE1 
G2, G3 
Step 5: Expansion of G2  
Notice that G2 is and OR gate and thus it is replaced by a vertical array of the input (BE2 and 




Here, BE2 and BE3 are basic events and cannot be further expanded. Only G3 can be expanded.  
Step 5: Expansion of G3  
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The gate G3 is a logic OR gate, and thus it is replaced by a vertical array of the input (BE4 and 






Step 5: Expansion of G4  
The gate G4 is a logic OR gate, and thus it is replaced by a vertical array of the input (BE5 and 








The above seven (7) rows in Step-5 represents seven (7) cut-sets for the FT. Notice that there are 
no supersets (i.e., cut-sets that contains other complete cut-sets) in the cut-sets, and hence the 7 
cut-sets are the minimal cut-sets of the tree.  
{BE1}, {BE2, BE4}, {BE2, BE5}, {BE2, BE6}, {BE3, BE4}, {BE3, BE5}, and {BE3, BE6} 
 
3.1.2. Quantitative Evaluation of Fault Trees 
The quantification of FT top event (system unavailability/unreliability) can be performed given 
the probability of occurrence of the individual BEs. MCS generated from qualitative analysis is 
used for the quantification of top events. There are several methods for computation of the top 
event such as the structure function method, rare event approximation method and the MCS upper 
bound method, Beeson (2002). For illustration purpose assume the following failure probability 
of BEs: BE1= 5 × 10−6, BE2= 3 × 10−5, BE3= 1 × 10−4, BE4= 1 × 10−4, BE5= 1 × 10−6, 
and BE6= 5 × 10−6. Generally, approximation methods are used for the computation of top 
event probability because the probabilities are relatively small, and computation of the exact 
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probability becomes complex due to the dependencies between cut-sets. In this thesis, the MCS 
upper bound method is used due to its simplicity and availability of software (CAFTA) that uses 
the methodology for top event probability computation. A system failure occurs if at least one of 
the MCS exist, and hence:  
𝑃𝑟⁡(System⁡failure) = 𝑃𝑟⁡(Atleast⁡once⁡MCS⁡exists) 
Thus;  




     (3-1) 
Where, 𝑃(𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑖) = The probability of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ cut-set; and 𝑛 = Total number of cut-sets  
Computation of the top event for the example FT using the above approximation method gives:  
𝑃𝑟⁡(𝑇𝑂𝑃) = 5.013 × 10−6 
Furthermore, the relative importance of any MCSs can be obtained by taking the ratio of the MCS 
probability to the total system probability. For example, taking the first MCS (a first order) of the 
example system, the relative importance is determined to be 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑠1 = 99.73⁡%, which implies 
the BE1 is the most critical component in the system.  
 
 Event Tree Analysis  
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a well-established technique [WASH-1400 (1975); NUREG-1150] 
that model an integrated overall plant response to an abnormal event. An event tree (ET) depicts 
possible sequence of events logically and graphically following an initiating event (abnormal 
condition that challenges the normal plant operation). The progression of an accident scenario 
from an initiating event to some final plant state is systematically analyzed taking into account 
the safety systems available and operator actions (success or failure) to counter or mitigate the 
progression of an accident. ETA is an inductive technique that starts with an abnormal event and 
progresses through the tree not only to determine the resulting consequences but also to enumerate 
all possible accident scenarios. It should be noted here that ET technique is based on binary logic. 
The accident sequence is characterized by the top events that generally represents the frontline 
systems that is needed to respond to an initiating event. The process of obtaining these sequences 
is called the qualitative analysis. Top events in an ET is typically modeled using FT technique. 
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Within the current PRA framework, FTA and ETA are generally linked to determine the overall 
plant core damage frequency, i.e., a FT model the individual systems and an ET model the overall 
plant states [NUREG-1150; Kumamoto et al. (2000)]. Upon obtaining the top event probabilities 
from FTs, accident sequences in the ET can be quantified.  
For illustration purpose, consider a simple ET shown in Figure 3. The overall system consists of 
three (3) safety systems (SS) that can either be functional or can be in a failed state. For instance, 
these safety systems can be emergency core cooling system, electrical power, containment 
system, etc. Given an initiating event (IE) with a probability 𝑃𝐼𝐸, the progression of the accident 
scenario in the ET results in a total of 8 accident sequences. The sequences can be divided into 
two general factors- the occurrence of IE and failure of frontline systems. Frontline systems in 
this example are SS-1, 2 and 3, which can individually be modelled via FTs and linked to the ET. 
Figure 2 FT which is considered as SS-1 is linked to the ET (Figure 3) for illustration purpose.  
 
Figure 3: Example event tree 
Assuming that the safety systems failure is independent from each other, accident sequences from 
ET can simply be obtained by multiplying the probabilities of passing along each branch point on 
any path through the tree by IE frequency. The accident sequences are shown in Table 5. For 
instance, 𝑃𝐼𝐸 , 𝑃𝑆𝑆1, 𝑃𝑆𝑆2⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑃𝑆𝑆3 implies the probability of IE frequency, success probability of 
safety system 1, 2 and 3 respectively, whereas ?̅?𝑆𝑆1 implies SS-1 failure probability.  
𝑃𝐼𝐸  

























Table 5: Accident sequence from the event tree 
Accident Sequence Probability 
Sequence-1 𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑆1𝑃𝑆𝑆2𝑃𝑆𝑆3 0.998 
Sequence-2 𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑆1𝑃𝑆𝑆2(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆3) 1.25E-07 
Sequence-3 𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑆1(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆2)𝑃𝑆𝑆3 5.34E-07 
Sequence-4 𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑆1(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆2)(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆3) 4.48E-11 
Sequence-5 𝑃𝐼𝐸(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆1)𝑃𝑆𝑆2𝑃𝑆𝑆3 7.52E-09 
Sequence-6 𝑃𝐼𝐸(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆1)𝑃𝑆𝑆2(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆3) 6.24E-13 
Sequence-7 𝑃𝐼𝐸(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆1)(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆2)𝑃𝑆𝑆3 2.71E-12 
Sequence-8 𝑃𝐼𝐸(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆1)(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆2)(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆3) 2.25E-16 
If SS-1 failure probability (?̅?𝑆𝑆1) is given by the top event of the FT in Figure 2, and assuming 
that 𝑃𝐼𝐸 = 1.5 × 10
−3, ?̅?𝑆𝑆2 = 3.6 × 10
−4, and ?̅?𝑆𝑆3 = 8.3 × 10
−5 respectively. ?̅?𝑆𝑆2 and ?̅?𝑆𝑆3 
failure probability can be from another coupled FT similar to the 𝑃𝑆𝑆1 that was obtained from the 
FT of SS-1. Frequency of each of the accident sequence can be computed with ease once the 
failure probability of each of the frontline system (top event) is obtained. For example, the 
accident sequence-1 frequency can be computed as:  
Sequence-1 = 𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑆1𝑃𝑆𝑆2𝑃𝑆𝑆3 = 0.998  
Similarly, the frequency of the rest of the sequences can be computed as shown in Table 5. Once 
the individual sequences probability is calculated, the total system failure frequency can be 
computed by summing all the accident sequences (AS) that lead to a system failure.  




      (3-2) 
Where; 𝑛 = total number of accident sequences leading to a system failure.  
The overall failure frequency of the system can be computed from the ET in Figure 3, and is 
determined to be 6.72𝐸 − 07. Furthermore, assuming that a failure of SS-1 results in an overall 
system failure, ET can be reduced from 8 to 5 accident sequences. The 5th accident sequence 




 Dynamic Flowgraph Method  
The DFM approach is based on representing the system of interest in a digraph (directed graph) 
model, which is enriched with explicit identification of the cause-effect and time dependencies 
among significant states of the system parameters that describe the system behavior [Garrett et 
al. (1995); Guarro et al. (1996)]. DFM provides an integrated analytical framework for 
systematically capturing the logical and dynamic behavior of a system respectively. The system 
logical nature is expressed in terms of causal relationships between physical variables, whereas 
dynamic behaviors are represented as a series of discrete state transitions. A system model can be 
developed in DYMONDA platform with key system parameters that represents discrete-state 
discrete-time system evolution. Once the DFM model is developed, the analysis can be performed 
in an inductive or deductive manner. An inductive algorithm can be performed with a set of initial 
and boundary conditions such as component states, time steps, direction rules, rate rules, etc., and 
trace the model in the forward direction to obtain a sequence of events that follows from the initial 
conditions. Whereas in the deductive algorithm, the user defines the desired specific system states 
and time sequence, and the model is traced backward in time to identify the logical combination 
of events leading to the defined top event.  
The results obtained from an inductive or deductive algorithm are in the form of prime implicants 
(PIs) that are analogous to the conventional FT MCS, with the exception that the PIs are time-
stamped. The probability of a PI occurrence can be calculated given the probability of each state 
of a component/system parameter (user defined). Then, the quantification of the PIs can be 
performed to obtain the exact top event probability, or the probability of system being in a specific 
state sought by the analyst. Once a DFM model is built, it can be used repeatedly to produce MVL 
and time-dependent PIs for a large number of possible top events that may be postulated for the 
system. In this thesis, the methodology is implemented using the software DYMONDA 
developed by ASCA Inc. A detail theoretical description, modelling process and analysis is 
discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
3.3.1. Theoretical Basis 
The DFM can be thought of as a series of snapshots of the classical FT technique, and hence the 
methodologies share several similarities despite their differences. Similar to the FTA, the 
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objective of DFM is to generate the PIs (MVL analogous of MCS encountered in binary FT) of a 
desired top event. Some definitions are vital for the purpose of theoretical discussion.  
 
Conjunction: The logical ‘OR’ operator (+,∪, or ∨) 
Disjunction: The logical ‘AND’ operator (. ,∩, or ∧) 
Literals: A primary event taking one of its state, e.g., event 𝐴1 (event A taking state 
1 from 𝑛 number of possible states)  
Monomial: A conjunction of literals, e.g., 𝑋 = 𝐴1𝐵2𝐶3 (a monomial 𝑋 is a 
conjunction of event A, B and C in state 1, 2 and 3 respectively)  
Top event: A disjunction of monomials 
Implicant: A monomial 𝑋 of disjunctive form of a top event, such that 𝑇𝑂𝑃 ∩ 𝑋 =
𝑋 (MVL analogous to cut-set)  
Prime Implicant: X is an implicant of a top event, and any other monomial Y subsumed by 
X is not an implicant of the top event (MVL analogous to MCS) 
Base of top event: Any disjunction of prime implicants which is equivalent to the top 
function 
Irredundant Base: A base which ceases to be a base if one of its prime implicants is removed 
Complete Base: The disjunction of all prime implicants 
 
Prime Implicants:  
The prime implicants in DFM can be computed from a deductive as well as inductive analysis. In 
this thesis, the deductive algorithm is emphasized due to its similarity with deductive FTA, which 
makes it easier for comparison purpose. A deductive analysis starts with a defined top event and 
track causality in reverse to uncover the root conditions that can cause the top event. As discussed 
earlier, in the classical FTA, once a tree is developed, Boolean algebra can be applied to reduce 
the tree to a unique disjunctive normal form in terms of its MCS. The MCSs are computed as a 
conjunction of primary events [NUREG-6942]:  





      (3-3) 
Where, 𝑀𝐶𝑆𝑗 = Indicator variable for the 𝑗





= Indicator variable for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ primary event in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ minimal cut-set  
𝑛 = Number of primary events in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ minimal cut-set  
The indicator variable for the top event (condition of interest- fail/success) can then be expressed 
in disjunctive form as:  




      (3-4) 
where, 𝑚 = Total number of PIs.  
The set of 𝑛 PIs obtained from a deductive analysis for a top event of interest, shown in Equation 
(3-5), is first converted into a set of 𝑚 mutually exclusive implicants (MEIs) shown in Equation 
(3-6). These MEIs can be thought of as the MVL equivalent of cut-sets that do not yield any cross 
product term. The sum of the probabilities of these MEIs yields the exact probability of the top 
event, as shown in Equation (3-7): Yau et al. (2007)  
Top Event = 𝑃𝐼1⁡⋁⁡𝑃𝐼2⁡⋁…𝑃𝐼𝑛      (3-5) 
𝑃𝐼𝑖 ∉ 𝑃𝐼𝑗; ⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑛𝑦⁡𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
Top Event = 𝑀𝐸𝐼1⁡⋁⁡𝑀𝐸𝐼2⁡⋁…𝑀𝐸𝐼𝑚     (3-6) 
Where; 𝑀𝐸𝐼𝑖 ⁡⋀⁡𝑀𝐸𝐼𝑗 = 0; 𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
𝑃(Top⁡Event) = 𝑃(𝑀𝐸𝐼1) + 𝑃(𝑀𝐸𝐼2) +⋯+ 𝑃(𝑀𝐸𝐼𝑚)    (3-7) 
This way the probability of the top event occurrence can be computed with the knowledge of the 
probability of the primary events that constitutes the prime implicants. All PIs are time-stamped 
and are referred to as “timed prime implicants”. For instance, 𝐴𝑖@𝑡 = 0 implies a component 𝐴 
is in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡 = 0. PIs identified in a DFM analysis are conjunctions of primary events 
that is sufficient to cause the top event but does not contain any shorter conjunction of events that 
is sufficient to cause the top event. The base of a top event is first determined, which are of two 
distinct types i.e., the irredundant base (IB) and complete base (CB) are more difficult to obtain 




3.3.2. Method of Generalized Consensus  
The determination of CB of a top event is of prime importance in the methodology. Several 
methods exist for the determination of CB which include; Tabular method, Nelson method and 
the Method of Generalized Consensus [Garribba et al. (1985); Philip (2016)]. In this thesis, the 
CB is computed using the Method of Generalized Consensus due to the availability of well-
developed software code, which enables one to implement the methodology to a more complex 
and realistic system. Quine developed the method of consensus for binary logic, which was then 
extended by Yau (1997) to treat MVL. The methodology starts at the component level/basic event 
having multiple states, and decision tables that establish a relationship among these components. 
The decision table maps the input to the output parameter and can be constructed in an inductive 
as well as deductive manner. A detail iterative process for the development of decision tables is 
provided in the literature Salem et al. (1976; 1977; 1979). These decision tables are then merged 
into a single table called the ‘critical transition table’. Several logic rules are applied on the critical 
transition table to obtain the PIs [Ogunbiyi et al. (1981); Yau (1997)]. Thus, the determination of 
PIs using the Generalized Consensus method consist of two iterative steps: Garribba et al. (1985)  
a) Reduction: Application of multi-valued logic reduction rules including absorption, 
reduction, merging and reduction-merging operation;  
b) Development: Addition of monomials to the reduced set of implicants to obtain the 
consensus terms (can be an implicant or PI).  
The above two steps are repeated in an iterative manner until no more new consensus terms are 
generated, and the total set of PIs include the reduced implicants from the original critical 
transition table as well as the new PIs generated, [Garribba et al. (1985); Philip (2016)].  
 
Decision Table Development  
Decision tables are used to describe each possible output state of a component/sub-system as a 
set of combinations of states of inputs, i.e., it maps the input parameters to the output. The use of 
decision tables for FT construction have been studied comprehensively in [Salem et al. (1976; 
1977; 1979)]. Decision tables can be constructed via inductive or deductive algorithm. The same 
concept is implemented in DFM with the exception that a decision tables maps the state variables 
as well as multistate system parameters. Detailed relationship between the multi-state nodes are 
represented in decision tables. For example, if a sensor can be in three states (See Table 6) and is 
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measuring a liquid level in a tank that can be at 0%, 50% and 100% (See Table 7), the measured 
level which is the output of the sensor is clearly dependent on the sensor state and the liquid level. 
The mapping of the input (liquid level- L and sensor state- SS) to output (measured level- ML) 
can be performed as shown in Table 8. Of course, the measure level (ML) will have the same 
number of states as the liquid level (L).  
Table 6: Possible sensor states 
No. Sensor State (SS) Representation 
1.  Normal 0 
2.  Failed Low -1 
3.  Failed High +1 
 
Table 7: Liquid level in the tank and measured level 
No. Liquid level State (L or ML) Representation 
1.  Level at 0 % 0 
2.  Level at 50 % 1 
3.  Level at 100 % 2 
 
The decision table that maps the input to output is given in Table 8.  
Table 8: Output decision table- the measured liquid level 
No. 
Input Output 
SS @t=-1 L @t=-1 ML @t=-1 
1.  0 0 0 
2.  0 1 1 
3.  0 2 2 
4.  -1 - 0 
5.  +1 - 2 
 
The above table can be interpreted as, if the level sensor is in normal condition, it will indicate 
liquid level values as the original level in the tank. However, if the sensor is failed low or high, it 
will indicate a low level (0 %) or high level (100 %) respectively no matter what the liquid level 
is currently in, i.e., a “Don’t care condition”.  
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A. Multi-Valued Logic Operations 
The PIs of a top event can be obtained by merging the decision tables of individual constituents 
in the system [Ogunbiyi et al. (1981)]. The merging operation is dependent on the structure of 
the DFM model and the top event sought by the analyst, Philip (2016). The MVL operation 
consist of absorption, merging, reduction and reduction-merging that are implemented to simply 
the merged critical transition table, and eventually to determine the PIs of a system top event 
sought by the analyst. The consensus operation is then applied to identify other PIs from the 
irredundant base and is a vital step in obtaining the complete base of the top event [Yau (1997)].  
 
1. Absorption Rule 
A monomial X is said to subsume (absorb) a second monomial Y in a decision table if both the 
monomials have identical output, and every input event in X also occurs in Y [Ogunbiyi et al. 
(1981)]. This is equivalent to the absorption law in Boolean algebra. For example, if A, B and C 
are three primary variables with multiple states, and:  
𝑋 = 𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2 and 𝑌 = 𝐴1. 𝐶2      (3-8) 
Then;  
𝑋 + 𝑌 = 𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2 + 𝐴1. 𝐶2 = 𝐴1. 𝐶2 = 𝑌     (3-9) 
Here, event A is in state 1, event B is in state 2 and event C is in state 2. The absorption rule 
implemented in the transition table can be shown as:  
Monomials Primary events  Primary events 
A B C 
≡ 
A C 
X 1 2 2 
1 2 
Y 1 − 2 
 
i.e., monomial X is absorbed into Y.  
 
2. Merging 
In a set of monomials 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛, if each 𝑋𝑖 contains identical literals except for one, and the 
different literal contains a primary variable that is enumerated in all its states in 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛, 
then the set of monomials can be merged into a single monomial [Yau (1997)]. For example, if 
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A, B and C are primary variables, of which B has three distinct states 1, 2 and 3, and 𝑋1, 𝑋2 and 
𝑋3 are monomials with:  
𝑋1 𝑋2 𝑋3 
𝐴1. 𝐵1. 𝐶2 𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2 𝐴1. 𝐵3. 𝐶2 
 
It can be observed that event A and C remains the same, whereas event B is enumerated in all its 
possible three states (1, 2, and 3). Thus monomials 𝑋1, 𝑋2 and 𝑋3 can be merged into a single 
monomials. For example:  
𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + 𝑋3 = 𝐴1. 𝐵1. 𝐶2 + 𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2 + 𝐴1. 𝐵3. 𝐶2 = 𝐴1. 𝐶2   (3-10) 
The merging rule implemented in the transition table can be shown as:  
Monomials Primary events  Primary events 
A B C 
≡ 
A C 
𝑋1 1 1 2 
1 2 𝑋2 1 2 2 
𝑋3 1 3 2 
 
i.e., three rows in the transition table have been merged into a single row.  
 
3. Reduction  
In a set of monomials 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛, if every literals of 𝑋𝑖 except one does not contradict with the 
literals of the other 𝑋𝑗 (either 𝑋𝑗 contains the same literal, or 𝑋𝑗 does not have a literal with the 
same primary event), and the contradicting literal contains a primary event that is enumerated in 
all its states in 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛, then 𝑋𝑖 can be reduced by removing the contradicting literal 
containing that primary event, Yau (1997). For example, if A, B and C are primary events, with 
B having three distinct states 1, 2 and 3; and 𝑋1, 𝑋2 and 𝑋3 are monomials with:  
𝑋1 𝑋2 𝑋3 




The primary event A and C in 𝑋1 does not contradict with those in 𝑋2 and 𝑋3, and event B is 
enumerated in all its three states in the 𝑋𝑖, then 𝑋1 can be reduced as:  
𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + 𝑋3 = 𝐴1. 𝐵1. 𝐶2 + 𝐵2 + 𝐴1. 𝐵3 = 𝐴1. 𝐶2 + 𝐵2 + 𝐴1. 𝐵3   (3-11) 





A B C A B C 
𝑋1 1 1 2 1 − 2 
𝑋2 − 2 − − 2 − 
𝑋3 1 3 − 1 3 − 
 
It can be observed that 𝑋1 has been reduced from 𝐴1. 𝐵1. 𝐶2 to 𝐴1. 𝐶2.  
 
4. Reduction-Merging 
The reduction-merging rule is a combination of reduction and merging operation and is only 
applicable to MVL systems. It is used to reduce an MVL decision table into its irredundant (most 
reduced) form, Philip (2016). If a monomial obtained after reduction operation on a set of 
monomials 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛, can absorb other monomials in the set, those subsuming monomials are 
removed from the set. For example, if A, B and C are primary events, with event B having three 
distinct states 1, 2 and 3, and 𝑋1, 𝑋2 and 𝑋3 are monomials with: [Yau (1997)] 
𝑋1 𝑋2 𝑋3 
𝐴1. 𝐵1. 𝐶2 𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2 𝐵3. 𝐶1 
Then;  
𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + 𝑋3 = 𝐴1 ∙ 𝐵1 ∙ 𝐶2 + 𝐴1 ∙ 𝐵2 ∙ 𝐶2 + 𝐵3 ∙ 𝐶1    (3-12) 
= 𝐴1. 𝐶2 + 𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2 + 𝐵3. 𝐶1     (3-13) 
𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + 𝑋3 = 𝐴1. 𝐶2 + 𝐵3. 𝐶1     (3-14) 
i.e., 𝑋1 is first reduced from 𝐴1. 𝐵1. 𝐶2 to 𝐴1. 𝐶2, and then 𝑋2 (𝐴1. 𝐵2. 𝐶2) is absorbed into the new 







A B C A B C 
𝑋1 1 1 2 1 − 2 
𝑋2 1 2 2 − − − 
𝑋3 − 3 1 − 3 1 
 
5. The Consensus Operation 
A critical transition table is not guaranteed to contain a complete set of PIs, particularly if 
multistate components and success states exist. Hence to obtain a CB of a top event, the consensus 
operation is performed that creates new terms out of the existing terms in the critical decision 
table by mixing and matching their input events [Ogunbiyi et al. (1981)]. The consensus operation 
can be illustrated as:  
Given a primary event A having 𝑛 distinct state 1, 2, … , 𝑛, and monomials 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛 do not 
contain the primary event A, then a consensus operation on the monomials 𝐴1 ∙ 𝑋1, 𝐴2 ∙
𝑋2, … , 𝐴𝑛 ∙ 𝑋𝑛 yields a new monomial 𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑋𝑛 provided this new monomial is not 
inherently false. This can be expressed as: [Yau (1997)]  
𝐴1 ∙ 𝑋1 + 𝐴2 ∙ 𝑋2 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑛 ∙ 𝑋𝑛 = 𝐴1 ∙ 𝑋1 + 𝐴2 ∙ 𝑋2 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑛 ∙ 𝑋𝑛 + 𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑋𝑛 (3-15) 
It can be observed that the consensus operation yields a new implicant (𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑋𝑛) from the 
base 𝐴1 ∙ 𝑋1 + 𝐴2 ∙ 𝑋2 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑛 ∙ 𝑋𝑛.  
For example, if A, B and C are primary events, with event A having two distinct states 1 and 2, 
and 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 are monomials such that:  
𝑋1 = 𝐵1 and 𝑋2 = 𝐶2        (3-16) 
The consensus operation on the monomials 𝐴1. 𝐵1 and 𝐴2. 𝐶2 is given as:  
𝐴1 ∙ 𝑋1 + 𝐴2 ∙ 𝑋2 = 𝐴1 ∙ 𝐵1 + 𝐴2 ∙ 𝐶2     (3-17) 
= 𝐴1 ∙ 𝐵1 + 𝐴2 ∙ 𝐶2 + 𝐵1𝐶2      (3-18) 
A new monomial 𝑋3 = 𝐵1𝐶2 is generated from the existing monomial 𝑋1 and 𝑋2. The consensus 







A B C A B C 
𝑋1 1 1 − 1 1 − 
𝑋2 2 − 2 2 − 2 
𝑋3 − − − − 1 2 
 
The consensus operation on the two monomials (two rows in the table) yields a third row in the 
critical transition table or a third monomial 𝑋3.  
 
3.3.3. DFM Modelling Process  
A DFM model expresses the logical and dynamic behavior of a system with a network of nodes 
created by discretizing the key system parameters and state variables. These system nodes are 
then linked together to represent the cause-and-effect and time-dependent relationships which 
exist among key system parameters. Decision tables within the nodes constructed from the 
equations governing the system behavior represents the functional mappings among the system 
parameters [Yau et al. (1998)]. The application of DFM within a PRA framework typically 
involves three essential steps: [NUREG-6465]  
1. Development of the DFM model for which safety analysis is desired  
2. Analysis of DFM model (deductive or inductive)  
3. Quantification of the prime implicants.  
The DFM model encompasses all the key system parameters and are represented by a network of 
nodes. The fundamental DFM modelling elements are shown in Figure 4. A DFM model utilize 
these elements to represent the temporal and logical relations that exist among key system 
parameters, Yau (1997).  
Process variable nodes:  
They represent physical variables that captures the essential functional behaviour, continuous or 
discrete of a system. A variable represented by a process variable node is discretized into finite 
number of intervals. The number of discretized intervals of a state variable is chosen on the basis 
of balance between the accuracy of the model, and the complexity introduced by higher numbers 









 Transition box 
 Causality Edge 
 Conditioning Edge 
Figure 4: Basic building blocks of DFM Model 
 
Causality edge: 
They are used to connect process variable nodes to indicate the existence of a cause-and-effect 
relationship between the variables described by the nodes. Each causality edge is connected to 
a transfer box to describe the precise functional relationships among the connected nodes.  
Transfer box: 
A transfer box represents a transfer function among system parameter nodes. A decision table is 
associated with each transfer box and is used to quantify the relationships between its input and 
output system parameters. A decision table is a multi-dimensional matrix whose dimension is 
equal to one plus the number of its inputs.  
Transition box:  
A transition box is similar to transfer box with the exception that, a time lag or time transition is 
assumed to occur between the time when the input variable become true and the time when the 
output variable associated with the inputs is reached. This time delay is a characteristic of the 
transition which is being modelled and is treated as an attribute of the transition box.  
Conditioning Nodes:  
It explicitly identifies component failure states, changes of process operation regimes and 
modes, and switching actions. These nodes can affect the logic superstructure of a system by 
modifying the causal relations between process variable nodes.  





They are used to represent true discrete behaviour in the system. Conditioning edge link 
parameter nodes to transfer boxes, indicating the possibility of using a different transfer 
function to map input variable into output variable states.  
 
3.3.4. Timed-Fault Tree Construction  
Timed-fault tree maybe viewed as sequences of static fault trees at different time steps 
representing the evolution of logical combinations of events leading to a top event, Garrett et al. 
(1995). The generation of a timed-fault tree is of prime importance due to the fact that most 
existing NPP PRAs model are based on classical techniques. In order that the PIs generated from 
the DFM model are incorporated into an existing plant PRA model, its conversion into FT become 
necessary. Timed-fault trees can be constructed from a DFM model using by backtracking 
through the decision tables. Throughout the backtracking process, the following consistency rules 
are applied: [Yau (1997); NUREG/CR-6465]  
a. Physical consistency rule  
Physical consistency rules are applied to eliminate physically impossible conditions from the 
timed fault trees. For instance, a state variable cannot be in two different states at the same time 
step in the time FTs; example, a component cannot be in ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ states in the same time 
step. The physical consistency rule is similar to the consistency rules applied in the classical FT. 
If a system parameter appears twice, in different states, in the same time step and under the same 
logic AND gate, then all the parameters beneath the first logic AND gate above the second 
occurrence of the event is pruned from the tree due to physical inconsistency. [Garrett et al. 
(1995); Yau (1997)].  
b. Dynamic consistency rule  
Dynamic consistency rules are applied to timed FTs to eliminate branches which cannot occur 
due to constraints from the dynamic behavior of the system under consideration. Dynamic rules 
are developed from the analyst's knowledge and assumptions with regard to system dynamic 
behavior. For instance, if the time step considered in a DFM model is 1 second, and water level 
in a steam generator was initially at 0%, the water level in the next time step cannot increase to 
80% (impossible condition due to system dynamics). Similar to physically consistency rule, the 
dynamically inconsistent branches, including all of the sub-branches connected to it via the first 
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parent AND gate are pruned. Further pruning is performed if eliminated branches cause other 
events to become impossible [Garrett et al. (1995); Yau (1997)].  
 
 Classical Markov Chain  
Markov chain enables one to model a sequence of random variables which correspond to the 
states of a system, and the system state at any point in time is dependent only on the system state 
in the previous time. Markov chain captures system dynamic nature with its two-fundamental 
property of characterizing a process evolution by a set of distinct system states and transition 
between these states. The mathematical model of a Markovian system is thus a collection of 
system states and the conditional probabilities between these states. The system dynamics is 
represented by a set of coupled linear differential equations (Chapman-Kolmogorov equation), 
which can be solved using standard analytical methods.  
 
3.4.1. Formulation of the Markov Chain 
Consider a discrete-time (𝑛) stochastic process with a sequence of random variables 
𝑋0, 𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3, … , 𝑋𝑛 (𝑋𝑛, 𝑛 ≥ 0) such that each random variable 𝑋𝑛 takes values in a discrete set 
𝑆 (𝑆 = ℕ) i.e., the state space, then:  
ℙ(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖,𝑋𝑛−1 = 𝑖𝑛−1,… ,𝑋0 = 𝑖0) = ℙ(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖) 
  (3-19) 
∀𝑛 ≥ 0; ⁡𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑖𝑛−1, …… , 𝑖0 ∈ 𝑆 
It may be observed from the equation that the process is memoryless, and the next system state is 
dependent only on the current state. Furthermore, 𝑋𝑛 is time homogeneous if:  
ℙ(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖) = (𝑋1 = 𝑗|𝑋0 = 𝑖) = 𝑃𝑖𝑗  
    (3-20) 
i.e., the transition probabilities are independent of 𝑛. Thus, for an (𝑛 + 𝑚) time steps with 𝑛 ≥
0,𝑚 ≥ 0, the above equation become:  
ℙ(𝑋𝑛+𝑚 = 𝑗,𝑋𝑛 = 𝑘|𝑋0 = 𝑖) = 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑗
𝑚  
    (3-21) 









      (3-22) 
Also by necessary probability condition:  
 ℙ(𝑋1 = 𝑗|𝑋0 = 𝑖)
𝑗∈⁡𝑆
= 1 
Here, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 denotes the probability that the chain, whenever in state 𝑖 transits into the next state 𝑗; 
and takes a value 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1 for all 𝑖 and 𝑗. For each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, the transition probability matrix 




       (3-23) 
 
3.4.2. Computation of State Probabilities 
For a Markovian system with a finite number of discrete-state, the objective is to determine the 
system state transition probabilities at a given point in time. The stochastic rate of transition 
among system states is described by a set of ordinary linear differential equations. The state 
probabilities can be determined by solving the set of coupled Chapman-Kolmogorov differential 












     (3-24) 
Where; 𝑛 = total number of system states  
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = state probability for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ state  
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = the rate of transition from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 (typically component repair and failure rates) 
The computation of state probabilities or solution of a Markov model involves three steps:  
a) Model development: This step involves the development of state transition diagram such 
as determination of system states, the possible transition between these states, and the 
transition rates. It may also include labeling of system states in a qualitative manner such 
as system operational, failure or partial failure.  
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b) Generation of ODEs: The Markovian state transition diagram developed in the preceding 
step is utilized to generate a set of linear ordinary differential equations that describes the 
system behavior and characteristics.  
c) Determination of State Probabilities: The obtained linear ODEs are solved to determine 
the system states probabilities. Many standard techniques are available for solving the set 
of ODEs, such as analytical methods, Laplace transform and numerical integration.  
For illustration purpose on computation of state probabilities, two cases are considered: (1) Non-
repairable system; and (2) Repairable system.  
1. A non-repairable system 
Consider a non-repairable component with two states, i.e., normal and failed states. The system 
can only make a transition from operational state to the failed state with a constant failure rate of 
𝜆 due to its nature of non-reparability. The system can possibly take two states, and can be 
represented in the transition diagram (Figure 5):  
State 1: System operational (𝑆𝑜) 
State 2: System failed, or absorbing state (𝑆1) 
 
Figure 5: Markov state-transition diagram of a two state component 








       (3-26) 
With the assumption that the system is fully operational at 𝑡 = 0, 𝑆0(0) = 1 and 𝑆1(0) = 0, 
solution of the differential equation, and probability density function of system failure is:  
𝑆0(𝑡) = 𝑒










(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 ) = 𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑡  
    (3-27) 
From definition, the system reliability and unreliability are simply represented by 𝑆0(𝑡) and 𝑆1(𝑡). 
For a component with a constant failure rate of 𝜆 = 0.005 failures per hr and a mission time of 
1200 hours, the reliability and unreliability of the system is plotted in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: System reliability and unreliability for a two state non-repairable system 
 
2. A repairable system  
Similar to the previous case, consider a system with two states i.e., operational and failed, with 
the difference that the system is repairable. The system can make a transition from operational to 
failed state with a rate 𝜆, and from failed state to operational state with a repair rate of ⁡𝜇. Hence, 
the probability that the system will remain in a given state is (1 − 𝜆) and (1 − 𝜇) for state 𝑆0(𝑡) 
and 𝑆1(𝑡) respectively. The Markov state transition diagram is shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: State-transition diagram of a two state component with repair 





= (1 − 𝜆)𝑆0(𝑡) + 𝜇𝑆1(𝑡) 
     (3-28) 
𝑑𝑆1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑆0(𝑡) + (1 − 𝜇)𝑆1(𝑡) 
     (3-29) 







𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡 and 𝑆1(𝑡) =
𝜆
(𝜆+𝜇)
(1 − 𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡)   (3-30) 
For a component with a constant failure rate of 𝜆 = 0.005 failures per hr, repair rate of 𝜇 =
0.00125 repairs per hr and a mission time of 1500 hours, the reliability (𝑆0(𝑡)) and unreliability 
(𝑆1(𝑡)) of the system is plotted in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: State probabilities for component with repair 
 
 Cell-to-Cell Mapping Technique  
Cell-to-Cell Mapping Technique (CCMT) is a systematic procedure to describe the dynamics of 
both linear and nonlinear systems in discrete time and discretized system state-space, or the 
subspace of the state variables only, Hsu (1980). The fundamental concept of the methodology is 
to discretize the state space into a finite number of cells and determine the probability that the 
system will occupy a discretized cell as time evolve by means of standard numerical integration 
methods such as Runge-Kutta method. Thus, a state variable represents the dynamics of a system 
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in discrete quantity that takes every possible value 𝑥 ∈ ℝ. Cell mapping technique can be 
categorized as: simple cell mapping, generalized cell mapping and interpolated cell mapping, 
Spek (1994). In this thesis, generalized cell mapping is used for benchmark system analysis, due 
to its efficiency and accuracy of the methodology to predict the long term dynamic behavior of 
linear and non-linear systems [Hsu (1980); Spek (1994)]. CCMT defines the system states in 
terms of both system configurations i.e., vectors of the discrete states occupied by the system 
components, and cells occupied by state variables. This allows modelling system configuration 
(instantaneous) changes upon crossings of threshold values (e.g., a valve closing when the liquid 
level exceeds a pre-set value). Consider a simple dynamic system governed by the ODE:  
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑥,𝛼, 𝑡) 
       (3-31) 
Where, 𝑥 is an 𝑁 dimensional state variable vector in ℝ𝑁, 𝛼 is the 𝐾 dimensional system 
parameter vector, 𝑡 is the time variable, and 𝑓 is a non-linear function vector. Equation (3-22) can 
be integrated over one period to relate the state of the system at the end of one period to the state 
at the end of the next period.  




      (3-32) 
The above solution for 𝑥 in discrete point mapping form can be written as:  
𝑥(𝑛 + 1) = 𝐺(𝑥(𝑛), 𝛼)       (3-33) 
Here, a point 𝑥(𝑛) in the state space is mapped by the mapping transition probability matrix (𝐺) 
after one discrete time step into a point 𝑥(𝑛 + 1), and hence the name point mapping method. 
This enables one to represent the system dynamics in finite sequence of discrete system states. 
This very feature of point mapping of the system dynamics as a continuum of dimension N state 
space results in poor computational efficiency. This leads to the idea of considering a state 
variable not as a continuum of points but as a collection of finite number of cells, Hsu (1980). 
The region of interest Ω in the state space is chosen and partitioned into finite number of subsets 
𝐽𝑖 ∈ Ω. Each subset 𝐽𝑖 is considered as the smallest entity in the control state space and called a 
regular or computational cell. All the cells can be labeled with an integer 𝑧, from 1 to 𝑁𝑐. The 
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region outside the control space 𝛤 can also be divided into finite number of cells called the sink 
cells, from 1 to ?̅?𝑠.  
The computational cells can be discretized or partitioned in several ways and is dependent on the 
analyst’s choice. For example, the coordinate axis of a state variable 𝑥𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁) can be 
divided into a finite number of intervals with an interval size of ℎ𝑖. The interval 𝑍𝑖 of the 𝑥𝑖 axis 
is defined to be one which contains all 𝑥𝑖 satisfying: [Hsu (1980)]  








, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑁 
     (3-34) 
Where, 𝑍𝑖 is an integer, and 𝑀𝑖 is the number of intervals. A 𝑁-tuple 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁 is called a 
cell vector of the state space and is denoted by ℤ. The collection of the regular cells and the sink 
cell forms a cell state space 𝑆 = {0, 1, … , 𝑁𝑐}. This way the continuous state space is transformed 
into a 1-dimensional integer array. Figure 9 shows an example state space discretization scheme 
with 𝑁𝑐 computational cells in the control space, and ?̅?𝑠 sink cell in 𝛤.  
 




𝐽2 𝐽1 𝐽3 













State Variable (𝑥1) 
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𝑁𝑐 𝑁𝑐
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A point 𝑥(𝑥𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁) belongs to a cell ℤ(𝑍𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁) if 𝑥𝑖 belongs to 𝑍𝑖 for all 𝑖. By 
an appropriate application of rules to identify 𝑥(𝑛) and 𝑥(𝑛 + 1) with corresponding 
computational cells 𝑍(𝑛) and 𝑍(𝑛 + 1), one can associate to the point-to-point mapping 
(Equation 3-24) a cell-to-cell mapping ℂ. Thus, cell mapping is derived from point mapping by 
appropriate discretization process.  
ℤ(𝑛 + 1) = ℂ(ℤ(𝑛),𝛼) 
 
ℤ𝑖(𝑛 + 1) = ℂ𝑖(ℤ(𝑛),𝛼) 
      (3-35) 
Where ℂ maps a set of integers to a set of integers, and thus ℂ is an integer-valued cell mapping.  
Note that, it is not necessary for all the computational cells to be identical, rather a computational 
cell can be of any shape. However, rectangle is the most commonly used shape because of its 
convenience, Chen (2004). Further Hsu (1981) developed the generalized cell mapping theory by 
removing the restriction in simple cells mapping that a computational cell ℤ(𝑛) is mapped by ℂ 
into only a single cell ℤ(𝑛 + 1). The generalized theory enables a computational cell ℤ(𝑛) to be 
mapped into several image cells, with each of the image cells having a definite fraction of the 
total probability. For instance, if a system is in a computational cell ℤ(𝑛) at time 𝑡 = 𝑛, the 
evolution of the system state in the next time step (𝑛 + 1) is given by:  
ℤ(1)(𝑛 + 1) = 𝑝(1), ℤ(2)(𝑛 + 1) = 𝑝(2), … , ℤ(𝑖)(𝑛 + 1) = 𝑝(𝑖)⁡; (𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁) 
Here, 𝑝(1) implies the probability of mapping ℤ(𝑛) into cell (1), and 𝑝(2) implies the probability 
of mapping ℤ(𝑛) into cell (2), and so forth. i.e., a single computational cell can be mapped into 
several other cells, or even into itself with some cell-to-cell transition probabilities. Of course, by 




      (3-36) 
i.e., the sum parameter covers all the possible image cell that a computational cell can take in the 
next time step. This allows one to describe the system state at any point in time with adequate 
probabilities of finding a system in several cells. Let:  
𝑆 = Closed set of cells of interest (cells within the control space)  
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𝜓𝑖(𝑛) = the probability of the state of the system being in cell 𝑖 at 𝑡 = 𝑛 
The vector 𝝍(𝑛) with component 𝜓𝑖(𝑛), 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 is called the cell probability vector.  
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Probability of cell 𝑗 being mapped into cell 𝑖 in one mapping time step 
𝑃 = Transition probability matrix with components 𝑝𝑖𝑗  








       (3-38) 
𝜓𝑖(𝑛) ≥ 0 and 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0  
Thus, the system evolution can be represented by:  
𝝍(𝑛 + 1) = 𝑃𝝍(𝑛) 
      (3-39) 
For a given initial cell probability vector 𝝍(0) at 𝑛 = 0, the subsequent system evolution is 
simply given by:  
𝝍(𝑛) = 𝑃𝑛𝝍(0) 
      (3-40) 
The mapping probability matrix, 𝑃 completely describe the system evolution and dynamics in the 
cell space. Thus, useful information of the system can be obtained by solving the transition 
mapping probability matrix 𝑃. It can be observed that the above equations transformed the system 
dynamics into a finite state Markov model with stochastic matrix 𝑃 governing the system 
dynamics.  
 
 Coupled Markov-CCMT Model  
The coupled Markov-CCMT model integrates the classical Markov model with CCMT to 
represent the possible coupling between failure events that can originate from the dynamic 
interactions between system components and controlled state variables, and among the different 
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constituents of the system [NUREG-6985]. Figure 10 provide the framework and methodology 
implementation flowchart.  
 
 
Figure 10: Coupled Markov-CCMT flowchart for integrated system analysis 
 
The coupled Markov-CCMT models a system evolution in discrete time through the probability 
𝑃𝑛,𝑗(𝑡) that the state variables are in a predefined regions or cells 𝑉𝑗 in the state space at time 
(𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 with the components state combination 𝑛 (e.g., valve failed-closed), given that the 
state variables was in cell 𝑉𝑗′  at time 𝑘∆𝑡 with a component state combination 𝑛′, Hassan and 
Aldemir (1990). The dynamic behavior of the system is usually described by a set of differential 
or algebraic equations, as well as the set of control laws.  
 
1. Model Assumptions 
The methodology is based on the following assumptions [Aldemir (1987); Hassan and Aldemir 
(1990); Belhadj and Aldemir (1992)]:  
1. The system configuration or components state do not change during the time interval 
[𝑘∆𝑡, (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡] but possibly at (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡;  
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2. For a given component state combination 𝑛 and cell 𝑉𝑗, 𝑃𝑛,𝑗(𝑘∆𝑡) is uniformly distributed 
over 𝑉𝑗;  
3. If the modeling is conducted in the state variable state space, no two controlled variable 
trajectories arrive at the same point in state space at the same time and move in different 
directions for the same component state combinations.  
Assumptions 1 and 2 lead to an approximation of the probabilistic system dynamics. Assumption 
1 also leads to an approximation of the failure characteristics of the components. Under these 
assumptions, the probabilistic evolution of the system in time 𝑃𝑛,𝑗(𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 can be determined 
recursively following an inductive Markov-CCMT implementation: [Aldemir (1987); Hassan 
and Aldemir (1990)]  
𝑃𝑛 ,𝑗 ((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) =   𝑔(𝑗 𝑗






  (3-41) 
Where;  
𝑞𝑛 ,𝑗
𝑛 ′ ,𝑗 ′ (𝑘∆𝑡) = 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′⁄ ,𝑛′ , 𝑘∆𝑡).ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) 
   (3-42) 
Therefore;  
𝑃𝑛 ,𝑗 ((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) =   𝑞𝑛 ,𝑗






    (3-43) 
The above equation is equivalent to the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation in discretized state space 
and discretized time. Here;  
∆𝑡 = Cell-to-cell mapping time step 
𝑃𝑛′,𝑗′(𝑘∆𝑡) = Pr{Controlled variables are in cell 𝑗
′, and component state combination is in state 
𝑛′ at time 𝑡 = 𝑘∆𝑡  
𝑃𝑛,𝑗((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) = Pr{Controlled variables are in cell 𝑗, and component state combination is in 
state 𝑛 at time 𝑡 = (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡  
𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) = Pr{Controlled variables are in cell 𝑗 at time (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 given that the 
controlled variables are in cell 𝑗′ at time 𝑡  
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ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) = Pr{Component state combination is in state 𝑛 at time (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 given 
that the component state combination is in state 𝑛′ at time 𝑡, and the state variables move from 
cell 𝑗′ to cell 𝑗 during [𝑘∆𝑡, (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡].  
𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
= Elements of the transition matrix for the Markov model  
Since, 𝑉𝑗 cover the whole control variable state space and 𝑁 includes all possible component state 
combinations, by essence of probability theory:  






      (3-44) 
  𝑞𝑛 ,𝑗







      (3-45) 
The parameter 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
 is a conditional probability that accounts for the simultaneous occurrence, 
and interactions between the state variables and the system components which are statistically 
dependent. Hence, to compute 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
, the conditional probability between 𝑔 and ℎ have to be 
known. However, neither 𝑔 or ℎ can be determined individually due to the statistical dependency 
Aldemir (1987). To overcome this drawback, the methodology approximates 𝑔 using Assumption 
1 that the system state does not change during the short interval [𝑡, (𝑡 + 𝑘∆𝑡)] but can 
simultaneously change during (𝑡 + 𝑘∆𝑡).  
 
2. Determination of cell-to-cell transition probabilities, 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡)  
The cell-to-cell transition probabilities depends on the system dynamics, the deterministic control 
laws, and the possible system configurations. 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) represents the system dynamics 
under normal and failed state of the components/sub-systems, i.e., conditional probability that the 
state variables are in cell 𝑉𝑗 at time 𝑡 = (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 given that:  
• The state variables are in cell 𝑉𝑗′ at time 𝑡 = 𝑘∆𝑡  
• The component state combination is in 𝑛′ at time 𝑡.  
 
The 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) can be found from [Hassan and Aldemir (1990); Belhadj et al. (1992)]:  
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′ ,𝛼𝑛 ′ ,𝑘∆𝑡) ;  𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑗 ′ ∈ 𝑅
𝑉𝑗 ′
𝛿𝑗 ,𝑗 ′                                                       𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  (3-46) 
Where;  
𝛿𝑗 ,𝑗 ′ = 𝐾𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 =   
1      ; 𝑖𝑓 𝑗′ = 𝑗
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
     (3-47) 
𝑒𝑗 (𝑥) = 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =   
1     ; 𝑖𝑓 ?̃?(𝑘+1)∆𝑡 ∈ 𝑉𝑗
0               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
    (3-48) 
Where; 𝑥′ = Initial value of the state variable at time 𝑡 = 𝑘∆𝑡  
?̃?(𝑘+1)∆𝑡(𝑥
′, 𝛼𝑛′ , 𝑘∆𝑡) = The location of the system in the state variable space at time 𝑡 = (𝑘 +
1)∆𝑡, given that the system location is 𝑥′ at time 𝑡 = 𝑘∆𝑡 and the component state combination 
is at 𝑛′. This system trajectories is typically determined using system code or simulator.  
𝑣𝑗′= Volume of the cell 𝑉𝑗′   
𝑑𝑥′
𝑣𝑗′
= The probability that the state variables are within the infinitesimal volume element 𝑑𝑥′ 
around 𝑥′ at time 𝑡. This probability is constant throughout each 𝑉𝑗′  (uniform distribution).  
Since the functional form of {?̃?(𝑥′, 𝛼𝑛′ , 𝑘∆𝑡)} is generally unknown, the integral in the above 
equation is evaluated numerically as follow: [NUREG-6942]  
• Partition the cell 𝑗′ into 𝑁𝑝 number of sub-cells  
• Choose the midpoint of each sub-cell as initial conditions over the time interval 𝑘𝛥𝑡 ≤
𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 under the assumption that the component state combination remains at 𝑛′ 
at all times during 𝑘𝛥𝑡 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡  
• Observe the number of arrivals in 𝑁𝑝+1 at time 𝑡 = (𝑘 + 1)𝛥𝑡, ?̃?(𝑘+1)∆𝑡(𝑥
′, 𝛼𝑛′ , 𝑘∆𝑡)  





3. Determination of the component state transition probabilities, ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡)  
The stochastic behavior of system components is represented by ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡), i.e., the 
conditional probability that component state combination is in 𝑛 at time 𝑡 = (𝑘 + 1)𝛥𝑡, given:  
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• The component state combination was at 𝑛′ at time 𝑡 = 𝑘𝛥𝑡; and  
• The state variables make a transition from cell 𝑉𝑗′  to cell 𝑉𝑗 during 𝑘𝛥𝑡 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 
For system components with statistically dependent failures, the probabilities ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ →
𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) is given by the products of the individual component failure or non-failure probabilities 
during the mapping time step from 𝑘𝛥𝑡 to (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡, i.e.,  
ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) =  𝑐𝑚(𝑛𝑚 𝑛′𝑚⁄ , 𝑗




    (3-49) 
Whereas for statistically independent failure, the probabilities ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) is given by:  




    (3-50) 
Where, 𝑚 = Number of components or units in the system under consideration  
𝑐𝑚(𝑛𝑚 𝑛′𝑚⁄ , 𝑗
′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡): The component state combination at the individual component or unit 
level and is the transition probability component 𝑚 from the state combination 𝑛′𝑚 → 𝑛𝑚 during 
the time step [𝑘∆𝑡, (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡].  
𝑐𝑚(𝑛𝑚 𝑛′𝑚⁄ , 𝑗
′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) can be determined systematically from given component failure rates, 
and the set of possible failure modes 𝑆𝑚 for a system transition from cell 𝑉𝑗′  to cell 𝑉𝑗 
{𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑆𝑚(𝑗
′, 𝑗)} for each 𝑛𝑚, 𝑛𝑚′ , 𝑗




′ → 𝑗,∆𝑡) = 1 −  𝜆𝑚 , 𝑛𝑚′
𝑛𝑚
′ ∈ 𝑆𝑚 (𝑗 ′ ,𝑗 )





′ → 𝑗,∆𝑡) = 𝜆𝑚 , 𝑛𝑚′ ∆𝑡 → 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑚 ∈ 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
   (3-52) 
 
4. Computation of the system transition probability matrix, 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
(𝑘∆𝑡) and 𝑃𝑛,𝑗(𝑘∆𝑡) 
The stochastic transition probability matrix 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
(𝑘∆𝑡) describes the probabilistic dynamic 
system behavior and is a function of both ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡) and 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) with the 
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matrix having a 𝑁 × 𝐽 dimension. The elements of 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′(∆𝑡) for the state variable within the 








′ → 𝑗, ∆𝑡)  𝑑𝑣′𝑒𝑗{?̃?(𝑘+1)∆𝑡(𝑥
′, 𝛼𝑛′ , 𝑘∆𝑡)};⁡𝑗





Thus, the probability of the system being in state 𝑛 and at cell 𝑗 is simply given by:  
𝑃𝑛 ,𝑗 ((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) =   𝑞𝑛 ,𝑗






     (3-53) 
The Markov-CCMT model will be used for its comparison with the classical techniques as well 
as with the DFM to meet the objectives of the research. Furthermore, the treatment of transition 
probability matrix will be evaluated using a different approach as well as combination of 





 CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION OF CLASSICAL AND DYNAMIC 
METHODOLOGIES 
This chapter implements the classical (ET/FT and Markov model) and dynamic PSA (DFM and 
Markov-CCMT) methodologies to a benchmark liquid level control system (Aldemir, 1987). 
Section 4.1 provide a detail description of the benchmark system (BS), system dynamics and 
associated control laws. Section 4.2 and 4.3 presents analysis of the BS using classical ET/FT 
analysis. Section 4.4 provide a detail time-dependent analysis (qualitative and quantitative) of the 
BS using a classical Markov model. Section 4.5 presents application of DFM to the BS, and 
subsequent generation of timed-fault trees from the model. Section 4.6 presents a detail modelling 
and analysis of the BS using tightly coupled Markov-CCMT model to generate dynamic accident 
sequence. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter with observations made and perform a detail 
comparison of classical and dynamic PSA techniques.  
 
 The Benchmark System Description 
The benchmark example system consists of a fluid hold up tank with three (3) independent fluid 
level control units. Each control unit consists of a separate level sensor that measures the fluid 
level in the tank, and whose output is an input to the control units. Figure 11 depicts the schematic 
diagram of the BS. Operational states of the control units are dependent on the feedback signal 
from level sensors. Mission of the BS is to maintain liquid level in the tank to a predefined control 
region. The system failure occurs when the liquid level in the tank drained or overflows. Unit-1 
and Unit-2 are the two liquid supply units (inflow), whereas Unit-3 is the liquid drain unit 
(outflow). Each unit can be thought of as a controller which switches the units “ON” or “OFF” 
based on the feedback signal from the level sensors. There are four (4) possible states for each 
control units: ON, OFF, fail-open and fail-closed.  
The tank liquid level is discretized into an arbitrary number of mutually exclusive regions or 
intervals, with the nominal level at 0 meters. All the other possible levels are measured against 
the reference level. The maximum level of the tank is 3 meters (at point b) and the minimum level 
of the tank is -3 meters (at point a). The system fails if the state variable is outside the defined 
control space. Within the maximum and minimum range, two set-points are defined at 𝑎1 
(−1⁡meter) and 𝑏1 (+1⁡meter). These set-points partition the control space into three (3) regions 
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for system operation. The discretization scheme is show in Table 9. Each control region defines 
a specific operating states of the units, and hence the system configuration.  
 
Figure 11: The benchmark liquid level control system 
 
Table 9: State variable discretization scheme 
Control Region Liquid Level (𝑥) Liquid Level (in meters) 
Region 5 𝑥 > 𝑏 Overflow 
Region 4 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏 +1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ +3 
Region 3 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1 −1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ +1 
Region 2 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎1 −3 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ −1 
Region 1 𝑥 < 𝑎 Drained 
 
Region 1 and Region 5 are considered as the absorbing states in which the top event or system 
failure occurs with drained and overflow respectively. No control action is taken once the system 
enters the absorbing states. During normal operating condition, the liquid level is in Region 3 
(𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1). In this region, Unit-1 and Unit-3 are ‘ON’ state balancing the liquid flow-in and 
flow-out of the tank, whereas Unit-2 is in standby mode or “OFF” state. When the level transit 
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from Region 3 to Region 2, Unit-3 receives a signal to turn off whereas Unit-1 and Unit-2 receives 
a signal to turn on. Each time the level makes a transition from one region to the other region, the 
control system demands certain deterministic actions to all the normal units in order to bring back 
the level to the nominal region or at least maintain the system from entering into Region 1 and 5. 
The deterministic control laws are given in Table 10.  
Table 10: Control laws for the benchmark system 
Liquid Level (𝑥) 
Control Unit State 
Unit-1 Unit-2 Unit-3 
𝑥 > 𝑏 - - - 
𝑏1 < 𝑥 OFF OFF ON 
𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1 ON OFF ON 
𝑥 < 𝑎1 ON ON OFF 
𝑥 < 𝑎 - - - 
 
A. Assumptions  
The following assumptions are made for the purpose of analysis, which includes:  
1. The liquid supply is inexhaustible, and failures of unit are non-repairable;  
2. The control units have discrete states and are nominally independent;  
3. The response is instantaneous, and the time delay is negligible;  
4. The probability of a unit failing-closed and failing-open are assumed to be equally likely 




(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑⁡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) = 2.283 × 10−3/ℎ𝑟.  
𝜆2
𝑓𝑐(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑⁡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑) = 𝜆2





(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑⁡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) = 1.563 × 10−3/ℎ𝑟⁡ 
 
B. Benchmark System Dynamics  
The tank is considered to be at the nominal level (Region 3) at the start of the system operation. 
If any transient occurs due to failure of a unit, the state variable can transit out of the nominal 
control region which can lead to system failure or can be kept within control space depending on 
the operational states of the remaining units. The state variable transition to failure space is 
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dependent on the initial level as well as the rate of change of liquid level in the tank. Since the 
initial liquid level is a known input, the element of interest is the rate of liquid level change. The 




       (4-1) 
Where; 𝑥 = The liquid level in the tank 
𝑓𝑛 = Rate of change of liquid level as a function of control unit states (𝑛). 
Table 11 list 𝑓𝑛 with respect to the unit states, where ?̂?1, ?̂?2 and ?̂?3 are the flowrates from Unit-1, 
Unit-2 and Unit-3 respectively. The flowrates at states fail-open and fail-closed for the units are 
not depicted in the table since the rate of change of level are the same with units’ states ON and 
OFF respectively. Considering an infinitesimally small time step (∆𝑡) relative to the system 
dynamics and failure rate of the units, and with the assumption that the system configuration does 
not change during this small interval, the liquid level in the tank at (𝑡 + ∆𝑡) can be represented 
by the following equation.  
𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) ≈ 𝑥′(𝑡) + 𝑓𝑛 ′ (𝑥′).∆𝑡 
      (4-2) 
Where; 𝑥′(𝑡) = Liquid level at time 𝑡  
𝑓𝑛′(𝑥′) = Rate of change of liquid level as a function of system configuration 𝑛′  
𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) = Liquid level at time (𝑡 + ∆𝑡)  
 
Table 11: Total net fluid flow into/out of the tank 
Control Unit State Rate of Level 
change (𝑓𝑛)  
Net fluid flow 
Unit-1 Unit-2 Unit-3 
ON ON ON ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 − ?̂?3 ?̂? 
ON ON OFF ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 2?̂? 
ON OFF ON ?̂?1 − ?̂?3 0 
ON OFF OFF ?̂?1 ?̂? 
OFF ON ON ?̂?2 − ?̂?3 0 
OFF ON OFF ?̂?2 ?̂? 
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OFF OFF ON −?̂?3 −?̂? 
OFF OFF OFF 0 0 
 
As mentioned earlier, the system is assumed to be in the nominal control region, where Unit-1 is 
ON, Unit-2 is OFF and Unit-3 is ON. This operating condition will continue until one of the units 
make a transition from normal to failure states. This transition to failure state will cause the fluid 
level to deviate from its nominal value, which can be level high or level low depending on which 
unit has failed and to which failure state. The system will change its configuration based on the 
new control region with the objective to bring back the level to its nominal value. The new system 
state may or may not result to a stable condition.  
 
 Fault Tree Analysis of the Benchmark System 
Fault tree analysis for the benchmark system can be performed in two different ways depending 
on the definition of the top events. Fault trees for:  
1. Binary unit/system state (normal or failure state);  
2. Multiple unit/system states (normal, failed-closed and failed-open states).  
Fault tree following the first approach (binary states) can be constructed as shown in Figure 12. 
The top event probability is evaluated as:  
Top Event = 𝐺1𝐺2 + 𝐺3 = 3.15 × 10
−3  
 




The second approach is necessary when top events are defined in terms of system state or state 
variable magnitudes. Since the benchmark system failure is defined in terms of state variable 
magnitude, it is a more natural way to construct FTs using the second approach. FTs for the 
benchmark system overflow and drained as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14 respectively.  
 
Figure 13: Fault tree for the benchmark system drained 
Minimal cut-set for BS drained = 𝐵1𝐵2𝐵3 = 1.02𝐸 − 08⁡ 











 Event Tree Analysis of the Benchmark System 
Provided an initiating event (IE), the state ordering or sequential operation of the frontline 
systems/units is fixed for a classical ET. The unit response, accident sequence and hence the final 
system state is significantly affected by the modes of unit failure. Furthermore, the sequence of 
unit state transition can affect the type of system failure or may lead the system to a quasi-stable 
state. Whereas in case of a FT, all sequence or cut-sets result to a system failure which is not 
necessarily true in this case. Since the benchmark system responds dynamically to any IEs, an ET 
is a more essential approach than FT for modeling the benchmark system. The unit failure modes 
have been explicitly modelled in the ET since different modes lead to different system states. For 
analysis purpose, hardware-oriented ETs are constructed for the system's response to the following 
IEs. These IEs was selected since they possess an interesting case and reveals some limitations of 
the technique.  
1. Unit-1 failed-closed and failed-open;  
2. Unit-2 failed-open;  
3. Unit-3 failed-closed.  
For the ETs constructed, quantification of the accident sequence is straight forward as can be 
observed in Figure 15. The analysis was performed using CAFTA code. Only the first case is 
illustrated for discussion purpose.  
 
a. Unit-1 Failed-Closed (𝝀𝟏
𝒇𝒄
) 
Event tree with an IE probability of 𝜆1
𝑓𝑐
= 2.28 × 10−3/ℎ𝑟 is depicted in Figure 15. It can be 
observed that with an IE Unit-1 failed-closed, probability of the benchmark system failing by 
overflow and drained condition is equally likely with a probability of 1.02E − 08/ℎ𝑟. Hence, there 
is a 50% probability that the system will overflow or drained if unit-1 failed-closed. The argument 
for this can be made as; given that unit-1 failed closed, liquid level in the tank will decrease with 
time since unit-3 is in normal state. However, when the liquid level transit below the nominal 
region, unit-2 will be turned on and unit-3 will be turned off as defined in the control laws. This 
action of unit-2 and unit-3 will cause the liquid level to rise till it reaches the nominal region. Once 
the level is in the nominal region, unit-2 will be tuned off and hence the level will start to decrease 
again. This oscillation will take place until one of the two units failure occur. Given that the unit-
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3 and unit-2 failing closed and failing open respectively have the same probabilities, it can be 
concluded that there is a 50% probability for system overflow and drained scenario. Also, it is 
evident that the system will be operating mostly around liquid level 𝑎1. Hence, after a qualitative 
analysis of the evolution of state variable, one may conclude that it is more likely for the system 
to fail by drained than overflow, or at least it will take more amount of time of the system to 
overflow for this particular scenario. However, this conclusion can only be definitive and 
quantified when the analyst has information about the timing of failure event.  
Note that the ordering of the unit response to the IE have been fixed a prior by the analyst, i.e., 
unit-3 response first to the IE and then the unit-2. From the figure, it can be observed that Unit-3 
being normal will lead the system to a stable or quasi stable state. Unit-3 failing open and unit-2 
failing close will lead the system to a drained scenario. Similarly, unit-3 failing-closed and unit-2 
failing open will result to a system overflow condition. It is important to note here that the failure 
of two (2) or three (3) units does not necessarily result to a system failure condition. For instance, 
the sequence Unit-1 failed-closed AND Unit-3 failed-open AND Unit-1 failed-open lead to a 
system quasi-stable scenario, i.e., the liquid level in the nominal region even after a failure of all 
the units. In fact, only two (2) event sequence lead to a system failure condition out of nine (9) 
sequences generated.  
 
Figure 15: Event tree for initiating event “Unit-1 Failed-Closed” 
The probability of the benchmark system overflow or drained scenario can be calculated by 
summing up all the accident sequences leading to a system overflow or drained respectively:  
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System overflow = 2.91𝐸 − 05  
System drained = 3.06𝐸 − 08  
It is evident that ET approach provide the analyst with more information about the dynamic system 
response and the possible end states compared to the FT technique. However, as mentioned earlier, 
the event ordering is fixed which may not be true in some scenarios. Again, the system response 
is dependent on evolution of the state variables when the next failure occurs in the sequence, timing 
of the failure event and pre-defined deterministic control laws. For example, Unit-2 may respond 
first in contrast to Unit-3 for IE unit-1 failed-closed. The ETs presented above explicitly models 
the different failure modes of the units, since the change in failure modes can result to a different 
system states or type. Thus, ETs must be constructed for each IEs, which becomes tedious for a 
system with several IEs. However, this approach enables the analyst to observe all possible 
scenarios for an IE, which can further be treated using well-established system codes. For instance, 
an accident sequence may lead the BS to quasi stable or failure state; however, the time taken from 
the system to reach these states, and final liquid level in the tank can be determined only if the 
system dynamics is considered.  
 
 Markov Model of the Benchmark System 
This section presents the time-dependent stochastic modelling of the BS using discrete-state 
discrete-time Markov chain. The time dependent behavior of the BS can be modelled by 
constructing state transition diagrams consisting of system states and possible transitions among 
these states. State ordering is explicitly modeled in defining the possible transitions in/out of a 
system states. Thus, Markov model provide a possible solution to overcome the limitations of 
capturing the time element and state ordering which was encountered in FT/ET techniques. 
Furthermore, the methodology provides a superior approach and solution for modeling 
components/units with multiple failure modes and system states. In constructing the Markov 
transition diagram, some assumptions were made, including:  
1. The units are non-repairable, and the units fail only once in a given failure sequence, i.e., 
once a unit failure mode have occurred, other modes cannot occur for the same unit. This 
assumption is true since units failing closed/open have different effect on the system and 
must be modelled separately;  
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2. The system is initially at normal operating condition, i.e., all units are normal and liquid 
level is at the nominal region at 𝑡 = 0;  
3. The system states are defined uniquely by distinct combination of the individual unit states 
and are statistically independent.  
At this point it should be made clear that for a unit in normal state, the unit can either be in ON or 
OFF depending on the user defined control laws, which in turn is characterized by the liquid level 
in the tank. Hence, the ON and OFF states can be combined and represented by a normal state, as 
was done while constructing the transition diagram (See Figure 16). Since each of the units have 
three (3) distinct states, the total number of distinct states that the system can have is:  
𝑁 = (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒⁡𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒⁡𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠)(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠) = 33 
𝑁 = 27 system states 
The 27 distinct system states can be written as an ordered set of distinct unit state or sub-sets for 
ease of system modelling with Markov chain. Consider, 𝑛1 = 0 implies Unit-1 in normal state; 
𝑛1 = 1 implies Unit-1 in failed-closed state; and 𝑛1 = 2 implies Unit-1 in failed-open state. 
Similarly, the same is true for Unit-2 and Unit-3. The possible unit state combinations which was 
used to construct the transition diagram is presented in Table 12.  
The transition diagram starts with all the units being in normal state at 𝑡 = 0, i.e., system state 𝑛 =
0. All the possible transition out of the normal system state are the sum of all the individual failure 
modes of each unit, i.e., system states with a single failure. Similarly, as the time step increase the 
transition from a single unit failure to two (2) unit failure can occur, and subsequently from a two 
(2) unit failure to three (3) unit failure, i.e., each additional failure generates a new system state. 
Hence, the transition diagram can be represented in a layer wise, with four (4) possible transition 








Table 12: Possible unit state combination 
Individual Unit States System States 
(𝑛) 
Possible end states 
Unit-1 (𝑛1) Unit-2 (𝑛2) Unit-3 (𝑛3) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 0 𝑃0(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 1 𝑃1(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 2 𝑃2(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 3 𝑃3(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 4 𝑃4(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 5 𝑃5(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 6 𝑃6(𝑡) System stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 7 𝑃7(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 8 𝑃8(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 9 𝑃9(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 10 𝑃10(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 11 𝑃11(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 12 𝑃12(𝑡) System Overflow 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 13 𝑃13(𝑡) System Overflow 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 14 𝑃14(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 15 𝑃15(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 16 𝑃16(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 17 𝑃17(𝑡) System Overflow 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 18 𝑃18(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 19 𝑃19(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 20 𝑃20(𝑡) System Dryout 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 21 𝑃21(𝑡) System Overflow 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 22 𝑃22(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 23 𝑃23(𝑡) System Overflow 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 24 𝑃24(𝑡) System quasi-stable 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 25 𝑃25(𝑡) System Overflow 




The system states are depicted systematically in a sequential layer representation. The first possible 
transition from normal system state is presented in Figure 16. Note that the order of failures should 
be strictly followed when generating failure sequences from the model because the variation in 
state ordering can produce different end states. Since the number of system states and the number 
of possible transition from one state to the other state is large, it is easier to construct the transition 
diagram considering a specific failure mode. Figure 17 depict the possible transition path from 
Layer-1 to Layer-3 (only one path depicted for illustration purpose).  
 
Table 13: Transitional layers representation of system states 
No.  Layers System State 
1.  Layer-0 All units in normal state 
2.  Layer-1 One (1) unit failure 
3.  Layer-2 Two (2) units failure 
4.  Layer-3 Three (3) units failure 
 
 





Figure 17: Transition path from Layer-0 to Unit-1 failed-closed to Layer-3 




















































































































                                                 
1 Note that all the 27 ODEs are grouped and depicted by a single equation numbering scheme for easier representation 

























































































































































































  (4-3) 
The above ODEs can be solved with given initial conditions. However, before going ahead to 
solving the above transition rate equations, a qualitative overview is provided for better 




4.4.1. Qualitative Assessment  
A preliminary qualitative analysis can be performed with the knowledge of the system states 
defined in the previous Table 12. It is important to note here that this qualitative assessment is only 
an approximation. It can be observed that failure probability of the BS to maintain nominal liquid 
level with all possible IEs is 29.63⁡%. Whereas, probability of the BS failing by overflow and 
drained is 87.5⁡% and 12.5⁡% respectively.  
Taking a step further, if the order and sequence of unit failure is strictly taken into account, the 
probability of a unit failing first must be considered and treated separately. The probability that a 
unit will fail first is given by the ratio of failure rate for that unit divided by the sum of the failure 
rates for all the units. Thus, probability of Unit-1 failing first is:  
𝑃(Unit − 1 → ⁡failing⁡first) =
𝜆1
𝜆1+𝜆2+𝜆3
    (4-4) 
𝑃(Unit − 1 → ⁡failing⁡first) = 34.06⁡% 
Similarly, the probability of Unit-2 and Unit-3 failing first is determined to be:  
𝑃(Unit − 2 → ⁡failing⁡first) = 42.63⁡% 
𝑃(Unit − 3 → ⁡failing⁡first) = 23.31⁡% 
The strict systematic ordering and sequencing of transition, and its subsequent end state with all 
possible unit failure modes is shown in Figure 18. This approach has some differences with the 
conventional Markov chain, in the sense that the number of end states and absorbing states are 
different.  
It can be observed that all system end state with failure modes ‘Unit-1 failed-open’ will eventually 
lead to a system overflow scenario or an absorbing state. Hence, with the failure mode ‘Unit-1 
failed-open’, there is a 100⁡% probability that the system will make a transition to an absorbing 
state or more specifically, the system will fail by overflow condition. For Unit-1 failed-closed 
failure mode, the liquid level will decrease until it reaches Region -1. Then, Unit-2 will be turned 
on and Unit-3 will be turned off as per control laws defined with respect to the liquid level. This 
causes the fluid level to rise until it reaches Region +1, at which time Unit-2 will be turned off and 
Unit-3 will be tuned on. This causes the liquid level to uniformly oscillate between 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 1 
and 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 1. Since the liquid flowrates from all the units are equal, the BS spends an equal 
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amount of time in the increasing and decreasing liquid level conditions. Thus, it can be concluded 
that, the BS is equally likely to fail in an overflow or drained state. Therefore, with the failure 
mode Unit-1 failed-closed, there is a 50⁡% chance that the system will fail by overflow and drained 
respectively. Combining all the possible system failures for both the failure modes from Unit-1 
(failed-closed + failed-open), it can be calculated that the probability of BS failing by overflow 
and drained is 80⁡% and 20⁡% respectively. Similarly, the state sequences transition with failure 
modes Unit-2 failed-closed and failed-open are the same as Unit-1.  
 
Figure 18: System state transition for Unit-1 failed-open 
For Unit-3 (the only drain unit), all system failures caused by the failure mode Unit-3 failed-open, 
there is a 50⁡% probability of system failing by overflow and drained respectively. This is true 
since the flowrates from all the units are assumed to be equal. For the failure mode Unit-3 failed-
closed, there is 100⁡% probability that the system will fail by overflow condition regardless of the 
relative flow rates provided by the three units. Unit-3 failing-closed will cause the liquid level to 
rise until it crosses the nominal region, at which time Unit-1 will be turned off. The tank will 
remain in this condition until either Unit-1 or Unit-2 fail-open, either of which will lead directly 
to the BS overflow. Thus, the probability of system failing by overflow and drained is 80⁡% and 
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20⁡% respectively. Utilizing the calculated probability values for individual units failing first, the 
probability that the BS failing by overflow is determined as:  
(0.3406213 × 0.8) + (0.4262653 × 0.8) + (0.233113⁡ × 0.8) = 0.80⁡ 
Thus, the BS will fail by overflow condition approximately 80⁡% of the time and fail by system 
drained approximately 20⁡% of the time. Note that, the system being stable or quasi-stable are not 
considered for the current analysis since we are interested only on the state ordering and qualitative 
aspect of the sequence transition and absorbing states. These aspects will be treated later when 
Markov model is coupled with CCMT to capture the system dynamics.  
The strict states ordering results in 48 total numbers of failure sequences/end states in contrast to 
the 27 system states generated by applying the classical Markov chain. The failure probability of 
the system states generated by the two approaches are different, wherein the first approach 
overestimates the probability of system failing by overflow and underestimates the probability of 
system failing by drained. The differences in the two approaches are presented in Table 14. 
Considering that all unit flowrates are equal for the BS, and that some unit failure type does not 
necessarily lead to a change in system configuration due to the control laws, these unit failure type 
can be omitted from IEs. For instance, if the system is in normal operating condition, Unit-3 failing 
open does not lead to a change in system configuration since Unit-1 fully open can compensate for 
these failures. The transition probabilities without a system configuration change is zero, in which 
case, the IE can be omitted. Similarly, the same argument holds for Unit-1 failing-open and Unit-
2 failing-closed since these failures does not lead to a change in system configuration. Note that 
this consideration is true only if the system is under normal operating condition. Thus, considering 
only the three (3) IEs; namely Unit-1 failed-closed, Unit-2 failed-open and Unit-3 failed-closed, 
the qualitative assessment can be performed for the system evolution leading to 18 failure 
sequences. Taking the IE Unit-3 failed-closed, all system failure event sequence eventually leads 
to system overflow condition i.e., a 100⁡% failure probability. For Unit-1 failed-closed, it is similar 
to as described in the previous section, i.e., there is a 50⁡% chance that the system will fail by 
overflow and drained respectively. Similarly, for the IE Unit-2 failed-open, there is a 100 % 
probability that the system will fail by overflow condition. Utilizing the calculated probability for 
individual units failing first, the probability that the BS failing by overflow is:  
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(0.341 × 50%) + (0.426 × 100%) + (0.233⁡ × 100%) = 0.83⁡ 
Thus, the BS will fail by overflow condition approximately 83⁡% of the time and fail by system 
drained approximately 17⁡% of the time. Differences in the qualitative assessment are presented 
in Table 14  
Table 14: A qualitative comparison of three different approach 
Approaches 
Number of Failure 
Sequence 
System failure states 
Overflow (%) Drained (%) 
Conventional Markov chain 27 87.50⁡% 12.50⁡% 
Markov chain with explicit 
state ordering 
48 80.00⁡% 20.00⁡% 
Markov chain with explicit 
state ordering for 3 IEs 
18 83.00⁡% 17.00⁡% 
 
The third approach provide a good approximation in the sense that the system failures by overflow 
and drained is not overestimated or under estimated. This is due to the fact that a specific unit 
failure is not necessarily an IE leading to a system failure. Hence, these failures are not included 
as IEs for analysis purpose. Of course, like all Markov chain state representation, this 
approximation is only true with the assumption that two failures do not occur simultaneously in a 
single time step.  
 
4.4.2. Quantitative Assessment 
The ordinary differential equations (ODEs) obtained from the Markov state transition diagram can 
be solved using two approaches: (1) Analytical methods; (2) Numerical methods.  
 
1. Analytical methods  
From the assumption that the BS is in normal operating condition at time 𝑡 = 0, or that the system 
is in state 𝑃0(𝑡 = 0), the initial conditions for all the ODEs can be defined as:  
𝑃0(0) = 1;⁡𝑃1(0) = 0;⁡𝑃2(0) = 0;⁡𝑃3(0) = 0;⁡𝑃4(0) = 0;……𝑃26(0) = 0 









































































































































  (4-6) 
And so on.  
Solving the coupled ODEs via analytical methods become extremely complex and time 
consuming. Furthermore, with an increase in the number of component states, it becomes 
impractical to solve ODEs by analytical methods. Thus, numerical methods provide a better 
approach in solving the coupled ODEs.  
 
2. Numerical methods 
Numerical method was used in this thesis for obtaining the solution of the coupled ODEs since it 
provides a more robust and practical approach. Finite difference method (FDM) has been used for 




      (4-7) 







      (4-8) 




𝑃(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝑃(𝑡)
(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝑡
 
      (4-9) 
Substituting Equation (4-5) in Equation (4-3) yields:  
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𝑃(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) = (𝐼 + 𝐴.∆𝑡).𝑃(𝑡) 
     (4-10) 
The above equation is equivalent to the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation in discrete time state-
space. With the assumption that the BS is in normal operating condition at time 𝑡 = 0, the state 
transition probabilities are computed by implementing FDM in FORTRAN95 code. Considering 
a time step of ∆𝑡 = 1⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟, we obtain the transition probabilities for 3 time steps (See Table 15).  
At any given time step, system failure probability can be determined by summing up the states 
leading to either system overflow or drained scenario. For instance, from Table 15, it can be 
observed that states 12, 13, 17, 21, 23, 25 and 26 result in a system overflow scenario. For 
illustration purpose, the probability of system overflow at time step 𝑘 = 4 is determined as:  
System overflow (𝑘 = 4) = 𝑃12(𝑡) + 𝑃13(𝑡) + 𝑃17(𝑡) + 𝑃21(𝑡) + 𝑃23(𝑡) + 𝑃25(𝑡) + 𝑃26(𝑡) 
System overflow (𝑘 = 4) = 8.68 × 10−05 
Similarly, the probability of system drained at 𝑘 = 4 can be obtained as:  
System drained (𝑘 = 4) = 𝑃20(𝑡) 
System drained (𝑘 = 4) = 6.12 × 10−08 
Similarly, the probability of system failure (overflow or drained) for any given time step can be 




Table 15: Transition probabilities in terms of 𝑃𝑛(𝑡) 
# 𝑃0(𝑡) 𝑃1(𝑡) 𝑃2(𝑡) 𝑃3(𝑡) 𝑃4(𝑡) 𝑃5(𝑡) 𝑃6(𝑡) 𝑃7(𝑡) 𝑃8(𝑡) 
𝑘 = 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 2 0.987 2.28E-3 2.28E-3 2.86E-3 2.857E-3 1.563E-3 1.563E-3 0 0 
𝑘 = 3 0.974 4.52E-3 4.52E-3 5.65E-03 5.654E-03 3.088E-03 3.088E-03 1.305E-5 1.305E-5 
𝑘 = 4 0.96 6.698E-3 6.698E-3 8.39E-3 8.392E-3 4.577E-03 4.577E-03 3.88E-5 3.882E-5 
 
 
# 𝑃9(𝑡) 𝑃10(𝑡) 𝑃11(𝑡) 𝑃12(𝑡) 𝑃13(𝑡) 𝑃14(𝑡) 𝑃15(𝑡) 𝑃16(𝑡) 𝑃17(𝑡) 
𝑘 = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 3 7.12E-6 7.135E-6 1.305E-5 1.30E-5 7.135E-6 7.13E-6 8.929E-6 8.93E-6 8.929E-6 
𝑘 = 4 2.11E-05 2.11E-05 3.882E-5 3.88E-5 2.12E-05 2.12E-05 2.66E-05 2.66E-05 2.66E-05 
 
 
# 𝑃18(𝑡) 𝑃19(𝑡) 𝑃20(𝑡) 𝑃21(𝑡) 𝑃22(𝑡) 𝑃23(𝑡) 𝑃24(𝑡) 𝑃25(𝑡) 𝑃26(𝑡) 
𝑘 = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 3 8.93E-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





 DFM Model of the Benchmark System 
A DFM model of the BS represents the temporal behavior and dynamic evolution of the system. 
To make an accurate representation of the system, vital components that dictates the system 
behavior is identified and included in the system model. For instance, considering the case of the 
BS, all the three (3) control units must be included in the model. Furthermore, each of the control 
units are considered as a single component rather than a system. Once the vital parameters are 
identified, causal, temporal and conditional relationships are established among the parameters. 
These relationships are manifested by algebraic or differential equations, which can be solved to 
construct the decision tables. For analysis purpose and model development, several assumptions 
are made, including:  
1. All assumptions made in the previous section applies;  
2. Level sensor failure characteristics are omitted;  
3. Unit fail-closed and fail-open are considered as sink states.  
 
A stepwise representation of the methodology application and model development of the 
benchmark system in the computer code DYMONDA is provided.  
 
1. Identification of system hardware components  
All hardware components are included in the DFM model and are represented by process variables 
nodes in the model. The BS hardware components are presented in Table 16.  
Table 16: System hardware identification 
No.  Description Representation 
1.  Unit-1 U1 
2.  Unit-2 (Standby unit) U2-SB 
3.  Unit-3 U3 
4.  Level Sensor ML 
 
2. Identification of system parameters  
Parameters that captures the attributes of the hardware components are identified and modelled as 
process variables nodes in the DFM model. The BS parameters are presented in Table 17.  
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Table 17: System parameter identification 
No.  Description Representation 
1.  Tank Level TL 
2.  Total Net Fluid Flow TNF 
3.  Total Liquid Inflow TIF 
4.  Total Liquid Outflow TOF 
5.  Liquid Flow from Unit-1 U1-F 
6.  Liquid Flow from Unit-2 U2-F 
 
3. Identification of Condition Nodes 
A condition node, like the process variable nodes represents physical parameters. However, 
conditioning nodes more explicitly identify the switching action or failure modes/states of a 
component. Condition nodes of the BS are presented in Table 18.  
Table 18: System conditioning node identification 
No.  Description Representation 
1.  Unit-1 State or failure modes U1-S 
2.  Unit-2 State or failure modes U2-S 
3.  Unit-3 State or failure modes U3-S 
 
4. Relationship Establishment (causal, temporal and conditional) 
The process variable nodes are linked together by causality edges through transfer boxes and 
transition boxes to model the cause-effect and temporal relationships among the parameters. The 
conditioning nodes are linked to the transfer or transition box by the condition edges. For example, 
consider Figure 19: the total liquid flow from Unit-1 (U1-F) is dependent on the command signal 
to Unit-1 (U1) and the failure modes of Unit-1 (U1-S) which are stochastic in nature. U1 and U1-
F have a causal relationship which are represented and linked by causality edges, whereas U1-S 
and U1-F have a conditional relationship which is represented and linked by a condition edge (as 




Figure 19: DFM model of Total Liquid Flow from Unit-1 
The process of node linking via causality and condition edges is carried out for among all the 
parameters having a causal, temporal and conditional relationships. Eventually, this result in an 
integrated causality and time transition network as shown in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20: DFM Model of the Benchmark System 
 
5. Discretization of system parameters  
The identified process variable nodes and the condition nodes are then discretized into finite 
number of states for the purpose of analysis. The number of discretized states or cells depends on 
the analyst choice, level of in-depth modelling and the desired outcome. A sample discretization 
of liquid level is into five (5) mutually exclusive intervals is depicted in Table 19.  
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Table 19: Discretization of TL into 5 intervals 
State Intervals/Cells Description 
-2 Low-low (Sink cell) (𝑥 < −3)⁡𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
-1 Low (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛:−1) (−3⁡𝑡𝑜 − 1)⁡𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
0 Nominal level ⁡(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛: 0) (−1⁡𝑡𝑜 + 1)⁡𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
+1 High (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛:+1) (+1⁡𝑡𝑜 + 3)⁡𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
+2 High-high (Sink cell) (𝑥 > +3)⁡𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 
6. Development of decision table 
The decision tables within the transfer and transition boxes are constructed systematically via 
inductive approach, i.e., enumerating all possible combinations of input states and then finding the 
output state for each combinations. This ensures a complete and comprehensive table. Since 
enumerating all possible input combinations can be time taking, decision table reduction method 
is utilized to produce a compact table, suitable for use in the DYMONDA code. Sample decision 
table is depicted in Table 20. Note: “*” represents a “Don’t care” condition.  
Table 20: Decision table for TT1 with 5 discretized liquid level intervals 
TNF @t=-1 TL @t=-1 TL @t=0 
* -2 -2 (sink state) 
* +2 +2 (sink state) 
-1 -1 -2 
-1 0 -1 
-1 +1 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 +1 +1 
+1 -1 0 
+1 0 +1 
+1 +1 +2 
+2 -1 0 
+2 0 +1 
+2 +1 +2 
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The decision table TT1 captures the time element in the model. Notice that there are two TL but 
with different time element (@t= -1 and @t= 0). This implies that the current liquid level @t= 0 
is dependent on the net liquid flow and the liquid level in the previous time step @t= -1. This 
temporal transition relationship (system dynamics) is capture by the decision Table 20.  
7. Model Analysis  
Two scenarios were analyzed i.e., overflow and drained with two different discretization scheme: 
(1) With 5 discretized state variable intervals; (2) With 8 discretized state variable intervals. The 
top events in the model are defined in terms of state variable magnitudes, e.g., TL=+2 @t=0 and 
TL=-2 @t=0. For instance, TL=+2 @t=0 is interpreted as the liquid level being above 3 meters at 
time, t= 0. The simulation time step is chosen in such a way that transition occurs from an interval 
to the adjacent interval in a single time step. This avoid multiple intervals transition and provide 
smooth and finer results. Taking into account the number of discretized tank level, a single 
simulation time step was approximated to be 1 hour. Once the top event and simulation time step 
is defined, backtracking is performed through the model to generate timed PIs. For illustration 
purpose, few generated results are presented below.  
 
4.5.1. DFM Model results  
A. For TL=+2 @t=0 or ‘overflow’ with single time step (5 intervals)  
The first step is to define a top event in terms of the process variable node. The defined top event 
is then expressed as a transition table. The depth of backtracking process is selected (analyst 
choice). For the current case, a single time step is selected for demonstration purpose. A reduced 
transition table is shown in Table 21.  









TOP TL=+2 @t=0 
* * * +2 True 
* +1 +1 +1 True 
-1 * +1 +1 True 




The above transition table cannot be further reduced since the analysis is carried out only for a 
single time step. Thus, the backtracking process and transition table expansion is terminated and 
completed for the current analysis time step, t=-1. The transition table in Table 21 is the critical 
transition table. A further absorption and reduction merging as well as consensus operation is 
performed on the critical transition table to obtain the complete base, but they do not produce any 
change in the critical transition table. Thus, Table 21 is the complete base for the top event. The 
rows of Table 21 are the 4 PIs obtained for the Top Event “TL = +2 @ t = 0”. Quantification of 
the above PIs can be carried out with ease by inputting failure rates of each units in the respective 
process variable or conditioning nodes. The sum of the probabilities of mutually exclusive PIs 
yields the exact probability of the top event. For illustration purpose, quantification of the top event 
for system overflow with single time step is shown Table 22.  
Table 22: Quantification of prime implicants for system overflow 
# Prime Implicants Time Logic Probability 
1.  Tank Liquid Level was at +3 meters @t= -1  - 











6.52 × 10−6 











4.46 × 10−6 











3.57 × 10−6 






B. For TL=+2 @t=0 with two time step  
System analysis can be performed for the top event “TL=+2 @t=0” or “system overflow” as done 
in the previous section, however with 2 simulation time steps or in other words for 2 hours in this 
case. This implies that backtracking process will be carried out for 2 cycles. Complete base of the 
top event “TL=+2 @t=0” with 2 simulation time steps is shown in Table 23.  
















* * * * * * +2 True 
* * +1 0 -1 -1 +1 True 
* * +1 +1 -1 -1 0 True 
* * +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 True 
* * +1 +1 -1 0 +1 True 
* 0 +1 +1 -1 0 0 True 
* 0 +1 0 -1 -1 0 True 
+1 0 * * -1 -1 0 True 
+1 0 * * -1 -1 +1 True 
+1 +1 * * -1 -1 0 True 
+1 +1 * * -1 -1 +1 True 
+1 +1 * * -1 0 +1 True 
+1 +1 +1 +1 * * 0 True 
+1 0 +1 +1 * * +1 True 
+1 +1 +1 0 * * +1 True 
+1 +1 +1 +1 * * +1 True 
+1 0 +1 +1 * * 0 True 
 
The rows of Table 23 are the 17 prime implicants obtained for the top event “TL = +2 @ t = 0” 
with 2 simulation time steps. The quantification of the PIs results in:  




C. For ‘TL=+3 @t=0’ with 1 backtracking depth and 8 state variable intervals 
The model analysis is performed with increased number of state variable intervals to check the 
sensitivity of the PIs with respect to the number of states variable intervals. Table 24 presents the 
PIs for system overflow with 8 state variable intervals for 1 backtracking depth.  
Table 24: PIs for system overflow “TL=+3 @t= 0” 
# Prime Implicants Time Logic 
1.  Tank Liquid Level was between +2 and +3 meters @t= -1 AND 
Unit-1 Fail-High @t= -1 AND 
Unit-2 Fail-High @t= -1  
2.  Tank Liquid Level was between +2 and +3 meters @t= -1 AND 
Unit-1 Fail-High @t= -1 AND 
Unit-3 Fail-Low @t= -1  
3.  Tank Liquid Level was between +2 and +3 meters @t= -1 AND 
Unit-2 Fail-High @t= -1 AND 
Unit-3 Fail-Low @t= -1  
4.  Tank Liquid Level was between +1 and +2 meters @t= -1 AND 
Unit-1 Fail-High @t= -1 AND 
Unit-2 Fail-High @t= -1 AND 
Unit-3 Fail-Low @t= -1  
System overflow [(𝑇𝐿 = +3⁡(@𝑡 = ⁡0)] 1.456𝐸 − 05 
 
From Table 24, it may be observed that the PIs generated for the top event ‘system overflow’ with 
state variable intervals of 5 (Case-I) differs from the one with 8 state variable intervals (Case-II). 
Specifically, the prime implicant 4 (PI-4) is an additional PI. PI-4 does not appear in Case-I due to 
the fact that it is eliminated during the simplification process by Boolean algebra or absorption 
rule. Recall that PI-4 appears as a cut-set in the fault tree analysis, but not as a minimal cut-set. 
Similarly, PI-4 appears as an implicant in Case-I, but not as a PI. This can be attributed to less 
number of mutually exclusive state variable intervals for Case-I. Notice that in PI-4, the tank liquid 
level was between +1 and +2 meters @t= -1”. This additional discretized interval of state variable 
causes the PI-4 to be a timed-prime implicants in the complete base, even though a combination 
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of “Unit-1 fail-high AND Unit-2 fail-high AND Unit-3 fail-low @t=-1” is not a PI. It is important 
to note that, due to the dynamic evolution of the state variable with time and the dependencies of 
the state variable on the unit state combination, a system overflow scenario is observed in a single 
time step with PI-4. This is true since the volume of the discretized intervals covering the entire 
state space for Case-I is larger than for Case-II. Hence, many transition from an interval will tend 
to remain in the same interval given that the simulation time is small, and the volume of the 
discretized intervals are large. However, for Case-II, the state variable can make a transition to 
another discretized intervals due to the smaller interval volume.  
Similarly, simulation for 2 backtracking depth generates 28 PIs for Case-II, whereas for Case-I 
only 17 PIs are generated. The increased number of state intervals provide the analyst a more detail 
information and also increases the accuracy of the result obtained. However, computation time and 
complexity increase significantly with increased number of mutually exclusive intervals.  
 
D. Variation of PIs for 5 and 8 state variable intervals  
It may be observed that the number of PIs increases as the backtracking depth is increased. For 
instance, the number of PIs increased from 4 to 28 as the depth increased from 1 to 2. This implies 
that, with increasing depth there will be an increased number of possible ways for the system to 
fail due to the availability of time for the units to make transitions from normal to failure state. 
This analysis is performed with 5 and 8 state variable intervals to check the sensitivity of the 
number of PIs with respect to variation in number of state variable intervals. The sensitivity plot 
is depicted in Figure 21 for 10 backtracking depth. Of course, the state variable can be discretized 
into a larger number of intervals to obtain a finer result. However, system modelling and 




Figure 21: Sensitivity of number of PIs to discretized state variable intervals 
 
4.5.2. Timed-Fault Tree Generation from DFM  
For illustration and discussion purpose, the generation of timed-fault trees for system overflow 
scenario with 5 discretized state variable intervals is presented below. Similar to the classical FT 
technique, the first step is to define a desired top event in terms of state variable magnitude i.e., 
“TL=+2 @t=0” which is associated with the transition table “TT1”. The decision table of TT1 is 
utilized to determine the inputs that causes the tank liquid level to be in TL=+2 @t=0. Since the 
TT1 associated with time delays, it changes the time at which a particular variable state occurs. 
The first transition from time 𝑡 = 0 to 𝑡 = −1 can be observed in the timed-fault tree given below 
(See Figure 22). Throughout the backtracking process, dynamic and physical consistency rules are 
applied to process variables and conditioning nodes similar to that applied while developing the 




Figure 22: Timed-fault tree top event and its transition from @t=0 to @t= -1 
It can be observed in Figure A-III-1 (Appendix III) that the backtracking process from the top event 
“TL= +2 @t=0” results in the tank level TL= -1 @t= -1 or TL= -2 @t= -1 (G28 and G33). 
However, the tank level TL= +1 @t= -1 have already occurred under the same parent AND gate 
(G3 in Figure 22). This condition is impossible due to physical consistency i.e., tank liquid level 
cannot assume two different values/state in the same time step. Hence, G28 and G33 is eliminated 
from the tree. This elimination further leads to pruning of the parent AND gate G25.  
In Figure A-III-2 (transfer-in gate G7), the backtracking process for single time step @𝑡 = −1 
leads to tank level being at 𝑇𝐿 = 0⁡ ∪ −1⁡ ∪ −2⁡@𝑡 = −1 (G37). However, under the same parent 
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AND gate (G2), 𝑇𝐿 = +2⁡@𝑡 = −1 has already occurred. By physical consistency check, this 
condition is impossible to occur since liquid level cannot be in two or more different state in the 
same time step. This results in an elimination of gate G37. The removal of G37 further lead to a 
pruning of the AND gate G35, since initial pruning of G37 made the succeeding event occurrence 
to be impossible. The same argument holds for G46 and G48 in the transfer gate G8 (See Figure 
A-III-3).  
Application of physical and dynamic consistency rule reduces the overall timed-fault tree to Figure 
A-III-6: . The FT in Figure A-III-4 is further pruned by application of physical consistency rule to 
generate the final timed-FT shown in Figure 23. Since the Unit-1 fail-high have already occurred 
in G7, Unit-1 fail-closed (G23) cannot occur due to physical consistency, i.e., the Unit-1 cannot 
be in two different state in the same time step. Similarly, this argument holds for Unit-2 state. Unit-
2 fail-high has already occurred in G8, hence Unit-2 fail-closed (G53) cannot occur due to physical 
consistency, i.e., Unit-2 cannot be in two different state in the same time step. These pruning are 
due to the fact that the gates G7 and G8 first occurs under the AND gate G6 rather than the AND 
gate G14. The pruning would have been reversed if gate G14 appears first in the timed-FT then 
gate G6, i.e., G7 and G8 would have been pruned, whereas G23 and G53 would have appeared in 
the MCS. The MCSs for the final reduced timed-fault tree are given in Table 25.  
Table 25: Minimal cut-set for the final timed-fault tree 
1.  TL= +2 @t= –1 OR 
2.  (TL= +1 AND U1-S= +1 AND U2-S= +1) @t= –1 OR 
3.  (TL= +1 AND U1-S= +1 AND U3-S= –1) @t= –1 OR 
4.  (TL= +1 AND U2-S= +1 AND U3-S= –1) @t= –1  
 
It can be observed that the MCS for the timed-fault tree is exactly the same as the PIs generated 
using the DFM model. In other words, this process of backtracking and generation of time-fault 
trees from the DFM model points out the fact that results obtained from dynamic methods can be 










 Markov-CCMT Model of the Benchmark System  
The classical Markov model of the benchmark system presented provide a time-dependent 
behavior of the system via a transition matrix, however lacks capability to capture system 
dynamics. This section couples the classical Markov model with CCMT.  
 
a. Computation of ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡)  
The state transition matrix can be developed considering assumption number 4 in Sub-section 
3.2.3, in that the units have a statistically independent failure. The unit stochastic behavior is 
represented through ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡), which is the probability that the unit state combination at time 
𝑡 = (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 is at 𝑛, given that the unit state at time 𝑡 = 𝑘∆𝑡 is at 𝑛′. It can be expressed as:  
ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) = ℎ{𝑛((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) = 𝑛 𝑛(𝑘∆𝑡) = 𝑛′}⁄  
   (4-11) 
It can be observed that ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) is a conditional probability of the component state 
combination being at 𝑛 at time 𝑡 = (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡, given that the component state combination was at 
𝑛′ at time 𝑡 = 𝑘∆𝑡. ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) can be expressed as in Equation (3-50). 
For instance, 𝑛1 = 0, 𝑛2 = 0⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡𝑛3 = 0 at time 𝑘∆𝑡 implies that all the three units are normal, 
and hence 𝑛′ = 0. If 𝑛1 = 0, 𝑛2 = 0⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡𝑛3 = 0 at time (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 i.e., Unit-1, Unit-2 and Unit-
3 are normal, which implies 𝑛 = 0 (as per Table 12). Thus ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) can be written as;  
ℎ(0 0⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) = (𝑛1 = 0 𝑛
′
1 = 0⁄ ) ∗ (𝑛2 = 0 𝑛
′
2 = 0⁄ ) ∗ (𝑛3 = 0 𝑛′3 = 0⁄ ) (4-12) 
i.e., a transition of the system from normal state to normal state at time step 𝑘∆𝑡, [(𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡].  
ℎ(0 0⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) can be quantified in terms of the unit failure probabilities:  
ℎ(0 0⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) = (1 − 𝜆1∆𝑡) ∗ (1 − 𝜆2∆𝑡) ∗ (1 − 𝜆3∆𝑡)   (4-13) 
ℎ(0 0⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) = 0.987 
The transition probabilities among the other state combinations can be computed in the same 





Table 26: System state transition probabilities 






1⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) Unit-2 (𝑛2 𝑛
′
2⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) Unit-3 (𝑛3 𝑛
′
3⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) 
𝑃(𝑛1 = 0 𝑛
′
1⁄ = 0) 





𝑃(𝑛2 = 0 𝑛
′
2⁄ = 0) 





𝑃(𝑛3 = 0 𝑛
′
3⁄ = 0) 





𝑃(𝑛1 = 1 𝑛′1⁄ = 0) = 𝜆1
𝑓𝑐
∆𝑡 𝑃(𝑛2 = 1 𝑛′2⁄ = 0) = 𝜆2
𝑓𝑐
∆𝑡 𝑃(𝑛3 = 1 𝑛′3⁄ = 0) = 𝜆3
𝑓𝑐
∆𝑡 
𝑃(𝑛1 = 2 𝑛′1⁄ = 0) = 𝜆1
𝑓𝑜
∆𝑡 𝑃(𝑛2 = 2 𝑛′2⁄ = 0) = 𝜆2
𝑓𝑜





1⁄ ) = 0, otherwise 𝑃(𝑛2 𝑛
′
2⁄ ) = 0, otherwise 𝑃(𝑛3 𝑛
′
3⁄ ) = 0, otherwise 
 
Since there are 27 unit state combinations, ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) will have a 27 × 27 dimension 
matrix with the structure like Table 27. The algorithm for generating the overall matrix is 
developed and implemented using Fortran95. Note that, ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) is expressed as a 
product of individual unit failure probabilities due to the initial assumption made for the BS that 
unit failures are statistically independent.  
Table 27: Possible state transition among distinct unit state combinations 
𝒏′ 
𝒏 
1 2 3 ……….. 𝒊 ……….. 𝒏 
1 𝜇11∆𝑡 𝜆12∆𝑡 𝜆13∆𝑡 ……….. 𝜆1𝑖∆𝑡 ……….. 𝜆1𝑛∆𝑡 
2 0 𝜇22∆𝑡 𝜆23∆𝑡 ……….. 𝜆2𝑖∆𝑡 ……….. 𝜆2𝑛∆𝑡 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
𝒋 0 0 0 ……….. 𝜇𝑗𝑖∆𝑡 ……….. 𝜆𝑗𝑛∆𝑡 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
𝒏′ 0 0 0 0 0 ……….. 𝜇𝑛′𝑛∆𝑡 
 
For the BS under consideration, the conditional transition probability matrix ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) 
represent the BS stochastic time-dependent properties. A further analysis of the transition 
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probability matrix can be performed by decomposing the matrix into four (4) sub-matrices and re-
writing the transition probability matrix ‘P’ in the canonical form as shown in Table 28.  
Table 28: Canonical form of the transition probability matric 
P 𝑺′ 𝑻′ 
𝑺 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠⁡(𝐼) 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠⁡(𝑇) 
𝑻 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜⁡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠⁡(0) 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠⁡(𝑄) 
 
The decomposition is performed to analyze the evolution of the system from a transient state by 
making use of the transient sub-matrices 𝑇 and 𝑄. This enable one to understand the steady state 
of the system, or the probability that the system will eventually end up in a specific sink system 
state. Hence, for analysis purpose, layer-3 of the Markov model i.e., all unit failure is considered 
as the sink state of the system. This consideration is valid since as time 𝑡 → ∞, the system will end 
up in any of the states within layer-3. The sub-matrices 𝐼 and 𝑄 are square matrix, and 𝑇 are 
rectangular matrix. Hence, if the total number of states in the system is 𝑛⁡ states and the number 
of absorbing states is 𝑚, then the total number of non-absorbing states is (𝑛 − 𝑚) states. It is 
known that the sub-matrix 𝐼 is composed of absorbing states since it is an identity matrix, and thus 
have the dimension of (𝑚 ×𝑚) matrix. Since 𝑄 is a non-absorbing transient square sub-matrix, 
its dimension is [(𝑛 − 𝑚) × (𝑛 −𝑚)] matrix, which lead us to the matrices 𝑇 and 0 having a 
dimension of [𝑚 × (𝑛 −𝑚)] and [(𝑛 − 𝑚) ×𝑚] respectively. It is obvious from the above matrix 
decomposition that the transient group (𝑇) describe the transition of states from transient group to 
persistent groups. Whereas, the transient group (𝑄) describe the transition of system states from 
transient group (𝑄) to transient group (𝑇). The transient sub-matrices are extracted from the main 
transition probability matrix for further analysis of matrices T and Q. The fundamental matrix (N) 
of P can be determined using:  
𝑁 = (𝐼 − 𝑄)−1 
      (4-14) 
Key information can be extracted from the matrix N. The sum of the elements of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ column 
of N gives the expected absorption time of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ column transient state to be absorbed into a 
persistent states (See Table 29). For example, taking the last column of the fundamental matrix 𝑁, 
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the sum of the elements is ≅ 448, which is the expected (mean) absorption time of the transient 
state 0 (all units normal) into any of the persistent states conditioned upon that the system started 
at state 0 (initial condition). A further analysis can be performed by considering the individual 
elements of the last column vector in matrix N. For instance, considering the last element of the 
column vector, which is ≅ 75, it can be interpreted as the mean number of time the system is in 
state-0 given that the system started in state-0 initially. Or, considering the first element which is 
≅ 17; it can be interpreted as the number of time the system is in state-18 given that the system 
was initially in State-0. Similarly, other elements of the transition matrix can be explained.  
The matrix TN gives the steady-state probabilities for ending in any absorbing state given that the 
system started in a transient state. The (𝑖, 𝑗)𝑡ℎelements of the transient matrix 𝑇𝑁 is the probability 
of being absorbed into persistent or absorbing state 𝑖 from the transient state 𝑗. This absorption 
probability of the transient states is represented by 𝛼𝑗𝑖. For illustration purpose considering the 
matrix element 𝛼0,26 = 0.125, it can be interpreted as the probability of transition from the 
transient State-0 to the absorbing State-26. Or, considering the column vector of TN 𝛼0,𝑖 = 0.125, 
which means if the system started at State-0 (all units normal), it is equally likely for the system 
to end up in any of the absorbing states. Again, consider the first column of the matrix TN. It can 
be observed that 𝛼18,26 = 𝛼18,22 = 0.5, i.e., the probability of the system being absorbed in state-
26 given that the system was in state-18 is equally likely, whereas the other elements 𝛼18,𝑗 is zero. 
This can be validated by going back to the Markov model state representation of the system, i.e., 
if the system is in state-18 (𝑛1 = 0, 𝑛2 = 2, 𝑛3 = 2), it can only make a transition to either State-
22 or 26 (𝑛1 = 1⁡𝑜𝑟⁡2, 𝑛2 = 2, 𝑛3 = 2). This is due to the fact that the BS is a non-repairable 



















Transient System States (𝑗) 
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
26 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.125 
25 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.125 
24 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.125 
23 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.125 
22 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.125 
21 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.125 
20 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.125 
19 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.125 





Limitations of the time-dependent Markov chain can be observed after a detail analysis of state 
conditional probability matrix, and also recalling the system qualitative analysis performed in 
Section 4.4. Note that, these limitations were underlined with the knowledge of dynamic PSA.  
• For the classical Markov chain, it was assumed that the system states 19 to 26 are absorbing 
states, however this is not true from the perspective of dynamic PRA, i.e., states 19, 22 and 
24 that belongs to the set of absorbing states are not necessarily absorbing since these states 
do not lead to system overflow or drained scenario.  
• The system states 12, 13 and 17 are assumed as transient states in the classical Markov 
model, however this in not true from a dynamic PRA standpoint since these states lead to 
system overflow and drained condition. Thus, the system states 12, 13 and 17 must be 
considered as an absorbing states for dynamic PRA.  
• The most important aspect to be taken from this analysis is that, the classical Markov model 
is concerned with only the system hardware states thus neglecting the dynamic evolution 
of the system. System failure is explicitly defined only on system configuration, i.e., system 
failure occurs when all the 3 units fail. This is not necessarily true since the system can end 
up in a quasi-stable state even if all the 3 units’ fail (the phenomenon was observed in event 
tree analysis).  
The conditional transition probabilities matrix ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑘∆𝑡) generated can be coupled with 
system dynamics to generate a joint system probability matrix, and hence providing a possible 
approach to perform an integrated deterministic and probabilistic system assessment.  
 
b. Computation of 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′,⁄ 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡)  
For determination of 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′,⁄ 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡), the sate space is first discretized into finite number of 
computational cells. The equal weight quadrature scheme was used to partition the state variable 
magnitude. It is important to note that the transition among discretized cells depends on both the 
initial cell location and the system configuration at that instant. Thus, care must be taken in 
defining the initial location of the state variable within a cell. For the BS, it is obvious that the 
controlled variable state space is one dimensional i.e., liquid level (𝑥). CCMT requires the 
knowledge of top events in terms of state variable magnitude or computational absorbing cells. 
Discretization scheme of the state variable along with the control regions is shown in Table 31.  
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- 𝑗 = 1 𝑥 < −3⁡𝑚 𝑉1 Drained 
𝑉𝑟 = 1 𝑗 = 2 −3⁡𝑚 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ −1⁡𝑚 𝑉2 Low 
𝑉𝑟 = 2 𝑗 = 3 −1⁡𝑚⁡ ≤ 𝑥 ≤ +1⁡𝑚 𝑉3 Normal 
𝑉𝑟 = 3 𝑗 = 4 +1⁡𝑚⁡ ≤ 𝑥 ≤ +3⁡𝑚 𝑉4 High 
- 𝑗 = 5 𝑥 > +3⁡𝑚 𝑉5 Overflow 
Note: The top events are shaded (green) in the table, i.e., overflow and drained 
 
The three (3) control regions 𝑉𝑟 can be further divided into arbitrary number of sub-cells depending 
on the analyst choice and the outcome desired. For the benchmark system, since Ṽr are disjoint 
intervals themselves, 𝑉𝑗 are identical to Ṽr for minimum 𝐽𝑟 (i.e., 𝐽𝑟 = 1) and partitioning is unique 
with a single departure point 𝑃 = 1 from each region. Of course, more number of sub-cells 
increases the result accuracy. However, computational complexity and intensity increases with 
increased number of sub-cells/cells. A possible equal weight quadrature scheme with increased 
number of sub-cells is shown in Table 32. For the current analysis, 𝑃 = 3 is chosen for 
demonstration of the methodology at the same time balancing the accuracy and computation 
complexity. It can be observed from Table 32 that there are three departure points 𝑃 = 3 from 
each sub-cells, or the initial liquid level in the tank which is an input for system simulation.  
Table 32: Cell discretization via equal weight quadrature scheme 
𝐽 Liquid Level (𝑥) 
Equal weight Quadrature scheme 
𝑃 = 1 𝑃 = 3 𝑃 = 5 
𝑗 = 1 𝑥 < −3⁡𝑚 - - - 
























𝑗 = 5 𝑥 > +3⁡𝑚 - - - 
 
The state space discretization can be fairly mechanized by implementing it in a computer code 
given that the control space and number of sub-cells are defined. The source code for state space 
discretization is shown in the Appendix IV. Once the control space is discretized into sub-spaces, 
the trajectories of the state vector in the discretized space must be determine. For the benchmark 
system, the dynamic evolution of the liquid level in the tank is defined by:  
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓𝑛  
       (4-15) 
Or, Equation (4-15) can be re-write as:  
𝑑𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑛 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 
 
𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑛 ∗ ∆𝑡      (4-16) 
Thus, liquid level in the next time step is given by:  
𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑓𝑛 ∗ ∆𝑡      (4-17) 
Here, we can re-define the above equation for our analysis. It is considered here that:  
𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑓𝑛 ′ ∗ ∆𝑡 
     (4-18) 
The above system dynamics is written in 𝑛′ terms due to the assumption in the methodology that 
the component state combination does not change for a small-time step ∆𝑡, i.e., the computation 
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of 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′,⁄ 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) is conditioned upon that 𝑛′ does not change in the small time step ∆𝑡. In fact, 
𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′,⁄ 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) itself constitute a Markov chain. Since all the parameters on the right hand side of 
the Equation 42 is known or can be defined by the user, 𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) can be determined with ease 
for any given time step. The dimension of the state vector trajectories 𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) is dependent on 
the number of departure points 𝑥(𝑡), with both having the same dimension, and hence 𝑓𝑛′ ∗ ∆𝑡. 
Once 𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) is computed from the system code, 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′,⁄ 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) can be determined by 
integrating over the control space.  
For illustration purpose, first consider the control region-2 which is partitioned into 3 equally 
distributed sub-cells. Hence, there are three trajectory segments departing from 𝑉2 at time 𝑡 with 
the same 𝑛′, and arriving in IC number of 𝑉𝑗 at (𝑡 + ∆𝑡), depending on location of the controlled 
variables within 𝑉2 which is the 𝑉𝑗′  for this case. For the benchmark system at state 𝑛
′(𝑡) = 1, if 
the trajectory segments depart from 𝑉21, 𝑉22⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑉23 at time 𝑡, then the arrival points 𝑉𝑗 at (𝑡 +
∆𝑡) and hence 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′,⁄ 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) can be determined using the below algorithm. Since initially the 
state variable is in 𝑉21, 𝑉22⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑉23 sub-cell which are within the cell 𝑉2 at time 𝑡, the total 
probability of 𝑃𝑟𝑗,𝑛′(𝑡) must be:  
𝑃21,1(𝑡) + 𝑃22,1(𝑡) + 𝑃23,1(𝑡) = 1      (4-19) 
Here;  
𝑃𝑟𝑗,𝑛′(𝑡) = 𝑃21,1(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟{𝑛(𝑡) = 1, 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ 𝑉21 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ 𝑉2⁄ }   (4-20) 
𝑃22,1(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟{𝑛(𝑡) = 1, 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ 𝑉22 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ 𝑉2⁄ }    (4-21) 
𝑃23,1(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟{𝑛(𝑡) = 1, 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ 𝑉23 𝑥(𝑡) ∈ 𝑉2⁄ }    (4-22) 
By definition or by equal weight quadrature discretization scheme, the sub-cells 𝑉21, 𝑉22⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑉23 
have equal volumes, i.e.,  
𝑃21,1(𝑡) = 𝑃22,1(𝑡) = 𝑃23,1(𝑡) =
1
3
     (4-23) 
Hence, the transition from 𝑉1 to 𝑉1 can be determined as follow:  
𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉2⁄ , 1) = 𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉21⁄ , 1). 𝑃21,1(𝑡) + 𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉22⁄ , 1). 𝑃22,1(𝑡) 
+𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉23⁄ , 1). 𝑃23,1(𝑡)     (4-24) 
𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉2⁄ , 1) = (1 ∗ 0.333) + (1 ∗ 0.333) + (1 ∗ 0.333) 
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𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉2⁄ , 1) = 1.00 
And hence 𝑔(𝑉𝑗 𝑉2⁄ , 1) = 0 for 𝑗 ≠ 1, since the state vector trajectories will remain in region-2 
will 100% probability rather than making a transition to the other control regions. For the second 
case, consider for 𝑛′ = 12 with the state vector depart from 𝑉21, 𝑉22⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑉23 at time 𝑡 which is 
represented by 𝑉𝑗′ . The state vector trajectories and the arrival point 𝑉𝑗 can be computed a follow. 
By equal weight quadrature discretization scheme:  
𝑃21,12(𝑡) = 𝑃22,12(𝑡) = 𝑃23,12(𝑡) =
1
3
    (4-25) 
The transition from 𝑉2 to 𝑉2 for 𝑛
′ = 12 can be determined as:  
𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉2⁄ , 12) = 𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉21⁄ , 12). 𝑃21,12(𝑡) + 𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉22⁄ , 12). 𝑃22,12(𝑡) 
+𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉23⁄ , 12). 𝑃23,12(𝑡)    (4-26) 
𝑔(𝑉1 𝑉1⁄ , 12) = (1 ∗ 0.333) + 0 + 0 
𝑔(𝑉2 𝑉2⁄ , 12) = 0.333 
For transition from 𝑉2 to 𝑉3, we have:  
𝑔(𝑉3 𝑉2⁄ , 12) = 𝑔(𝑉3 𝑉21⁄ , 12). 𝑃21,12(𝑡) + 𝑔(𝑉3 𝑉22⁄ , 12). 𝑃22,12(𝑡) 
+𝑔(𝑉3 𝑉13⁄ , 12). 𝑃23,12(𝑡)     (4-27) 
𝑔(𝑉3 𝑉2⁄ , 12) = 0 + (1 ∗ 0.333) + (1 ∗ 0.333) 
𝑔(𝑉3 𝑉2⁄ , 12) = 0.667 
Hence, 𝑔(𝑉𝑗 𝑉2⁄ , 1) = 0 for 𝑗 ≠ 2, 3; since the state vector trajectories will remain in region-2 
with probability of 33 % and in region-3 with a probability of 66.7 %. Similarly, the rest of the 
trajectories can be computed mechanically via computer codes as shown in the Table 33. 
𝑃𝑟⁡{𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′, 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡⁄ )} is a 5 × 5 matrix for each unit state combinations, which results in 135 × 5 












𝒋′ 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 
2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1.00 
3 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1.00 
4 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 1.00 
5 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
131 26 1 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 
132 26 2 0 0.33 0.67 0 0 1.00 
133 26 3 0 0 0.33 0.67 0 1.00 
134 26 4 0 0 00 0.33 0.67 1.00 
135 26 5 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 
 
c. Computation of transition probability matrix 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′(𝑘∆𝑡)  
The elements of the overall system transition matrix 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′(𝑘∆𝑡) is a function of both the cell to 
cell transition probabilities 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′, 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡⁄ ) and the conditional unit state transition probabilities 
ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, 𝑘∆𝑡). 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′(𝑘∆𝑡) can be computed as follow:  
𝑞𝑛 ,𝑗
𝑛 ′ ,𝑗 ′ (𝑘∆𝑡) = 𝑔(𝑗 𝑗′ ,𝑛′ ,𝑘∆𝑡⁄ ).ℎ(𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗,𝑘∆𝑡) 
    (4-28) 
The sum of the column elements of 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
(∆𝑡) must be equal to 1.00. Hence, the transition matrix 
can be verified and validated once obtained before performing further computation. Since there 
are 27 distinct system states and 5 cells of the controlled variable state space, the 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′(𝑘∆𝑡) matrix 
will have an overall matrix dimension of 27 × 5 = 135 rows and 135 columns, where 𝑁 = 27 
and 𝐽 = 5. Thus, the transition matrix 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′(𝑘∆𝑡) = 135 × 135 square matrix (a small portion of 











d. Computation of 𝑃𝑛,𝑗((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡)  
The computation of 𝑃𝑛,𝑗(𝑘∆𝑡) for any specific time step can be performed using the inductive as 
well as the deductive algorithm. For the current case, an inductive algorithm has been implemented 
with the initial condition 𝑃𝑛′,𝑗′(0) to determine 𝑃𝑛,𝑗((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡). For analysis purpose, the system 
is assumed to be in normal condition with all the units being in normal state and the liquid level in 
the nominal region. This can be quantitively expressed as;  
𝑃𝑛 ′ ,𝑗 ′ (0) =  
1   ; 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛′ = 1, 𝑗′ = 3
0   ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
     (4-29) 
Or, the initial system condition is expressed as:  
𝑃1,1(0) = 0;⁡𝑃1,2(0) = 0;⁡𝑃1,3(0) = 1;⁡𝑃1,4(0) = 0;⁡𝑃1,5(0) = 0;⁡𝑃2,1(0) = 0;… . . 𝑃𝑁,𝐽(0) = 0 
Once the initial condition and the time step are fixed, 𝑃𝑛,𝑗((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) can be computed utilizing 
𝑞(𝑛, 𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, 𝑘∆𝑡) and by implementing the Forward algorithm. In order to determine the top event 
probabilities at any given time step, we must recall the space discretization scheme in which 𝑗 = 1 
and 𝑗 = 5 are considered as absorbing cells in the system. Hence, the top events are described in 
terms of the value of computational cells 𝑗. More specifically, 𝑗 = 1 implies liquid level 𝑥 < −3⁡𝑚 
which is the Drained condition, and 𝑗 = 5 implies 𝑥 > +3⁡𝑚 which is the overflow condition. 
Thus, for a specific time step, summing up all the elements of 𝑃𝑛,𝑗((𝑘 + 1). ∆𝑡) for 𝑗 = 1 and 𝑗 =
5 will give the probabilities of system drained and overflow scenario respectively. If the overall 
probability of system failure (overflow + drained) at any given time step is represented by 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑘∆𝑡), it can be written as the summation of:  
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑘∆𝑡) =  𝑃𝑛 ,1(𝑘∆𝑡)
𝑁
𝑛=1




    (4-30) 
Hence the system reliability 𝑅(𝑘∆𝑡) is given by (See Table 35):  





Table 35: Top event probabilities for the benchmark system 
Time step 𝑃𝑛,1(𝑘∆𝑡) 𝑃𝑛,5(𝑘∆𝑡) 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑘∆𝑡) 
𝑘 = 0 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 1 0 0 0 
𝑘 = 2 0 1.02E − 08 1.02E − 08 
𝑘 = 3 1.86E − 07 9.17E − 05 9.19E − 05 
𝑘 = 4 2.15E − 06 5.11𝐸 − 04 5.14E − 04 
 
Table 36: Sample state transition probabilities 
𝑷𝒏,𝒋 𝑷(𝒌 = 𝟎) 𝑷(𝒌 = 𝟏) 𝑷(𝒌 = 𝟐) 
𝑃0,3 1 0.9867 0.96 
𝑃1,3 0 0.0023 0.0067 
𝑃2,3 0 0.0023 0.0067 
𝑃3,3 0 0.00283 0.0083 
𝑃4,3 0 0.00283 0.0083 
𝑃5,3 0 0.00155 0.00457 
𝑃6,3 0 0.00155 0.00457 
𝑃7,3 0 6.50E − 06 5.77E − 05 
𝑃8,3 0 6.50E − 06 5.77E − 05 
𝑃9,3 0 3.55E − 06 3.14E − 05 
𝑃10,3 0 3.55E − 06 3.14E − 05 
𝑃11,3 0 6.50E − 06 5.77E − 05 
𝑃12,3 0 6.50E − 06 5.12E − 05 
𝑃12,4 0 0 6.46E − 06 
𝑃13,3 0 3.55E − 06 2.79E − 05 
𝑃13,4 0 0 3.51E − 06 
𝑃14,3 0 3.55E − 06 3.14E − 05 
𝑃15,3 0 4.44E − 06 3.95E − 05 
𝑃16,3 0 4.44E − 06 3.95E − 05 
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𝑃17,3 0 4.44E − 06 3.51E − 05 
𝑃17,4 0 0 4.40E − 06 
𝑃18,3 0 4.44E − 06 3.95E − 05 
𝑃19,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.73E − 07 
𝑃20,2 0 0 1.02E − 08 
𝑃20,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.62E − 07 
𝑃21,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.42E − 07 
𝑃21,4 0 0 3.06E − 08 
𝑃22,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.73E − 07 
𝑃23,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.42E − 07 
𝑃23,4 0 0 3.04E − 08 
𝑃24,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.73E − 07 
𝑃25,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.02E − 07 
𝑃25,4 0 0 6.08E − 08 
𝑃25,5 0 0 1.02E − 08 
𝑃26,3 0 1.02E − 08 2.42E − 07 
𝑃26,4 0 0 3.04E − 08 
Note: Only the non-zero state probabilities are depicted in the table. Of course, as the time step 
increases the whole state space will be covered.  
For discussion and illustration purpose, consider Table 35 and Table 36.  
1. For 𝑘 = 1, the top event probability 𝑃𝑛,5(𝑘∆𝑡) = 0. This implies that the system overflow 
scenario will not occur in a single time step given that the system was in the nominal region at 
𝑘 = 0. It can be observed that even though the system does not result to a condition, there exist 
some probabilities for the system to make transitions from the system nominal operation state 
to several other system states. This can be evidently observed in the table, where the 𝑃𝑛,𝑗(1) 
elements for 𝑛 ≠ 0 and 𝑗 = 3 have non-zero probabilities. These elements can be interpreted 
as the probabilities of the system states transition due to the stochastic nature of the unit 
failures, however without leading to any system failure condition. This provide the analyst an 
important information that a defined top event in terms of state vector magnitude does not 
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necessarily occur even if a hardware/component failure may occur at a given time. This is due 
to the fact that the system dynamics have been accounted for, and the initial/previous position 
of the state vector at ((𝑘 − 1)∆𝑡) in the discretized space and its subsequent evolution for a 
given system state dictates the top event probabilities. In contrast to the FT analysis where 
instant system failure occurs, or the top event probability is dictated only by the state of the 
basic events, thus neglecting dynamic evolution of state vector. The methodology also provides 
significant quantitative information on the possible states a system can take at any point in 
time. Furthermore, the probability of the system being in normal condition i.e., all units normal 
and liquid level at nominal region is 0.986. This value implies the dynamic reliability of the 
system or an explicit representation of hardware state and state variable. Besides the normal 
operating condition, the most probable state that the system can take in a single time step are 
𝑃3,3(1) = 𝑃4,3(1) = 2.84E − 03. 𝑃3,3(1) and 𝑃4,3(1) both implies a change in system state 
[(𝑛1 = 0 ∩ 𝑛2 = 1 ∩ 𝑛3 = 0)⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡(𝑛1 = 0 ∩ 𝑛2 = 2 ∩ 𝑛3 = 0)], but constant state variable 
magnitude (Region-3).  
2. For 𝑘 = 2, summing up all the elements for 𝑗 = 5, we obtain the top event probability of 
system overflow is 𝑃𝑛,5(2) = 1.02E − 08⁡ and system drained is 𝑃𝑛,1(2) = 0. And the 
probability of the system being in normal condition is 0.96. It is self-explanatory that the model 
output explicitly identifies system configuration, state variable magnitude and unit state order.  
The obtained results of 𝑃𝑛,𝑗((𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡) can be validated by checking the necessary condition 




𝑛=1 = 1. This validation assures the analyst that the computation was 
performed correctly with the computational cells covering the entire space without overlapping, 
and that the probability of finding the state vector 𝑥 in the discretized space 𝑗 for a given system 
configuration 𝑛 at any given time step 𝑘∆𝑡 is 1.00.  
 
 Conclusion and Comparison  
In this chapter, a detail analysis of the BS was performed using FT/ET analysis, classical Markov 
model, DFM and coupled Markov-CCMT method. It was observed that the dominant classical 
techniques (ET/FT) have limitations in the modeling and treatment of time-dependent interactions 
that shape dynamic event sequences, and state variable evolution. For instance, for the BS, the end 
states depend on the order of unit failure, timing of failure events and magnitude of the state 
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variable. Classical PRA approach which is static in nature do not have the capability to capture 
these interactions and may omit risk-significant event sequence. Classical Markov model have the 
capability to capture time-dependent system behavior through state transition matrix. However, 
the model lacks the capability to capture system dynamics. Dynamic PRA methods attempt to 
address the above-mentioned issues and drawbacks by accounting simultaneously for the time 
element, stochastic state transition and dynamic system evolution. A comparison of the 
methodologies is presented below.  
 
1. Predicted benchmark system failure probability  
The failure probability of the benchmark system predicted by each of the methodologies for four 
(4) time steps are presented in the tables below.  
Table 37: Predicted failure probability of the BS using FT (binary) 
FT (binary) 
Predicted system failure probability 
𝒕 = 𝟏 𝒕 = 𝟐 𝒕 = 𝟑 𝒕 = 𝟒 
Total failure probability  3.15𝐸 − 03 6.36𝐸 − 03 9.61𝐸 − 03 1.29𝐸 − 02 
 
Table 38: Predicted failure probability of the BS using FT (multi-state) 
FT (multi-states) 
Predicted system failure probability 
𝒕 = 𝟏 𝒕 = 𝟐 𝒕 = 𝟑 𝒕 = 𝟒 
Overflow  1.46𝐸 − 05 5.82𝐸 − 05 1.31𝐸 − 04 2.33𝐸 − 04 
Drained  1.02𝐸 − 08 8.16𝐸 − 08 2.75𝐸 − 07 6.53𝐸 − 07 
Total failure probability 1.46𝐸 − 05 5.83𝐸 − 05 1.31𝐸 − 04 2.34𝐸 − 04 
 
Table 39: Predicted failure probability of the BS using ET 
Event Tree  
Predicted system failure probability 
𝒕 = 𝟏 𝒕 = 𝟐 𝒕 = 𝟑 𝒕 = 𝟒 
Overflow  2.91𝐸 − 05 1.83𝐸 − 04 5.69𝐸 − 05 1.29𝐸 − 03 
Drained  3.06𝐸 − 08 2.45𝐸 − 07 8.26𝐸 − 07 1.96𝐸 − 06 




Table 40: Predicted failure probability of the BS using Markov model with the qualitative 
consideration taken in Table 12.  
Markov model  
Predicted system failure probability 
𝒕 = 𝟏 𝒕 = 𝟐 𝒕 = 𝟑 𝒕 = 𝟒 
Overflow  0 2.91𝐸 − 05 8.68𝐸 − 05 1.73𝐸 − 04 
Drained  0 0 0 6.12𝐸 − 08 
Total failure probability 0 2.91𝐸 − 05 8.68𝐸 − 05 1.73𝐸 − 04 
 
For the dynamic methods presented in the below tables, the initial condition of the tank level was 
assumed to be in the nominal region.  
Table 41: Predicted failure probability of the BS using Markov-CCMT model  
Markov-CCMT model 
Predicted system failure probability 
𝒕 = 𝟏 𝒕 = 𝟐 𝒕 = 𝟑 𝒕 = 𝟒 
Overflow  0 1.02E − 08 9.17E − 05 5.11𝐸 − 04 
Drained  0 0 1.86E − 07 2.15E − 06 
Total failure probability  0 1.02E − 08 9.19E − 05 5.14E − 04 
 
Table 42: Predicted failure probability of the BS using DFM 
DFM  
Predicted system failure probability 
𝒕 = 𝟏 𝒕 = 𝟐 𝒕 = 𝟑 𝒕 = 𝟒 
Overflow  0 3.345E − 05 9.54E − 05 1.86E − 04 
Drained  0 1.36E − 07 4.985E − 06 2.345E − 05 
Total failure probability  0 3.36E − 05 1.00E − 04 2.09E − 04 
 
2. Multistate Modelling 
Fault Tree Analysis:  
Classical FTA is based on binary representation of component/system states, and hence only two 
states (normal and failed) are analyzed for system reliability assessment. However, realistically, 
there is always a possibility for a component/system to have several failure modes. This is 
especially true while modelling a redundant system. For instance, a valve can fail-high, fail-closed, 
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fail in 50% position, etc.; and a system can overflow, drained or quasi-stable. In FTA, component 
failure modes are treated independently, rather than in an integrate fashion (refer Appendix I). This 
result in an overestimation of system failure probability. Furthermore, for a system with multiple 
failure modes, each top event requires a separate construction of FT.  
Event Tree Analysis:  
Similar to the FTA, classical ETA is also based on binary representation of component/system 
states. ETA being an inductive approach provide a possibility to model multiple component or 
system states, in the sense that every possible failure mode of a component results in multiple 
system states. It may be observed from the BS analysis that, each unit failure mode results in 9 
possible system states. However similar to the FTA, all failure modes of a component are treated 
independently, and each failure modes requires a separate analysis and construction of ET. Hence 
for a component with multiple failure modes the analysis become tedious and time consuming.  
Classical Markov Model:  
The classical Markov model clearly provide a superior way to analyze systems or components 
with multiple states as compared to the classical FT/ET (Appendix I). Markov model of a 
component/system takes into account the competition among states of a component, i.e., the 
likelihood of occurrence of a particular component state among all possible states. This provide 
the analyst a realistic result and does not overestimate the system failure probability. At a system 
level, it may be observed from the BS analysis that the model results in 27 distinct system states.  
Dynamic Flowgraph Method:  
DFM is based on a multi-valued logic, where multiple component/system states are expressed in 
terms of causal relationships among system parameters. Any number of component/system states 
can be enumerated in the decision table. For instance, a three-state variable (fail low, fail high and 
fail at 50% position) is represented as three inputs to a decision table resulting in different output 
of the decision table. Furthermore, a single DFM model once developed can analyze any system 
condition of possible interest, i.e., any number of top event of interest can be evaluated with a 
single model. This is a significant advantage over the classical PSA techniques.  
Coupled Markov-CCMT Model:  
Markov-CCMT model is based on a multi-state system characterization, with the feature to 
represent an arbitrary number of system states depending on the number of component states and 
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partitioned state variable states. It can be observed from the analysis of benchmark system that the 
model result in a 135 distinct system states. This provide significant information to an analyst with 
regard to possible states a system can take. However, a drawback in explicit states definition is 
that it is difficult to visualize or foresee the total set of possible states a system can take prior to 
scenario development.  
 
3. Time Dependencies 
Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis:  
The classical FT/ ET is based on static logic modelling, and hence do not account for the time 
element (exact timing of failure event) and lacks the capability to accurately quantify the event 
sequence probability deviation with time besides the state variable evolution in time.  
Classical Markov Model:  
The Markov model is a rigorous time-dependent model with explicit modelling of time element 
during states transition. Time-dependent system state probabilities can be obtained once the model 
is constructed. However, an accident sequence with state variable evolution in time cannot be 
captured in the model due to the fact that system dynamics is ignored in the model.  
Dynamic Flowgraph Method:  
The DFM can explicitly represent time element as well as the evolution of the state variable in 
time besides depicting the type of unit failure. All the PIs generated via DFM model are time-
stamped and dictates the type of system failure scenario. The backtracking process can also be 
performed to unveil system state in the previous time steps (dependent on the depth of 
backtracking), as was demonstrated in this chapter. This allow one to observe the development of 
event sequence in time.  
Coupled Markov-CCMT Model:  
The coupled Markov-CCMT model can explicitly account for the time element as well as the state 
variable evolution. Besides the unit states, the exact timing of failure event is taken into account 
that eventually influence the end state (overflow or drained). The methodology utilizes real time, 





4. System Dynamics 
Fault and Event Tree Analysis:  
The classical FTA and ETA represent a system state with a set of success/failure states of the 
system components. The methodologies are neither developed nor is deliberated to model system 
dynamic response and its evolution. Thus, the classical methodologies lack the capability to 
capture unit/component dynamic interactions. It was observed that ET technique provide a better 
approach compared to FT to model systems that response dynamically to IEs, in that, it can provide 
a correct failure logic and a qualitative assessment of system end states.  
Markov Model:  
The classical Markov model is intended for discrete time discrete system state representation, but 
not to model system dynamics or state variable evolution, i.e., the deterministic aspect. The model 
is oriented to system hardware states modelling rather than system dynamics. Hence it lacks the 
capability to model dynamic system evolution.  
Dynamic Flowgraph Method:  
DFM provide a favorable approach to model system dynamics by explicit representation of time 
element and state variable evolution. Dynamic system behaviors are represented as a series of 
discrete state discrete time transitions and is modelled in the transition box decision tables. 
Furthermore, dynamic consistency rules are applied to eliminate impossible events and generate a 
consistent accident sequence. However, decision tables have to be constructed separately for 
varying time steps size and state variable intervals. The methodology is oriented towards and 
sensitive to the partitioned state variable interval size. A drawback of the methodology is that, the 
influence of state variable evolution on the failure/demand rate of the units cannot be accounted. 
The methodology rather focuses on probabilistic system dynamic and provide an overview of the 
evolution of failure as well as normal events for each time steps. Overall DFM can accurately 
represent, analyze and uncover all risk-significant dynamic event sequence.  
Coupled Markov-CCMT model:  
Due to the limitation of the classical Markov model to account for system dynamics, CCMT is 
coupled with Markov model to represent system dynamics in discrete-space discrete-time. The 
joint transition probability matrix of the model explicitly depicts evolution of the state variable, 
the conditional dependencies between the unit states. Thus, the model captures the unit states 
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transition caused by deterministic laws as well as by stochastic nature of the units. This feature of 
the methodology enables one to simultaneously account for system dynamics and stochastic state 
transition (tightly coupled). In addition to accounting for time-dependent system states probability, 
the model has the capability to capture the possibility of failure frequency deviation with state 
variable evolution i.e., likelihood of a subsequent failure given an IE due to the state variable 
evolution. For instance, if all the units are in normal state and the state variable make a transition 
from region 𝑗′ → 𝑗 = 2 → 3 at 𝑡 = 0, the deterministic law will demand unit-1 to remain open, 
unit-2 to turn off and unit-3 to open. Hence, the possible unit failure states are: unit-1 can fail-
closed, unit-2 can fail-open and unit-3 can fail-closed. Unit-1 fail-open failure rate is not taken into 
account since this state of the unit does not contribute to the system failure conditioned upon that 
the control laws demand the unit to open. Hence, for this particular case unit-1 fail-open rather 
contribute to the success of the system at this particular time step and state variable magnitude 
transition. The same argument holds for the case of unit-2 and unit-3. This dynamic scenario and 
system response to an event thus changes the probability of unit failure, besides the deviation of 
unit failure rate with time.  
 
5. Event Ordering 
Fault Tree Analysis:  
The FTA is not intended to model state or failure event ordering, rather it represents the top event 
in terms of combinations of basic events (minimal cut-sets) without any particular ordering index.  
Event Tree Analysis:  
In ETA, the sequence ordering in pre-set by the analyst as was observed and pointed out in the ET 
of the benchmark system. Hence, the methodology lacks the capability to capture risk significant 
dynamic event sequences that can probabilistically evolve from dynamic system interactions, 
which would then remain uncovered.  
Classical Markov Model:  
In the Markov model, the order in which a unit/component state occur in the accident sequence is 
explicitly modelled due to the dependence of top events on state ordering. This is especially true 
for systems with multiple top events. The state sequence and possible number of system state is a 
priori fixed by the analyst. It can be observed from the BS analysis that each of the 27 states have 
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unique state ordering, and the probability of occurrence of a state is dictated not only by time and 
transition rate, but also by the order in which unit failure occurs. The state ordering is simplified 
by categorizing the system states in a layer wise approach (as done in this case).  
Dynamic Flowgraph Method:  
In DFM, the event sequence is not pre-determined by the analyst but rather the sequence evolves 
probabilistically from the time-dependent system model, and dynamic interactions among the 
units. The methodology strictly takes into account the order of unit failures in each time step. This 
allow one to observe the time-dependent scenario development in an orderly fashion. The dynamic 
accident sequence is presented as a set of timed-prime implicants for any top event of interest with 
explicit representation of the state variable magnitude and time element. Size of the PIs as well as 
the number of PIs increases with increasing time steps, i.e., similar to the logic ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ 
gate in FT where AND gate increases the MCS size and OR gate increases the number of MCSs.  
Coupled Markov-CCMT:  
Similar to the classical Markov model, state sequence is explicitly modelled, and the possible 
number of system states are a priori set by the analyst. This is also a limitation since it is difficult 
to envision all the possible system states prior to scenario development. Only the state probabilities 
changes, and the model is memoryless, in that, time-dependent sequence development cannot be 
observed. Unlike DFM, the order, size and number of system states in Markov-CCMT model 
remains fixed throughout the analysis. Here, DFM provide an advantage as it allow one to observe 
the dynamic event sequence.  
 
6. Computational Demand, Complexity and Time  
Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis:  
The classical FTA and ETA are well-established methodologies that can be implemented 
systematically requiring less computational resource and time. The time requirement however may 
increase significantly depending on the number of top events and IEs for FT and ET respectively.  
Classical Markov Model:  
For system with large number of possible system states, the computational demand and complexity 
increases significantly. Furthermore, construction and modelling of the transition diagram can be 
considerably time consuming depending on the number of states.  
A-118 
 
Dynamic Flowgraph Method:  
In comparison with other methodologies, DFM provide the flexibility for system analysis via 
inductive as well as deductive approach. However, construction of decision tables can become 
complex and time consuming with increased number of system parameters and discretized states, 
requiring other pseudo codes for decision table construction. For instance, decision table TT1 for 
the BS was constructed in MATLAB. The methodology also requires a highly time-dependent 
system model which may require significant amount for time for model development. The results 
obtained from DFM model requires significant post-processing so that they can be integrated into 
an existing classical PRA model. The post-processing via backtracking process, and subsequent 
generation of timed-FTs requires significant amount of time and diligent application of consistency 
rules in every branching point, thus requiring a high analytical skill level.  
Coupled Markov-CCMT:  
It was observed from the BS analysis that the computational demand for coupling physical and 
stochastic model can be very intensive, complex and timing consuming. The computational 
increases significantly with the number of state variables, possible system states and discretized 
number of computational cells in the state-space. This phenomenon is well known as state space 
explosion. The size of the transition matrix can become very large requiring significant amount of 
time for its evaluation. In contrast to the above, the methodology provides features to validate the 
model at any point in time during its implementation. Another drawback of the methodology is 
that, it requires a highly time-dependent system model. Furthermore, post-processing of the results 
obtained from Markov-CCMT model requires significant time. Last but not the least, the analytical 
skill level required to model and implement the methodology is considerably demanding.  
 
7. Interface 
Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis:  
FTA and ETA are user friendly, and there exist several well-established computer codes such as 
CAFTA, FaulTree+ and RiskSpectrum.  
Classical Markov Model:  
Solving the set of coupled ODEs can be challenging with increased number of system states and 
transition among these states. However, there exist many well established numerical methods for 
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obtaining the ODE solutions and can be systematically implemented in computer codes such as 
Fortran95, C and Python.  
Dynamic Flowgraph Method:  
System modelling and analysis in DFM can be performed in DYMONDA code, a graphical user 
interface. This is a significant advantage over other dynamic techniques which does not have an 
integrated and user friendly interface.  
Coupled Markov-CCMT Model:  
There exist no well-established integrated computer codes for implementation of the methodology. 
Stochastic nature of the components and the deterministic aspects of the system have to be 
modelled separately using different codes, and then eventually coupling the two model. For the 
BS, the Markov model is implemented in Fortran95 and CCMT or deterministic system model is 
implemented in MATLAB. Thus, coupling of Markov-CCMT model is relatively complex and 




 CHAPTER 5: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
OF PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEM  
 Introduction  
This chapter presents a preliminary roadmap and activities to be carried out for the project on 
“Design and Performance Assessment of Passive Engineered Safety Features in Advanced Small 
Modular Reactors”. the method of selection of the technology and system to be analyzed is 
presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses a novel approach to modelling generic passive 
safety systems (PSSs) in an integrated framework for dynamic reliability assessment. Section 5.4 
provide a detail description of a generic isolation condenser system (ICS) to be used as a 
benchmark system for the CRP. Note that the current research is not design/plant specific but 
concerns a typical design of an ICS implemented in iPWR SMRs. Section 5.5 characterize the ICS 
into macro-components or units, with each unit modelled separately using FT (failure rate 
evaluation method) and Markov model. Section 5.6 integrates the individual units to predict the 
overall ICS system behavior. Note that only sample results are presented for illustration purpose.  
 
 Research Project Roadmap  
This sub-section provide a roadmap for the coordinated research project (CRP) on, “Design and 
Performance Assessment of Passive Engineered Safety Features in integral PWR-type Small 
Modular Reactors”. The task and responsibilities include:  
• For 2017: literature survey of defence-in-depth being adopted in SMR designs and draft 
a technical report on technical description of passive engineered safety features in SMRs;  
• For 2018: develop manual and support CRP participants in using certain PSA techniques;  
• For 2019: draft the scope and main content of a technical document (project outcome).  
Recognizing and taking into account the above responsibilities to be fulfilled, a review of current 
SMR technology and passive safety systems in advanced reactor designs was performed as an 




Figure 24: Proposed coordinated research project roadmap 
 
Aforementioned in Chapter 4, Markov-CCMT model was chosen over DFM to model passive 
systems due to its capability to capture time-dependent dynamic interactions. The author intends 
to provide the basis of how dynamic PRA can be more applicable and suitable for passive systems 
analysis in iPWR-type SMRs.  
1. SMRs are simple in design; thus, fewer number of components that address both steady 
and transient conditions. Yet even for smaller core, off normal reactivity control must be 
as quick as large reactors. Thus, post shutdown system must remove decay heat with little 
human intervention for approximately 72 hours mission time. Thus, the extent to which 
dynamic analysis like that presented in Chapter 4 should be investigated in order to assure 
that classical PRA is sufficient or insufficient;  
2. Provided that iPWR-type SMRs as designed in simple terms with less number of 
components, the phenomenon of state-space explosion can be investigated to develop and 
demonstrate dynamic PRA methods.  
3. Passive systems performance is not only dependent on the hardware state, but also on 
critical system parameters such as presence of non-condensable, heat loss, fouling, etc. 
These parameters which influence the system dynamics and hence the functional reliability 
must be taken considered in the analysis. The dynamic methods presented in Chapter 4 
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have the capabilities to account for these parameters in an integrated fashion. However, the 
applicability of the techniques to model and analyze passive systems reliability should be 
demonstrated via a benchmark system.  
 
The IAEA defines PSSs as “a system that is composed entirely of passive components and 
structures or a system, which uses active components in a very limited way to initiate subsequent 
passive operation”. PSSs can be categorized into four (4) class: [IAEA-TECDOC-626]  
I. Category A: Characterized by systems that has no signal inputs of intelligence, no 
external power sources or forces, no moving mechanical parts and no moving working 
fluid, e.g., accumulators.  
II. Category B: Characterized by systems that has no signal inputs of intelligence, no 
external power sources or forces, no moving mechanical parts but have a moving 
working fluid, e.g., passive containment cooling systems.  
III. Category C: Characterized by systems that has no signal inputs of intelligence, no 
external power sources or forces, but composed of moving mechanical parts with or 
without moving working fluids, e.g., relief valves.  
IV. Category D: Intermediary zone between active and passive where the execution of the 
safety function is made through passive methods, i.e., passive execution/active 
initiation, e.g., emergency shutdown systems based on gravity.  
A comprehensive review of active, passive and hybrid safety systems implemented in SMRs 
technology with focus on iPWR design was performed. Additionally, the author categorized the 
PSSs based on their functions, including:  
1. Passive residual heat removal systems (e.g., mPower)  
2. Passive safety injection system (e.g., SMART)  
3. Passive containment cooling system (e.g., NuScale)  
4. Passive/automatic depressurization system (e.g., CAREM).  
The iPWR SMR designs that implements passive systems to achieve the above mentioned 
functions are provided as an example. A stepwise assessment and flowchart of the reviews 
performed to select the reactor design and passive safety system to be used as a benchmark for the 




Figure 25: Stepwise review and flowchart for design and system selection 
 
The passive ICS belonging to the category of passive reactor depressurization systems was selected 
to be used as a benchmark system for the project. According to the IAEA classification on passive 
systems, the ICS is within the Category D. The basis for the selection of ICS as a benchmark 
system includes:  
• The ability to maintain reactor coolant system pressure without the loss of primary coolant;  
• The ICS has been implemented in iPWR SMRs (e.g., CAREM, IRIS, AHWR) with varying 
objectives such as reactor depressurization, to maintain reactor hot standby and to reduce 
the frequency of SRVs operation;  
• The ICS has been used as a benchmark system for validation of developing methodologies 
for reliability assessment of passive safety systems [IAEA-TECDOC-1752];  
• Large reactor designs such as ESBWR has implemented ICS. This increases the availability 
of research materials on ICS, physical modelling approach and experimental data;  
• An ongoing effort within the nuclear community to model and predict system behavior 
based on natural circulation.  
After the selection of reactor design (i.e., iPWR) and passive safety system to be analyzed (i.e., 
the ICS), the next step is the selection of a methodology to assess and predict the deterministic as 
well as probabilistic behavior of the isolation condenser system. A comprehensive review of 
current methodologies for assessment of PSSs was performed, of which reliability methods for 
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passive safety functions (RMPS) [Ricotti et al. (2002); Jafari et al. (2003); Marques et al. (2005)] 
and Assessment of Passive System Reliability (APSRA) [Nayak et al. (2007, 2008(a))] 
methodologies provide a promising approach [IAEA-TECDOC-1752 (2014); Zio et al. (2009)]. 
The two methodologies differ from the fact that APSRA attributes the passive system failure to 
hardware failures (e.g., condensate return valves), whereas RMPS methodology emphasize more 
on the uncertainties arising from physical phenomenon such as heat loss, non-condensable 
fraction, oxidation, etc. In PSSs system dynamics have a huge impact on its behaviour. Both the 
methodologies attribute the passive system failure to the deviation of system parameters and 
component failures, however the two are treated separately, i.e., independent modelling of system 
deterministic and probabilistic aspect. However, the performance of passive systems can be 
significantly affected by the system dynamics especially due to the low driving force. For instance, 
during the course of passive system operation, a component can fail due to its stochastic nature 
which will in turn affect the system parameters. This change in system parameters can further 
influence the state of the hardware components. These complex dynamic interactions can rapidly 
result to a system failure and may evolve to a system state not anticipated or predicted by the 
deterministic assessment and classical PSA approach. To the author’s knowledge, the current 
passive system reliability assessment methodologies do not account for these complex dynamic 
interactions and subsequent probabilistic dynamic system evolution. This motivates the author to 
develop a novel approach and provide an integrated framework to account for risk-significant 
scenarios arising from dynamic interactions. The integrated dynamic approach is particularly 
important for passive safety systems assessment that operates extensively on natural and physical 
laws that have a small driving force, as compared to the active systems that operates on high 
driving forces from external input energy. This implies that a small deviation in critical system 
parameters can significantly influence the system performance and hence the reliability. Given an 
IE, it is very likely that the state variables can make a transition out of the control space very 
quickly as compared to active systems. Furthermore, there exist uncertainties with regard to 
complex physical phenomenon such as natural circulation, thermal stratification, etc., which are 
not well understood or modelled till date. The proposed methodology has the potential to account 
for these complex interactions, capture the physical phenomenon by accounting for state variable 




 An Integrated Framework for Dynamic Reliability Assessment of Passive Safety 
Systems  
A novel approach for systematic modelling and integrated analysis of passive safety systems 
(PSSs) is outlined in this sub-section. The approach provides a framework to couple the system 
deterministic evolution with the system stochastic nature. The proposed approach consists of 
several steps and provide a roadmap for the IAEA-UOIT CRP as well as to perform a meaningful 
comparison between the classical PSA techniques and dynamic methodologies. The objectives of 
the methodology include:  
• Provide a coherent approach to modelling PSSs in NPPs;  
• An integrated framework to couple deterministic and probabilistic aspect of a system;  
• A cohesive treatment of both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties;  
• The inclusion of PSSs as a frontline system in accident sequence analysis.  
Note that the methodology in many ways is explained using the passive ICS as an example so that 
the readers could comprehend the approach with ease. The project roadmap and the proposed 
methodology flowchart is shown in Figure 26.  
1. System Identification and description  
The first step of the proposed methodology involves the identification and selection of the passive 
safety system to be analyzed. A brief description of the system and principle of operation may be 
provided along with the scenarios in which the system is expected to operate.  
2. Accident/transient scenario  
The descriptions of scenarios (transient/accident) for which the passive safety system is designed, 
along with the system state during normal reactor operations. A brief operational characteristic 
and the system initiation following a reactor transition from normal to transient condition.  
3. Definition of System Mission  
The mission of a system are the objectives to be accomplished by the system under a priori defined 
normal or accident scenarios. Generally, the sets of objectives are predefined by the designers and 
can be correlated. Overall, the scenario and time at which the system is required to operate as well 
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as the duration of operation (mission time) must be manifested in this step. For example, the ICS 
maintains the RCS pressure by removing decay heat from the reactor for a period of 72 hours.  
4. Success and Failure Criteria of the System  
Success and failure criteria of the system must be manifested for all possible modes of operation 
and scenarios. The criteria may include hardware failures, state variables exceeding a pre-defined 
threshold limit or activation/operation of other safety systems. For example, the ICS can be 
considered failed, if the safety relief valves operate or if the system pressure is above 7.5 MPa. 
Often, these criteria are related to the system mission, and hence while defining the criteria, system 
mission must be taken into account.  
5. Operational characteristics and parameters identification  
The operational characteristics and the parameters influencing the operation of PSSs must be 
identified. These two factors are correlated since system parameters effect the PSSs operational 
behavior. The goal of this step is to comprehend the operating principle and characteristics from a 
qualitative view point, and not to accurately model and predict the system behavior. Of course, 
this will naturally involve identification of system operating parameters. For example, a natural 
circulation operates on coolant density difference between the heat source and sink, and the amount 
of heat removed can be dependent on the coolant flowrate, pressure and temperature in the sink 
and source side, etc. All the system parameters involved must be identified and listed in this step.  
6. Identification of failure modes affecting the system performance  
This step involves systematic identification of failure modes affecting the system performance. 
This can be achieved by the well-established and commonly used standard techniques such as 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), and hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP). The 
traditional approach is mostly oriented towards hardware failure modes, however physical (virtual) 
phenomenon failure modes that degrade the physical mechanism must be taken into account in 
case of PSSs analysis due to its reliance on small driving force. For instance, performance of the 
ICS is significantly affected by pipe fouling, oxidations, presence of non-condensable gases, 
corrosion, degraded heat transfer, etc. Furthermore, the modes of failure should be prioritized with 
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7. Preparation of failure data base 
A data base must be developed for the purpose of quantitative assessment. The failure data can be 
given in terms of probability of failure or failure rate with an exposure time, representing an 
unavailability of a component. Each of the failure modes identified in step 5 must be assigned with 
a failure probability or failure rate. Failure data may be obtained from international reliability data 
base such as the IAEA, USNRC and IREP.  
8. Identification/screening of critical parameters affecting the system performance  
This step is a continuation of step 5, in that, all the identified parameters are ranked or screened 
according to their importance or the level of influence on the system performance. The critical 
parameters are direct indicator of the system performance and include both hardware state as well 
as state variables. For example, the ICS operation is significantly affected by drain valve state, the 
presence of non-condensable gases, water temperature in the pool, differential pressure, etc. 
Importance analysis can be performed in the fault tree analysis to rank the critical hardware 
components. However, a physical model is required to rank the physical system parameters. This 
step enables an analyst to deduce the system modelling and analysis to a feasible and manageable 
state by eliminating the insignificant parameters.  
9. Identification of parameters relationship and dependencies  
The dependencies between critical system parameters must be identified and taken into account 
adequately in the process of quantification. Conditional probability can be used for the classical 
approach whereas dependencies arising due to dynamic interactions is treated in the process of 
coupling the system stochastic model with system dynamic model. The negligence of relevant 
dependencies can result in an inaccurate assessment of system reliability. For example, in the ICS, 
operation of the drain valve is dependent of the loop pressure. Loop pressure could be affected by 
the heat transfer rate, leading to a reduced heat transfer to the pool and hence further increasing 
the pressure in the loop. This could further lead to a reduced opening of the drain valve, resulting 
to a rapid increase of failure.  
10. Reliability assessment via classical PSA techniques  
Once the failure modes are identified, prioritized and failure rate data base are created, system 
reliability assessment (qualitative and quantitative) can be performed using the well-known 
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standard classical fault tree technique. The combination of failure modes resulting to a system pre-
defined failure i.e., the MCSs and its subsequent quantification can be performed using well-
established computer codes such as CAFTA. There can be multiple top events with respect to PSSs 
initiation and operation as shown in Figure 27. 𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆 implies passive safety system start-up, ?̅?𝑆𝑆𝑆 
implies PSS failure to start, 𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑂 implies PSS operation, ?̅?𝑆𝑆𝑂 implies failed operation, 𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃 implies 
PSS successful performance or it meet the design criteria and ?̅?𝑆𝑆𝑃 implies passive safety in 
operation but failed to meet the criteria. For example, PSSs based on natural circulation in principle 
will not fail as long as there is a heat sink and source. However, it may not meet the success criteria 
such as heat transferred, coolant flowrate, etc.  
 
Figure 27: Representation of passive safety system in classical ET/FT 
 
11. Stochastic modelling of the system  
This step involves modelling of the system using the well-known time-dependent Markov chain. 
The system is described by a finite number of system states, and the probability of the system 
being in any of the pre-defined states is computed. Each of the system states are further 
characterized by the individual component states, i.e., the discretized state-space is characterized 
by the smallest element in the system (basic event). The ordering of states can also be performed 
if it effects the end state of the system. To reduce the number of system states and avoid state space 
explosion, the system can be characterized into macro-components or units, where the individual 
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12. Development of system physical model  
This step involves a detail development of the system physical model using qualified best estimate 
thermo-hydraulics system codes (e.g., RELAP5) or a simpler standalone model. Uncertainties arise 
in the modelling process especially due to lack of knowledge of physical phenomenon in PSSs, 
lack of operating experience, the input variables, approximation in system geometry, etc. This in 
turn effects the predicted system behavior. Uncertainties in the predicted system behavior can be 
reduced using or by comparing against experimental data in the modelling of physical 
phenomenon.  
13. Model Validation: reference or design case system simulation  
Once the physical model is developed, a standard reference case can be run to validate the system 
model. Select an initiating event that requires operation of the PSS and observe the system behavior 
and performance. For instance, for the ICS, a closure of MSIV or reactor scram can be selected as 
an initiating event that increases the system pressure and eventually demands the ICS to operate. 
The system model validation can also be performed if experimental data are available.  
14. Define the top event of interest  
In contrast to the classical approach (FT) and Markov model, the top events in dynamic 
methodologies are defined in terms of the state variables. For instance, for the ICS, the top event 
can be defined as ‘RCS pressure above a defined threshold limit’. Of course, the computational 
complexity and time increases significantly with the increase in state variables. Again, taking the 
ICS as an example, the top event can be described as ‘system pressure and peak cladding 
temperature above the threshold limit’. As an initial step and with the intention to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the methodology in modelling PSSs, only one state variable is considered, i.e., the 
RCS pressure.  
15. State-space discretization: controlled state variables  
The state space is discretized into finite number of disjoint computational cells covering the entire 
space, with the control region defined by the analyst. The control space can be identified with the 
knowledge of system set-points and boundaries. Information of the top event defined in step 13 
can be utilized for the purpose of state-space discretization and vice versa. Step 13 and 14 are in a 
sense complementary to each other. The number of computational cells in the state-space and 
A-131 
 
control space is user defined. Depending on the analyst choice, the state space can be single or 
multi-dimensional. For example, a 3-dimensional sate space can consist of system pressure, peak 
cladding temperature and reactor water level. Of course, the computational complexity will 
increase significantly with the increase in the number of computational cells and state variables. 
On the other hand, too less number of cells will result in an inaccurate prediction of the system 
behavior. Hence, in the discretization process, the analysts should keep in mind a balance between 
the prediction accuracy and computational complexity have to be made.  
16. Computation of cell-to-cell transition probability  
The system dynamics is modelled as transition between the discretized computational cells in the 
state space, i.e., the probability of making a transition from one cell to the other. Here, one is 
interested in the evolution of the state variables in the state-space for a given system state. The 
discretized system state defined in step 10 is an input, whereas the state variable trajectories is the 
output. The number of simulation run is dependent on the number of distinct system states, which 
can be very large and can quickly become unmanageable. Depending on the knowledge of the 
system, state merging can be done to reduce the number of runs. The computation of cell-to-cell 
transition probabilities are explained in detail in chapter 3 and 4.  
17. Stochastic-dynamic dependencies model  
This step is arguably the most important part of the methodology. The stochastic time-dependent 
system model in step 10 is modified taking into account dynamic interactions between the system 
hardware and state variables. This step captures the dependencies between the two elements as 
well as dependencies arising from human error. For example, the system pressure will deviate 
based on the state of the drain valve, or the demand frequency of the drain valve can increase or 
decrease in a certain time interval depending on the system pressure. These dynamic interactions 
can affect the failure rate magnitude of a component. The term “stochastic-dynamic dependencies 
model” is used due to the fact that the model simultaneously takes into account the random 
component failures as well as dependencies arising from system dynamic evolution.  
18. Coupling of the stochastic and deterministic model  
The cell-to-cell and system state transition probabilities obtained from step 13 and 14 respectively 
are merged into a single state transition probability matrix that describes the system stochastic and 
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dynamic behavior. The system dynamic evolution is transformed into a Markovian model, where 
the probabilistic mapping is performed via the state transition matrix. A detail theoretical and 
numerical implementation of the coupling process is given in chapter 3.  
19. Quantitative Reliability Evaluation  
This step involves a systematic computation of state probabilities at any given point in time 
(similar to the classical discrete Markov chain). Once computation of state probabilities is obtained 
for each user defined time step, the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of a predefined top event can be determined. The statistical importance of any 
system states/configuration can also be computed for a given top event.  
20. Assignment of probability distributions to critical parameters  
In order to add credit to the point estimate predicted system behavior, critical parameters identified 
in Step-7 can be assigned with some probability distributions with the objective to perform an 
uncertainty analysis. The choice of the distributions is dependent on the state of knowledge of the 
parameter, availability of data and expert judgement. If there is a very limited knowledge of the 
system parameter, a uniform (Gaussian) distribution can be assigned i.e., all the data points within 
the bounded limits are equally likely. The assignment of distributions to the parameters must be 
done with great care since it significantly affects the predicted reliability of the PSS.  
21. Integrated uncertainty evaluation  
Upon assignment of probability distributions to the critical parameters which include both 
hardware and physical parameters, propagation of the distribution in the model can be performed 
using standard techniques such as direct Monte Carlo simulation. The superiority of the 
methodology is that, both the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties can be captured in an integrated 
fashion. Uncertainties arising due to lack of knowledge of physical phenomenon can be accounted 
in the probabilistic state variables mapping, whereas uncertainties due to the random component 
failure is accounted in the stochastic model.  
 
 The Benchmark Passive Isolation Condenser System  
1. System identification and description  
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The isolation condenser system (ICS) is employed in many advanced generation and innovative 
reactor designs (Gen III and Gen III+), including integrated pressurized water reactor (iPWR) type 
small modular reactors (e.g., CAREM25, IRIS). The ICS consist of a heat exchanger, IC pool, 
isolation valves, drain valves, bypass drain valves and vent valves. The schematic diagram is 
depicted in Figure 28. The principle of operation is based on natural circulation.  
 
Figure 28: Passive Isolation Condenser system 
 
The ICS operates in closed loop natural circulation mode (gravity driven) by condensing the 
incoming saturated steam inside the IC HX and returning the condensate back via a dedicated 
condensate return line to the RPV. This operational mechanism of buoyancy driven pump is 
created by the heat source and sink with an elevation difference between the RPV and the IC water 
pool. Decay heat removal from the reactor (heat source) is achieved by transferring heat to the 
isolation condenser (IC) water pool (heat sink) via IC heat exchangers (HX) that are immersed in 
the IC pool, located outside the containment and above the RPV (See Figure 28). Steam in tube 
side of the IC HX is condensed by boiling pool water in the shell side of the HX and venting the 
evaporated pool water to atmosphere. Due to the opening of the valve on the condensate line in 
order to trigger its operation, the ICS comply with the IAEA Category D passive system, which 
addresses the intermediary zone between active and passive, where passive execution of the safety 
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function is accomplished through passive means (i.e., natural circulation), but the process is 
initiated by active components (i.e., condensate valves actuation).  
2. Scenario identification  
2.A. Normal reactor operation:  
During normal reactor operation the ICS is in standby mode with the steam line isolation valves 
in fully open position and the drain valves in closed position. The steam line isolation valves are 
open so that the HX tube bundles are at reactor system pressure. This allows condensate to build-
up in the HX up to piping high point and filling the condensate drain line, which are maintained at 
a sub-cooled temperature by IC pool water. Live reactor steam is present in the steam supply line 
up through the horizontal distribution branch piping that feeds steam to the IC HX upper headers, 
[SBWR standard safety analysis report (1992)]. The vent and water makeup valves are also closed 
during normal operation, unless during maintenance and water replenishment/pool cleanup.  
2.B. Transient scenario:  
The ICS is a standby high-pressure system that removes residual and decay heat from the reactor 
pressure vessel (RPV) in the event of a reactor SCRAM in which, the reactor becomes isolated 
from the main condenser, or if any other high-pressure abnormal condition exists. The ICS aids in 
reactor vessel depressurization in the event that either the feedwater coolant injection or high-
pressure coolant injection system fails. In other words, the ICS passively removes core decay heat 
following a reactor SCRAM from 100% full power operation and when the normal heat removal 
system is unavailable [29]. Typically, the ICS is required to remove up to 4% (approx.) of rated 
power which results from decay heat. Overall, ICS could be thought of as a pressure regulating 
system during abnormal operation, and core decay heat removal system.  
The ICS is initiated by any of the following signals/action:  
1. RPV pressure above a specified threshold value;  
2. Main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) closure fraction;  
3. RPV water level below a specified threshold value;  
4. Remote manual initiation by operators.  
For instance, the ICS is automatically initiated if a high reactor pressure condition is sustained for 
15 seconds (generic). The time delay prevents unnecessary system initiation during turbine trips 
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[29]. Additionally, in many reactors design the ICS is automatically initiated on a low RPV water 
level to aid in reactor depressurization for small line breaks. These initiating signals places the ICS 
into operation by opening the condensate return line isolation valve, which results in draining of 
the accumulated condensate. Saturated steam flows from the RPV to the HX tubes via steam supply 
line and are condensed in the HX tubes. The condensate returns to the downcomer region of the 
RPV by gravity via condensate drain line. The start-up process is sufficiently fast to limit the 
reactor pressure rise resulting from reactor isolation to well below the pressure set-point of the 
SRVs for all non-accident transient isolation event [SBWR design description]. The natural 
circulation i.e., the buoyant force generated from coolant density difference dictates the coolant 
flowrate in the IC loop. In other words, pressure in the condensate return line region determines 
the coolant flowrate into the RPV. The opening of the condensate drain valve causes the liquid 
level in the loop to drop and to increase the available tube surface area for vapor condensation 
[Khan et al. (1992)]. This results in transfer of heat from the IC loop to the IC water pool, and the 
heat transfer rate is dependent on the IC pool conditions, heat transfer characteristics of the IC 
tubes, presence of non-condensable gases, state of the HX, etc. The extended operation of the ICS 
i.e., a mission time of 72 hours is accomplished by replenishing water into the IC pool through 
dedicated water makeup systems, thereby keeping the HX submerged in the IC water pool.  
 
3. System mission  
The primary objective/mission of the ICS includes:  
1. Reactor pressure vessel depressurization;  
2. Remove sensible and decay heat from the reactor for 72 hours (mission time);  
3. Maintain fuel peak cladding temperature within design limits.  
The above-mentioned objectives are typically achieved by employing a number of totally 
independent IC loops for the purpose of redundancy. First, in trying to achieve the above mission, 
the ICS also prevent unnecessary activation of safety relief valves (SRVs) by maintaining system 
pressure below SRVs set-point. This in turn eliminate or mitigate loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) 
that may result from SRVs being fail-open. In other words, the ICS reduces the cycling frequency 
(opening and closing) of the SRVs, and hence can decrease the probability of SRVs failure on 
demand. Second, system depressurization under defined transient events can be achieved without 
the loss of primary coolant inventory. Thus, the ICS remove excess sensible and core decay heat 
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from the reactor in a passive way with minimal loss of coolant inventory when normal heat removal 
systems are unavailable. Third, operation of high pressure coolant injection system could 
potentially be eliminated or delay while maintaining the system pressure. Furthermore, in the event 
of a small LOCA, the ICS is demanded to depressurize the RCS so that high pressure injection 
system could be activated for coolant injection. The above three functions can be considered as 
secondary objectives.  
 
4. System success/failure criteria  
The ICS failure criteria includes:  
1. Failure to maintain the reactor coolant system pressure below threshold value;  
2. Failure to remove specified decay and residual heat produced from the reactor, i.e., decay 
heat removed < decay heat generated;  
3. Failure to maintain peak fuel cladding temperature below threshold.  
It may be observed that the above criteria are interrelated. For instance, criteria 2 can cause both 
criteria 1 and 3 to occur, i.e., a failure to remove decay heat from the reactor will result to an 
increase in system pressure as well as a heat up of the fuel which can eventually lead to fuel failure. 
Also, a deviation in differential pressure can influence the condensate flowrate in the IC loop, 
which can in turn affect the amount of heat transfer rate to the IC pool. These inter-dependencies 
must be accounted for when developing the physical model of the system. For instance, the 








     (5-1) 
𝑃𝐼 =  
     1;         Ideal success state (HR = DHG)
≥ 1;          Not of interest for analysis
< 1;   System failure or partial failure
 
   (5-2) 
A typical ICS is designed to remove four (4) percent of reactor rated power, which means that five 
minutes after a scram and initiation of the ICS, the heat removal capacity of the IC system must 
equal the decay heat production rate of the shutdown reactor. This will ensure that the system 
pressure is below threshold limit. And note that, the reactor coolant system pressure is considered 
as the state variable of interest for analysis purpose.  
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5. The ICS components  
The ICS consist of the following components: [Note that the ICS description is generic in nature 
and does not imply any specific design]  
a. Steam supply line piping (vapor phase)  
The steam supply line connects the RPV to the HX tubes, i.e., live reactor steam enters the HX 
tubes via steam line. This region remains under reactor coolant system pressure, and in vapor state. 
The steam supply line is normally open with the steam line isolation valve in fully open position 
during normal operation. The isolation valve is closed in case of leakage/rupture in the ICS piping 
or rupture in the HX tubes. This region is typically guardpiped so that a break in the line is fully 
contained.  
b. The heat exchanger  
The heat exchanger is a critical component of the ICS in which the live reactor steam is condensed 
inside the HX tubes. The HX consist of a number of vertical placed tubes and is emerged in the 
ICS water pool (shell side) creating an interface with the IC loop (tube side). The heat transfer 
from one loop to the other takes place in the HX.  
c. Condensate drain line (liquid phase)  
The condensate return line begins from the lower header of the IC HX and are normally filled with 
sub-cooled condensate. The condensate drain line consist of a series pair of isolation valves and a 
parallel pair of condensate drain valves. The pressure in this region controls the performance of 
the ICS during a transient event. The drain line piping ends at a dedicated condensate return nozzle 
that are typically located at the mid-height of the RPV.  
d. Condensate drain valves  
The condensate drain valves are the most critical components of the ICS. The initiation, operation 
and performance of the ICS is highly dependent on drain valves state. The coolant flowrate in the 
IC loop and hence the heat transferred is controlled by the drain valve position. The drain valves 
consist of the main and bypass valve that are connected in parallel. Typically, the main valve is a 




e. Vent lines  
The vent lines are typically installed at the lower and upper headers of the IC HXs with the main 
purpose to purge air and non-condensable gases from the HXs which could significantly affect and 
degrade the natural circulation of the coolant in the IC loop. They consist of a number of vent 
valves (spring and motor operated) that are normally closed. The vent lines for each of the ICS 
HXs are routed into the containment, and then to the suppression pool (typical advanced BWR 
reactor designs). These lines are provided with two main and two bypass valves located in a series 
of valves that are required to open at high reactor pressure during ICS operation.  
f. Vent valves 
During normal plant operation, air and non-condensable gases may accumulate in the ICS 
condenser due to hydrogen buildup from water chemistry control additions and air entrained in the 
feedwater. This could degrade the long-term heat removal capacity of the ICS. The purpose of the 
vent valves is to remove accumulated air and non-condensable gases from the ICS loop during its 
operation. The vent valves are installed in the vent line with a parallel configuration for redundancy 
diversity. The vent valves operation is controlled by automatic logics as well as by operator manual 
actuation. Venting is initiated whenever a combination of two signals is present:  
• High RPV pressure;  
• Operation/opening of the condensate drain valves.  
The operating pressure of the venting unit is established below the set-point at which the lowest-
set SRVs will actuate. This help ensures that the SRVs will not actuate during a reactor isolation 
transient even without operator intervention [29].  
g. Water makeup systems 
The purpose of the water makeup system is to supply water to the IC water pool during extended 
ICS operation, and to ensure that the HX tubes remain covered at all time. A reduced water level 
will lead to uncover of HX tubes and thus degrading the heat transfer rate from the IC loop to the 
IC pool. Typically, a dedicated condensate water makeup system is in place, with the firewater 




 The ICS system characterization  
The ICS hardware components is characterized into several units for stochastic modelling of the 
system. The units are as follow:  
(b) Condensate Drain Unit (DU)  
(c) Heat Exchanger Unit (HXU)  
(d) Vent Unit (VU)  
(e) Water Make-up Unit (MWU)  
(f) Primary boundary envelope (EF)  
Of course, the ICS operation is significantly affected by the hardware unit states. However, there 
are several physical parameters that significantly influence the ICS performance such as presence 
of non-condensable gases, oxidation, pipe fouling and thermal stratification. Due to the 
unavailability of failure data and their nature of influence on the system failure, these parameters 
cannot be included in the stochastic system model at this point. Hence, only the hardware system 
components are modelled using the Markov model. The author has proposed two approaches to 
modelling the overall ICS system reliability:  
1. Small Markov model and large fault tree: The individual system units are modelled using 
Markov model whereas the overall system reliability is modelled using FT technique. It must 
be underlined that the individual unit reliability is given in terms of probability of unit failure, 
and hence quantification can be performed using any standard FT codes. The system reliability 
is given in terms of probability of failure.  
2. Large Markov model and small fault tree: In this approach, the individual units are modelled 
in FT using the failure rate evaluation method. Note that the unit reliability is in terms of failure 
rates, rather than the failure probability as in the first approach. Once the failure rates of the 
individual units are obtained, the overall system reliability is modelled using time-dependent 
Markov model. The system reliability is given in terms of probability of failure. This approach 
is implemented in this thesis, since it allows for coupling the model with CCMT.  
The key difference between the two approaches is that the first approach uses probability 
evaluation method to determine the individual unit’s reliability, whereas the second approach uses 
failure rate evaluation for individual units. However, both methods provide the result in terms of 
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probability of failure. The second approach have an advantage over the first since it can yield a 
time-dependent model of the overall system, and the interactions among the units. In a way, these 
two approaches can be used as a complementary to each other and add credit to the predicted 
system reliability. The two (2) approaches are used to model the individual units of the ICS. The 
results obtained from the individual unit analysis is utilized for IC system reliability assessment. 
The computation of the time-dependent failure rate under a logic AND gate is determined as:  
𝜆𝑆(𝑡) =












𝜆𝑖 = individual component failure rate  
𝑛 = number of components connected in parallel and are within the unit 
𝜆𝑆(𝑡) = time-dependent unit failure rate  
For two identical components in parallel with the same failure rate given by 𝜆, the time dependent 





       (5-4) 
The above relations are implemented throughout this sub-section to determine the time-dependent 
unit failure rate, besides the Markov model that directly yields the unit failure probability.  
 
A. Condensate Drain Unit  
The condensate drain unit consist of two drain valves i.e., the main drain valve and bypass valve 
connected in parallel for redundancy and diversity of the unit. Each of the valve is considered to 
have three (3) possible states as shown in Table 43. It is assumed that the main and bypass valve 






Table 43: Failure modes and rate of the main/bypass valve 
Valves Failure modes Failure rate (per yr) 
Main/bypass 
drain valve  
Normal  − 
Failed to remain open (𝜆2
𝐷)  8.6 × 10−09 
Failed-to-open (𝜆1
𝐷)  1.4 × 10−06 
Failed-to-open due to CCF (𝜆1,𝐶𝐶𝐹
𝐷 )  1.2 × 10−04 
Failed to remain open due to CCF (𝜆2,𝐶𝐶𝐹
𝐷 ) 7.2 × 10−07 
 
Enumerating all possible component state combination (See Table 44), the drain unit can have nine 
(9) possible states (See Table 45). Furthermore, state merging can be performed to reduce the 
overall unit states. For the drain unit, the nine (9) states are merged into two (2) unit states, i.e., 
normal or failure. The unit is considered failed if both the units are in any failed or partially failed 
state, and a unit normal/operational state if any of the valve are in normal state.  
Table 44: Possible drain unit state combination 
Unit state combination Unit States 
(𝑛) Main valve states Bypass valve states 
Normal Normal Normal 
Normal Fail-to-open Normal 
Normal Failed to remain open  Normal 
Fail-to-open Normal Normal 
Fail-to-open Fail-to-open Failure 
Fail-to-open Failed to remain open Failure 
Failed to remain open  Normal Normal 
Failed to remain open  Fail-to-open Failure 










Table 45: Unit state ordering and the inclusion of CCF 
Unit State Combination CCF of the 
valves 
Unit States 
(𝑛) Main valve states Bypass valve states 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 - 1 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 - 2 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 - 3 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 - 4 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 CCF 5 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 - 6 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 0 - 7 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 1 - 8 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 2 CCF 9 
 
Note: 0 = component normal; 1 = component fail-to-open; 2 = component fail to remain open. 
The Markov state transition diagram of the condensate drain unit is given in Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29: Markov transition diagram of the condensate drain unit 
 



































































𝐼𝑉𝐶 𝑃1(𝑡) + (𝜆2
𝐵 + 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐹
𝐼𝑉𝐶 )𝑃7(𝑡) + (𝜆2
𝐷 + 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐹
𝐼𝑉𝐶 )𝑃3(𝑡) 
  (5-5) 
The solution of the abo2ve ODEs is obtained using finite difference method implemented in 
Fortran95 code. Sample unit state transition probabilities for 4 time steps are shown in Table 46.  
Table 46: Condensate drain unit state transition probabilities 
Unit states 𝑘 = 0 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 
𝑃1(𝑘∆𝑡) 1.00 0.998 0.997 0.996 
𝑃2(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 1.4E-05 2.797E-05 4.19E-05 
𝑃3(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 8.6E-08 1.72E-07 2.58E-07 
𝑃4(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 1.4E-05 2.79E-05 4.19E-05 
𝑃5(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 1.2E-03 2.39E-03 3.59E-03 
𝑃6(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 0 1.04E-10 3.13E-10 
𝑃7(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 8.6E-08 1.72E-07 2.58E-07 
𝑃8(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 0 2.41E-12 7.22E-12 
𝑃9(𝑘∆𝑡) 0 7.2E-06 1.44E-05 2.16E-05 
Sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
A state merging on Table 46 gives Table 47.  
 
                                                 
2 Note that the ODEs for individual units are grouped and depicted by a single equation for ease of representation  
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Table 47: Merged condensate drain unit state 
Unit state 𝑘 = 0 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 
Unit normal 1.00 0.998 0.997 0.996 
Unit failure 0 1.21E-03 2.41E-03 3.62E-03 
 
The FT of the condensate drain unit is depicted in Figure 30.  














Figure 30: Fault tree of the condensate drain unit 
 
B. Vent Unit  
The vent unit consist of two vent valves connected in parallel for redundancy of the unit. Each of 
the valve (component level) is considered to have three (3) possible states (See Table 48). A 
common cause failure (CCF) of the valves are considered, and the vent valves are considered to 




Table 48: Failure modes and rate of the vent valve 
Component Failure modes Failure rate (per yr) 
Vent valve  Normal  − 
Failed closed (𝜆𝑉
𝑓𝑐
)  1.7 × 10−08 
Failed open (𝜆𝑉
𝑓𝑜
)  2.9 × 10−06 
Failed closed due to CCF (𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐹
𝑓𝑐
)  7.2 × 10−07 
Failed open due to CCF (𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐹
𝑓𝑜
)  1.2 × 10−04 
 
The overall vent unit is characterized and merged into three (3) possible states: (1) Normal; (2) 
Partial unit failure; and (3) Total unit failure. The set of possible states of the venting unit or 
component state combination is found by enumerating all the possible modes of failure of the two 
vent valves (See Table 49).  
Table 49: Unit state numbering and the inclusion of CCF 
Component State Combination Unit States 
(𝑛) Valve-1 state Valve-2 state 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 1 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 2 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 3 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 4 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 5 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 6 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 0 7 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 1 8 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 2 9 
 
A partial unit failure is considered for the venting unit due to the ICS performance sensitivity to 
the presence of non-condensable gas fraction. Partial failure implies the vent valves getting fail in 
any intermediate position (e.g., 50%, 60%, 40%, etc.), which provide a flexibility to observe the 
system response under varying system configuration. Of course, both the valves failing open or 
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close will result in a unit failure. The Markov transition diagram for the vent unit is given in Figure 
31. Note that, V= vent valve 1, and B= vent valve 2.  
 
Figure 31: Markov transition diagram of the vent unit 












































































   (5-7) 
Performing state merging on the solution of the above ODEs with normal unit state at 𝑡 = 0 yields 




Table 50: Vent unit states transition probabilities 
Unit state 𝑘 = 0 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 
Normal  1.00 0.998 0.997 0.996 
Partial failure 0 0.00 1.97E-11 5.91E-11 
Total failure 0 1.21E-03 2.413E-03 3.62E-03 
 
The FT for the vent unit using failure rate evaluation method is performed for two (2) modes, i.e., 
the unit total failure and partial failure. The total unit failure rate obtained from the FT is:  












)   (5-8) 
= 1.21 × 10−04⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑦𝑟 
Whereas, the unit partial failure rate is:  








)     (5-9) 
Unit partial failure = 1.62 × 10−15⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑦𝑟 
 
C. HX Unit  
The HX unit consist of a single U-tube heat exchanger immersed in a pool of water. The HX is 
considered to have the failure modes and rates as shown in Table 51.  
Table 51: Failure modes and rate of the heat exchanger 
Component Failure modes Failure rate (per yr) 
Heat 
exchanger 
Normal  − 
Single pipe rupture 2.63 × 10−06 
Multiple pipe rupture 2.63 × 10−07 
Single pipe plugging 2.63 × 10−06 
Multiple pipe plugging 2.63 × 10−07 
 
The HX creates the interface between the two loops, and is the most critical component of the ICS, 
in that, heat transfer takes place from the reactor to the IC pool. A change in the HX configuration 
could significantly affect the ICS performance, and hence the system pressure. Investigation was 
performed into the possible number of states that the HX can take. Nine (9) possible states for the 
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HX is considered, and a qualitative outcome of the state combinations and individual failure modes 
was made (See Table 52).  
Table 52: Possible states of the HX unit 




Normal (𝑛1 = 0)  1 Normal 
Single tube rupture (𝑛1 = 1)  2 Partial failure 
Multiple tube rupture (𝑛1 = 2)  3 System failure 
Single pipe plugging (𝑛1 = 3)  4 Partial failure 
Multiple pipe plugging (𝑛1 = 4)  5 System failure 
Single tube rupture (𝑛1 = 1) and Single 
pipe plugging (𝑛1 = 3)  
6 Partial failure 
Single tube rupture (𝑛1 = 1) and 
Multiple pipe plugging (𝑛1 = 4)  
7 System failure 
Multiple tube rupture (𝑛1 = 2) and 
Single pipe plugging (𝑛1 = 3)  
8 System failure 
Multiple tube rupture (𝑛1 = 2) and 
Multiple pipe plugging (𝑛1 = 4)  
9 System failure 
 
This approach enables one to reduce the number of states, and thus to avoid state space explosion 
phenomenon. For instance, a single tube rupture or plugging may not necessary lead to a total 
system failure. Hence, a partial system failure is considered, and the individual failure modes are 
grouped into one state assuming that the consequences of both the failure modes are similar. 
Merging all possible states based on their consequences, the HX unit is characterized into three (3) 
possible states: normal, partial failure and total unit failure.  
Some of the above unit states are highly unlikely but have non-zero probabilities. For instance, 
multiple tube rupture and multiple pipe plugging simultaneously occurring is highly unlikely but 
have occurred in NPPs during the past decade. Note that an independence is considered between 
tube plugging and rupture, which is realistic. The Markov state transition diagram for the HX unit 
is given in Figure 32. Even though, the HX unit consist only of one component, the state transition 
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diagram is more complicated. This is due to the possible states as well as the possible state 
evolution of the HX unit. For instance, a single tube rupture can evolve into a multiple tube rupture 
state, or a single tube rupture along with single tube plugging can evolve into multiple tube rupture 
with single tube plugging.  
 
Figure 32: Markov state transition diagram for the HX unit 
 






































































𝑚𝑡𝑟 𝑃7(𝑡) + 𝜆𝐻𝑋
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑃8(𝑡) 
   (5-10) 
Performing state merging on the solution of the ODEs for four (4) time steps yields Table 53.  
Table 53: The overall HX unit state probabilities 
Unit state 𝑘 = 0 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 
Normal 1.00 0.9999 0.9998 0.9998 
Partial failure 0 2.89E-05 5.78E-05 8.67E-05 
Total failure 0 5.26E-06 1.05E-05 1.58E-05 
 
A failure rate evaluation for partial failure and total failure of the HX is performed to determine 
the time dependent failure rate that is required to construct and compute the overall ICS state 
probabilities. Unit state 2, 4 and 6 in Table 52 implies a partial failure of the unit, hence the failure 
rate of the unit to be in partially failed state can simply be determined by.  
Partial unit failure= {(𝑛1 = 1) + (𝑛1 = 3) + {(𝑛1 = 1)⁡𝐴𝑁𝐷⁡(𝑛1 = 3)}}  (5-11) 
= 5.26 × 10−06⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑦𝑟 
Unit states 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9 implies a total unit failure. Hence, a total unit failure probability is:  
Total unit failure= {(𝑛1 = 2) + (𝑛1 = 4) + {(𝑛1 = 1)⁡𝐴𝑁𝐷⁡(𝑛1 = 4)} + {(𝑛1 = 2)⁡𝐴𝑁𝐷⁡(𝑛1 = 3)} +
{(𝑛1 = 2)⁡𝐴𝑁𝐷⁡(𝑛1 = 4)}}       (5-12) 
= 5.26 × 10−07⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑦𝑟 
 
D. Water Make-up Unit 
The water makeup-up unit consist of two redundant and diverse systems as follow:  
• Main water make-up system (e.g., condensate)  
• Alternate water make-up system (e.g., Firewater)  
The two systems are treated as two components connected in parallel with each component have 
three possible states: (1) Normal; (2) Fail-to-open; and (3) Fail-to-remain-open (See Table 54). No 
common cause failure (CCF) of the system are considered due to the nature of diversity and 
independence between the two systems. The failure modes and their respective failure rate are:  
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Table 54: Failure modes and rate of the vent valve 
Component Failure modes Failure rate (per yr) 
Main system  Fail to open (𝜆1
𝑀) 1.2 × 10−03 
Fail to remain open (𝜆2
𝑀) 1.0 × 10−04 
Alternate system  Fail to open (𝜆1
𝐴) 1.4 × 10−03 
Fail to remain open (𝜆2
𝐴) 1.0 × 10−04 
 
The overall water make-up unit is characterized and merged into two (2) possible system states: 
(1) unit normal; and (2) unit failure. The set of possible water make-up unit states is found by 
enumerating all possible modes of failure of the main and alternate makeup system (See Table 55).  
Table 55: Unit state combinations and ordering (notations) 
Unit State Combination Unit States 
(𝑛) Main valve states Alternate valve states 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 1 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 2 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 3 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 4 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 5 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 6 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 0 7 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 1 8 
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 2 9 
 




Figure 33: Markov state transition diagram of the water makeup unit 




















































     (5-13) 
Analytical solution of the above ODEs is presented below. This was done to check the steady state 















































































































































𝑀)𝑡   (5-16) 













−∞     (5-17) 
𝑃2(𝑡) = 0 













𝑀     (5-18) 
𝑃5(𝑡) = 0.862 (steady state value) 
A state merging on the solution of the ODEs yields two unit state transition probabilities. Sample 
state probabilities for four (4) time steps are given in Table 56.  
Table 56: Overall makeup water unit states 
Unit state 𝑘 = 0 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 
Normal 1.00 1.0E+00 0.999 0.998 
Unit failure 0 0 3.90E-04 1.15E-03 
 
The failure rate evaluation from the FT of the water makeup unit can simply be given by:  








𝐴    (5-19) 
= 3.21 × 10−08⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑦𝑟 
 
E. Envelope failure (EF) or pipe break/rupture 
Envelope failure implies a degraded state of the primary IC loop. A failure of IC loop will result 
in a loss of coolant inventory from the RCS. Envelope failure can be categorized based on the 
break size and location, however for modelling simplicity, only two state are considered, i.e., 
normal or failure. Failure rate of the envelope is 𝜆𝐸𝐹 = 2.74 × 10
−04⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑦𝑟. Therefore, unit states 
probability via Markov model is:  
𝑃0(𝑡) = 𝑒
−𝜆𝐸𝐹.𝑡 and 𝑃1(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝐸𝐹.𝑡)     (5-20) 
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The probability of EF being in a failed or pipe break state can easily be found using the solution 
for 𝑃1(𝑡) at any point in time. Note that the mission time considered for the analysis is 72 hours.  
 
 Markov Model of the Benchmark Passive ICS  
This sub-section integrates the results to predict the overall ICS reliability. The units are modelled 
as a single entity or a macro-component thus merging the system states. This significantly reduces 
the computation time and complexity, without compromising the model and prediction accuracy. 
The number of possible states that the ICS can take any point in space is first determined from the 
number of unit possible states. From the previous sections, the individual units have the following 
number of states:  
1. Vent unit: 3 states 
2. Makeup water unit: 2 states 
3. Drain unit: 2 states 
4. System envelope: 2 states  
5. HX unit: 3 states  
Therefore, the number of possible states that the ICS can take is 5 × 12 = 72⁡discrete system states 
(See Table 58). For ease of identification and analysis purpose, the individual unit’s notations and 
numbering is categorized as shown in Table 57.  
Table 57: Individual unit notation and numbering 
Units Unit number 
Condensate Drain Unit Unit-1 
Vent Unit Unit-2 
HX Unit  Unit-3 
Makeup Water Unit Unit-4 








Table 58: Possible individual unit state combinations 
Individual Unit State Combination  
System States 









𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 0 𝑃0(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 1 𝑃1(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 2 𝑃2(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 3 𝑃3(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 4 𝑃4(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 5 𝑃5(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 6 𝑃6(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 7 𝑃7(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 8 𝑃8(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 9 𝑃9(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 10 𝑃10(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 11 𝑃11(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 12 𝑃12(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 13 𝑃13(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 14 𝑃14(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 15 𝑃15(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 16 𝑃16(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 17 𝑃17(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 18 𝑃18(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 19 𝑃19(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 20 𝑃20(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 21 𝑃21(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 22 𝑃22(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 23 𝑃23(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 24 𝑃24(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 25 𝑃25(𝑡) 
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𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 26 𝑃26(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 27 𝑃27(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 28 𝑃28(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 29 𝑃29(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 30 𝑃30(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 31 𝑃31(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 32 𝑃32(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 33 𝑃33(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 34 𝑃34(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 35 𝑃35(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 36 𝑃36(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 37 𝑃37(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 38 𝑃38(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 39 𝑃39(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 40 𝑃40(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 41 𝑃41(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 42 𝑃42(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 43 𝑃43(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 44 𝑃44(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 45 𝑃45(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 46 𝑃46(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 47 𝑃47(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 48 𝑃48(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 49 𝑃49(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 50 𝑃50(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 51 𝑃51(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 52 𝑃52(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 53 𝑃53(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 54 𝑃54(𝑡) 
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𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 55 𝑃55(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 56 𝑃56(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 57 𝑃57(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 58 𝑃58(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 59 𝑃59(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 60 𝑃60(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 61 𝑃61(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 62 𝑃62(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 63 𝑃63(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 64 𝑃64(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 65 𝑃65(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 66 𝑃66(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 67 𝑃67(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 68 𝑃68(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 69 𝑃69(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 70 𝑃70(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 71 𝑃71(𝑡) 
 
Constructing a Markov state transition diagram become quite complex, challenging and 
unmanageable due to the large number of system states. However, a systematic treatment of the 
above enumerated system states can be performed using simple algorithm and implementing it in 
tools such as MATLAB. The system states are organized systematically in layer fashion based on 
the number of components failure (See Table 59 to Table 64). For instance, Layer 0 implies a 
normal system states or zero (0) unit failure, Layer 1 implies a single (1) unit failure, Layer 2 







Table 59: Systematic organization of system states in Layer fashion 
Individual Unit State Combination 
System States 









Layer 0 (Number of states with no failure= 1) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 0 𝑃0(𝑡) 
Layer 1 (Number of states with one= 7) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 36 𝑃36(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 12 𝑃12(𝑡) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
Layer 2 (Number of states with two failures= 19) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 48 𝑃48(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 0 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 60 𝑃60(𝑡) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
Layer 3 (Number of states with three failures= 25) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 52 𝑃52(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 2 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 0 56 𝑃56(𝑡) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
Layer 4 (Number of states with 4 failures= 16) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 0 54 𝑃54(𝑡) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 0 𝑛5 = 1 53 𝑃53(𝑡) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
Layer 5 (Number of states with five failures= 4) 
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 1 𝑛3 = 1 𝑛4 = 1 𝑛5 = 1 55 𝑃55(𝑡) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
 
The possible number of transition from one layer to other can be determined systematically. Of 
course, since no repair of the units are considered, the layer can only progress in an increasing 
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manner. For instance, the system can make a transition from layer 2 to layer 3, but not vice versa. 
The number of transition from each layer with their respective failure rates are given in Table 60.  
Table 60: Transition from Layer 0 to Layer 1 
From Transition rate To No. 
𝑛 = 0:  
{(𝑛1 = 0)(𝑛2 = 0)(𝑛3 = 0)⁡ 
(𝑛4 = 0)(𝑛5 = 0)} 
𝜆1
𝐷𝑈
 𝑛 = 36 1 
𝜆1
𝑉𝑈
 𝑛 = 12 2 
𝜆2
𝑉𝑈
 𝑛 = 24 3 
𝜆1
𝐻𝑋𝑈
 𝑛 = 4 4 
𝜆2
𝐻𝑋𝑈
 𝑛 = 8 5 
𝜆1
𝑀𝑊𝑈
 𝑛 = 2 6 
𝜆1
𝐸𝐹
 𝑛 = 1 7 
 
Table 61: Transition from Layer 1 to Layer 2 
From Transition rate To No. 
𝑛 = 36: 
{(𝑛1 = 1) (𝑛2 = 0) (𝑛3 =
0) (𝑛4 = 0) (𝑛5 = 0)} 
𝜆1
𝑉𝑈
 𝑛 = 48 1 
𝜆2
𝑉𝑈
 𝑛 = 60 2 
𝜆1
𝐻𝑋𝑈
 𝑛 = 40 3 
𝜆2
𝐻𝑋𝑈
 𝑛 = 44 4 
𝜆1
𝑀𝑊𝑈
 𝑛 = 38 5 
𝜆1
𝐸𝐹
 𝑛 = 37 6 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
 
Table 62: Transition from Layer 2 to Layer 3 
From Transition rate To No. 
𝑛 = 48: 
{(𝑛1 = 1) (𝑛2 = 1) (𝑛3 = 0) 
(𝑛4 = 0) (𝑛5 = 0)} 
𝜆1
𝐻𝑋𝑈
 𝑛 = 52 1 
𝜆2
𝐻𝑋𝑈
 𝑛 = 56 2 
𝜆1
𝑀𝑊𝑈
 𝑛 = 50 3 
𝜆1
𝐸𝐹
 𝑛 = 49 4 




Table 63: Transition from Layer 3 to Layer 4 
From Transition rate To No. 
𝑛 = 52: 
{(𝑛1 = 1) (𝑛2 = 1) (𝑛3 = 1) (𝑛4 = 0) (𝑛5 = 0)} 
𝜆1
𝑀𝑊𝑈
 𝑛 = 54 1 
𝜆1
𝐸𝐹
 𝑛 = 53 2 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
 
Table 64: Transition from Layer 4 to Layer 5 
From Transition rate To No. 
𝑛 = 54:  
{(𝑛1 = 1). (𝑛2 = 1). (𝑛3 = 1) (𝑛4 = 1).(𝑛5 = 0)} 
𝜆1
𝐸𝐹
 𝑛 = 55 1 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
 
The resulting ODEs from the state transition diagram is presented below in a layer fashion.  










𝐸𝐹)𝑃0(𝑡)   (5-21) 
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The above coupled ODEs are solved using finite element method in the computer code Fortran95. 
The following initial conditions at 𝑡 = 0 is assumed for system analysis:  
𝑃𝑛(𝑡 = 0) =   
1;  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑛 = 0
0;  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑛 ≠ 0
 
       (5-27) 
Sample results obtained from the code is presented in Table 65. Only three (3) system state 
transition probabilities with 10 time steps are presented for comprehension. Moreover, due to the 
volume of information, the results depiction significantly requires a large number of pages 
(approximately 30 pages). Sample transition state probabilities is provided in Appendix V. It is 
obvious from the result that the probability of the system state 𝑛 = 0 (all units in normal state) 
decreases as time progresses, i.e., the failure probability of the unit increases with time, which is 
intuitive. From a total of 72 systems states, it was found that the states 𝑃1(𝑡), 𝑃24(𝑡), 𝑃36(𝑡), 𝑃4(𝑡), 
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𝑃8(𝑡), 𝑃37(𝑡), 𝑃25(𝑡) and 𝑃60(𝑡) are most likely to occur with the state probabilities within the 
range 10−03 and 10−06 for 𝑘 = 9. Of course, the simulation time steps could be increased, 
however it requires significant amount of time to obtain the solution from the computer code. 
Among the above-mentioned states, 𝑃1(𝑡) have the highest probability of failure. This implies that 
the ICS system is likely to fail due to an envelope failure or the pressure boundary being 
compromised, i.e., a pipe break or rupture as compared to the other system states. This scenario 
directly challenges the IC loop, and a failure of which could rapidly result to a total system failure. 
A failure of the ICS to maintain its loop pressure will directly affect the reactor coolant system 
pressure, which can result in a operation of the safety relief valves. System state 𝑃1(𝑡) is followed 
by the states 𝑃24(𝑡) and 𝑃36(𝑡) which are the vent unit and drain unit failure respectively. An 
occurrence of any of these two states will result to a system failure. For instance, the failure of 
vent unit to vent non-condensable gases from the IC loop will significantly degrade the heat 
transfer rate and hence the ICS performance. It is evident that a failure of drain unit will directly 
result to a system failure since the IC loop will be degraded and the condensate coolant flow path 
will be affected. The reason for 𝑃1(𝑡) being higher than 𝑃24(𝑡) and 𝑃36(𝑡) is due to the redundancy 
provided for the vent and condensate return unit. Whereas, 𝑃36(𝑡) being lower than 𝑃24(𝑡) is due 
to the diversity provided in the condensate return valves as compared to the identical vent valves. 
Regardless, any of the above scenarios will have a direct influence on the IC loop pressure and 
coolant flow, which in turn will affect the reactor coolant system pressure. The predicted time-
dependent stochastic ICS system behavior can be utilized in the next step of the project to couple 
the model with deterministic system evolution, thus enabling an analyst to predict an integrated 
determinist and probabilistic system evolution.  
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Table 65: Sample ICS state transition probabilities with 10 time steps 
1. For system state 𝑛 = 0:  
𝑘 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
𝑃0(𝑡) 1 0.9995 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.995 
 
2. For system state 𝑛 = 1:  
𝑘 0 1 2 3 4 5 
𝑃1(𝑡) 0 2.74E-04 5.48E-04 8.21E-04 1.09E-03 1.37E-03 
 
6 7 8 9 
1.64E-03 1.91E-03 2.19E-03 2.46E-03 
 
3. For system state 𝑛 = 2:  
𝑘 0 1 2 3 4 5 
𝑃2(𝑡) 0 3.21E-08 6.41E-08 9.61E-08 1.28E-07 1.591E-07 
 
6 7 8 9 
1.92E-07 2.24E-07 2.55E-07 2.87E-07 
 
Note: State transition probabilities are systematically organized by system configuration. A sample total state transition probabilities for 




 CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the conclusion of the research work and some recommendations for future 
research. The conclusion is derived from all the chapters of the thesis. Recommendations for 
potential future research activities as an extension of the present work as well as ongoing and near-
term activities to be performed for the CRP are also noted in this chapter.  
 
 Conclusions  
This thesis investigates the application and comparison of classical and dynamic PSA techniques 
that are utilized for safety analysis of nuclear power plants. The classical techniques include the 
fault tree, event tree and classical Markov model, whereas the dynamic methodologies include the 
Markov-CCMT model and Dynamic Flowgraph Method. The capabilities and limitations of the 
techniques are demonstrated by applying it to a benchmark liquid level control system exhibiting 
dynamic characteristics. The failure probability of the top events (drained and overflow) are 
evaluated using each method, and the predicted results are compared. The system reliability 
analysis using FT/ET are performed using the CAFTA code, whereas states transition probabilities 
in classical Markov model are executed in Fortran95 code. The DFM model of the benchmark 
system is developed using the code DYMONDA, and the coupling of Markov-CCMT model is 
performed using Fortran95 and MATLAB tools. The contribution of this research includes;  
• Demonstration of the advantages of dynamic techniques over classical methods for 
reliability modelling and analysis of system exhibiting dynamic characteristics;  
• Formulated the time-dependent reliability analysis of system with multiple failure modes 
and multi-state components;  
• Generation of timed fault trees from DFM model through the backtracking process that 
can be integrated into an existing conventional PSA model;  
• Performed a detailed comparison of the two dynamic PSA methods, i.e., DFM and 
Markov-CCMT models with regard to time-dependent modelling capability, dynamic 
accident sequence generation, modelling complexity and computational time required;  
• Developed a roadmap for the Coordinated Research Project and a novel approach to 




The classical techniques are static in nature except the time-dependent Markov model, and 
consider an instant system failure for a given minimal cut-set. This leads one to conclude that given 
the set of possible system failures, the classical approach is a systematic approach linking known 
anticipated events. However, it has been shown in this research that a failure event does not 
necessarily result in an instant system failure, rather there is a time delay which is dependent on 
the evolution of the state variables. The knowledge of time delay is important since it may be the 
time available for the operators to respond to an initiating event, or the time available for the next 
frontline system to activate on demand. It is self-evident that classical approach limits itself to the 
state of the hardware system, whereas the dynamic approach simultaneously considers both the 
hardware states as well as the magnitude of the state variables. The top events in classical 
techniques are defined only in terms of failure probability of the hardware state, whereas dynamic 
methods define the top events in terms of magnitude of state variables. This research thus 
demonstrates that the dynamic methods can capture the time element and the time-dependent 
probabilistic accident sequence evolution, and hence provides a more detailed approach to 
evaluating complex dynamic system behaviour.  
However, this comes at the expense of model complexity, and computationally, the time required 
to process large transition matrix. Additional factors include, the large number of simulation runs 
and complicated coupling process/algorithm. For instance, consider the Markov-CCMT model. 
This physical model of the liquid level control system was created using MATLAB and verified 
via analytical method. The stochastic model was developed systematically via Markov transition 
diagram, and the generated coupled ODEs was solved in Fortran95 code. State variable 
discretization, i.e., five (5) computational cells was performed in the MATLAB environment. 
Based on the number of computational cells and possible systems states from the stochastic model, 
the number of runs to be performed was determined. The evolution of state variable in the state-
space for each run is mapped, and its conditional probabilities computed using the CCMT model. 
The coupling of the two models i.e., Markov and CCMT, and evaluation of the transition 
probability matrix was performed in MATLAB. The size of the transition matrix increases with an 
increase in number of system states and computational cells, and hence evaluation of the matrix 
become considerably complicated requiring significant computational time.  
The impact of state ordering of the accident sequences is also demonstrated such that the dynamic 
techniques model ordering of failures and thus provides more information of the failure sequence. 
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DFM and Markov-CCMT model strictly account for failure ordering which is probabilistic in 
nature and enable probabilistic dynamic system evolution, i.e., simultaneously accounting for 
failure ordering as well as system dynamics. This is due to the fact that both system state variables 
and hardware states are accounted for simultaneously. In contrast, FT technique represents a 
system failure without any particular ordering index; that is, the sequence is fixed apriori by experts 
undertaking ET analysis. Here, analysis has shown that DFM present advantages in this regard. 
Furthermore, DFM can account for stochastic accident sequence evolution, in contrast to the 
classical techniques and Markov-CCMT model where the possible system states are set a priori by 
the analyst. For instance, with an increase in backtracking steps, basic events in the prime 
implicants (analogous to minimal cut-sets in fault tree) increases, whereas the possible system state 
in Markov-CCMT model remains the same except with a deviation in the failure probability. This 
is of vital importance as the evolution of accident sequence can be observed from the individual 
timed-prime implicants (time stamped). DFM however lacks the capability to model deviation in 
component/system failure rate and demand frequency influenced by a prior failure event. The 
predicted failure probability of the benchmark system for both overflow and drained scenarios 
show significant deviation from classical and dynamic techniques. The difference in the predicted 
failure probabilities is attributed to lack of treatment of dynamic interactions among the units 
through the state variable, and consideration of independence among unit failure modes in the 
classical approach. In contrast, dynamic methods account for competition within the failure modes 
and treat all unit modes in an integrated fashion. The classical approach yields conservative results 
and thus serves to identify logical correctness and establishes conservative relationships between 
top events and system end states. The viability of integrating the results obtained from a DFM 
model to an existing static PSA model is depicted by generating timed-fault trees through the 
backtracking algorithm. we note that even though it is impractical to model the entire plant using 
DFM, specific system important to safety can be modelled with DFM, and its results can be 
integrated after post-processing of timed-prime implicants to construct timed-fault trees.  
The current research also achieves its objective in developing a preliminary roadmap and selection 
of a benchmark passive safety system for the coordinated research project. The passive ICS was 
selected on the basis that: many current generation SMRs concepts implements ICS, availability 
of research materials and the objective within the international community to determine the 
functional reliability of system based on natural circulation. A dynamic and integrated approach 
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for safety assessment of passive systems is developed and presented in Chapter 5. A Markov-
CCMT model was selected as the most viable candidate for ICS system modelling due to its nature 
of tight coupling, and the capability to capture dynamic interactions between systems that results 
to a deviation in demand frequency of the interacting systems. As a first step towards integrated 
safety assessment, two classical approaches to reliability modelling of the passive ICS were 
proposed: (a) small Markov model and large fault tree; and (2) small fault tree and large Markov 
model. The first approach is largely classical (static in nature) and provide results in terms of cut-
sets and is unable to incorporate dynamic characteristics such as state variable evolution and state 
ordering. The latter approach enables one to model system level time-dependent characteristics as 
well as merge unit/component states using FT failure rate evaluation method. This results in a 
reduced system state. This indicates that the latter approach for stochastic system modelling is 
practical, and subsequently eventual coupling with ICS deterministic model. Reliability of the ICS 
and hence the system state transition probabilities are predicted using the latter approach. The 
analysis confirms a high system reliability for the required mission time.  
 
 Recommendations for Future Work  
Based on the thesis research activities performed, recommendations and anticipated directions are 
presented in this sub-section. The recommendations also include the activities to be performed for 
the research project, and is aligned with the roadmap of the project outlined in Chapter 5. The 
potential subject of research includes:  
1. Development of a mechanized coupling process of stochastic and deterministic system 
model (best estimate code) through a user-friendly computer code. For instance, the 
coupling of stochastic model in Fortran95 and physical model in RELAP5 can be realized 
using Python as the coupling tool.  
2. Most, if not all, of the existing NPPs are based on static classical PSA approach. This 
requires post-processing of results obtained from dynamic techniques in order to integrate 
into an existing PSA model. Due to the significant volume of information obtained from 
dynamic methods, post-processing is itself a challenge. This will require time and 
investigation. Furthermore, there exist no standard technique for post-processing and is 
thus, analyst dependent. Additional work should be performed to develop a systematic 
approach for post-processing of results that can be integrated with an existing PSA model.  
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3. The ICS is a passive reactor pressure depressurization system. However, in almost all 
current generation reactors, an active system is also dedicated for the same purpose, such 
as safety relief valves (SRVs) or automatic depressurization systems (ADS). The modelling 
of complex dynamic interactions between the two-depressurization system through the 
RCS pressure evolution needs further research. This will enable one to comprehend how 
dynamic interactions can influence the failure rate, demand frequency and hence the 
reliability of interacting systems. This may be particularly important for PSSs that function 
on a small driving force which is highly sensitive to system parameters such as heat loss, 
presence of non-condensable gases, pipe fouling and oxidation. Unlike the active systems 
where these parameters are negligible due to the high driving force. These phenomenon in 
turn influence the state variable (i.e., RCS pressure) evolution, and thus the demand 
frequency and reliability of interacting systems.  
 
In conclusion, risk assessment of NPPs requires accurate estimates of the frequency of accident 
scenarios and adequate treatment of dependencies among multiple failure events. The ET/FT 
methodology currently used is fundamentally well-suited to conservatively treat dependencies that 
can be expressed in static and logical terms. However, it is not as well-suited to treat dependencies 
associated with time-dependent processes or continuously varying variables. The methodology 
does not explicitly carry information concerning the evolution of state variables and operator state 
that may couple a number of failure events together. the three major severe accidents (TMI, 
Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi) substantiate this observation. The study shows that the two 
dynamic methods provide a promising pathway to bridging the gap and overcoming the limitations 
encountered in classical PSA; hence providing risk-significant information and insights into the 
probabilistic system dynamic evolution. Lastly, dynamic PSA techniques can be used as a 
complement to the classical approach in that, it provides information on the system dynamic 
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 APPENDIX I 
Multi-state modelling with FT and Markov model 
To demonstrate the capability of FT and Markov model in modeling multi-state 
component/system, consider a simple non-repairable system consisting of two components 
connected in parallel. Assume that the system is fully operational initially and is represented by 
the system state 𝑆0 (both components in normal state) at 𝑡 = 0. Two distinct cases are considered 
for analysis and illustration purpose.  
1. Components with one failure modes (binary);  
2. Components with two failure modes (multi-state).  
 
1. Components with one failure modes  
It is considered that each component is independent and has only one failure mode i.e., normal or 
failed. The state transition probabilities are 𝜆𝐴 and 𝜆𝐵 for components A and B respectively. The 
Markov state transition diagram for the redundant system is given in Figure A-I-1.  
 
Figure A-I-1: Second-order failures Markov state transition diagram 
Figure A-I-1 can be characterized by a set of ODEs:  
𝑑𝑆0
𝑑𝑡












= 𝜆𝐵𝑆1 + 𝜆𝐴𝑆2 
         (A-I-1) 
Solving the set of ODEs with the initial conditions 𝑆0 = 1 and 𝑆1 = 𝑆2 = 𝑆3 = 0, we obtain the 








−𝜆𝐵 𝑡(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐴 𝑡) 
 
𝑆2(𝑡) = 𝑒
−𝜆𝐴 𝑡(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐵 𝑡) 
 
𝑆3(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝐴 𝑡). (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐵 𝑡) 
       (A-I-2) 
Since a system failure occurs when it occupies state 𝑆3 (both component failure), the system failure 
probability via Markov model is given by:  
𝑆3(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝐴𝑡). (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐵𝑡)     (A-I-3) 
The system failure probability (top event) predicted by the FT technique for the redundant system 
is given by an AND gate as follow:  
Failure probability of component A, 𝑃𝐴 = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝐴𝑡)   (A-I-4) 
Failure probability of component B, 𝑃𝐵 = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝐵𝑡)   (A-I-5) 
𝑃(𝑇𝑜𝑝⁡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴 ∧⁡𝑃𝐵 = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝐴𝑡). (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐵𝑡)   (A-I-6) 
Clearly, the top event (failure probability) predicted by FT and Markov model are the same.  
 
2. Components with two failure modes  





𝐵 respectively with the same system configuration as the first case. The state transition diagram 
is shown in Figure A-I-1.  
 
























































    (A-I-7) 
Considering that the system is operational at 𝑡 = 0, initial condition is given as:  
𝑆𝑛(0) = 0; 𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑛 ≠ 0     (A-I-8) 
Where; 𝑛 = the number of system states  





















































































































































𝐴)𝑡   (A-I-9) 
The system unreliability is determined by summing all the second order failures.  






































Some differences between FTA and Markov model can be observed. To highlight one key 
difference, consider the system state 𝑆8(𝑡), where both component A and B are in a failed state 
with modes 𝜆2
𝐴 and 𝜆2
𝐵 respectively. The individual failure probabilities of the components are:  
𝑃𝐴2 =  1 − 𝑒
−𝜆2
𝐴𝑡  and 𝑃𝐵2 =  1 − 𝑒
−𝜆2
𝐵𝑡     (A-I-12) 
Therefore, system failure probability (top event) predicted by FT technique is computed as:  
Top⁡Event = 𝑃𝐴2 ∧⁡𝑃𝐵2 =  1 − 𝑒
−𝜆2
𝐴𝒕 .  1 − 𝑒−𝜆2
𝐵𝒕     (A-I-13) 
Whereas, the failure probability of the top event computed from Markov model is given in 
Equation (A-I-9). Clearly, it can be observed that the failure probability predicted by the FT and 
Markov model are different. For illustration purpose, consider that the component A have two 
failure modes with failure rates 𝜆1
𝐴 = 0.005⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡ℎ𝑟 and 𝜆2
𝐴 = 0.007⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡ℎ𝑟, and component B 
have two failure modes with failure rates of 𝜆1
𝐵 = 0.005⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡ℎ𝑟 and 𝜆2
𝐵 = 0.007⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡ℎ𝑟 
respectively. The two cases are simulated for comparison purpose.  
• Components A and B with binary mode (normal and failed)  
• Components A and B with multiple modes, and system failure occurs when A and B are in 
𝜆2
𝐴 and 𝜆2




It may be observed from Figure A-I-3 that the top event probabilities computed from the two 
methods are different. The top event computed from Markov model is smaller than the one from 
the FT technique (green and red curve). This is due to the fact that Markov model accounts for 
competition between failure modes of a component, while the FT treats the two failure modes 
independently. For the explicit mode consideration, top event from FT is simply given by an AND 
gate between 𝜆2
𝐴 and 𝜆2
𝐵, whereas in Markov model, 𝑆8(𝑡) represents the top event.  
 
Figure A-I-3: Top event comparison between FT and Markov model 
The asymptotic behavior of the system predicted by FT tends to ‘1’ as (𝑡 → ∞), whereas the 
system state 𝑆8(𝑡) from the Markov model as (𝑡 → ∞) is given by:  












𝐵     (A-I-14) 
i.e., 𝑆8(𝑡 → ∞) = 0.3403 (limiting state probability), as opposed to ‘1’ predicted by the FT 
technique. These properties of Markov model accounting for failure modes in an integrated fashion 





 APPENDIX II 
! Chireuding Zeliang/Major: Nuclear Engineering  
! Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science: University of Ontario Institute of Technology, 
Oshawa, Ontario, 2018 
Program Benchmark_Liquid_Level_Control_System 
! Declaration of variables 
Real :: M(27,27), A(27,27), P(11,27), dt, t, q(27), sum  
Integer :: i, j, k 





do i= 1, 27 
do j= 1, 27 
M(i,j)=0. 
A(i,j)=0. 
if (i.eq.j) then  




do k=1,11 ! The number of time steps  
do i=1,27 
P(k,i)=0. 
q(i)=0.  ! Initial transition matrix  
end do 
end do  
P(1,1)=1.  ! Initial state of the system  




M(1,1): − 0.0134 M(2,1):  0.0023  M(2,2):  −0.0088 
M(3,1):  0.0023 M(3,3): −0.0088 M(4,1):  0.0029 
M(4,4): −0.0077 M(5,1):  0.00285 M(5,5): −0.0077 
M(6,1): 0.0016 M(6,6): −0.0103 M(7,1): 0.00156 
M(7,7): −0.0103 M(8,2): 0.0028 M(8,4): 0.0023 
M(8,8): 0.0031 M(9,2): 0.0028 M(9,5): 0.0023 
M(9,9): −0.0031 M(10,2): 0.0016 M(10,7): 0.0023 
M(10,10):  −0.0057 M(11,2): 0.0016 M(11,6):  0.0023 
M(11,11): −0.0057 M(12,3): 0.0029 M(12,4): 0.0023 
M(12,12):  −0.0031 M(13,3):  0.0029 M(13,5): 0.0023 
M(13,13): −0.0031 M(14,3): 0.00156 M(14,6): 0.0023 
M(14,14):  −0.0057 M(15,3): 0.00156  M(15,7):  0.0023 
M(15,15): −0.0057 M(16,4):  0.00156 M(16,6): 0.00285 
M(16,16):  −0.0046 M(17,4): 0.00156 M(17,7):  0.00285 
M(17,17): −0.0046 M(18,5):  0.00156 M(18,6): 0.00285 
M(18,18):  −0.0046 M(19,5): 0.00156 M(19,7):  0.00285 
M(19,19): −0.0046 M(20,8):  0.00156 M(20,10): 0.00285 
M(20,16):  0.0023 M(21,8): 0.00156 M(21,11):  0.00285 
M(21,17): 0.0023 M(22,9):  0.00156 M(22,10): 0.00285 
M(22,18):  0.0023 M(23,9): 0.00156 M(23,9):  0.0016 
M(23,11): 0.00285 M(23,19):  0.0023 M(24,12): 0.0016 
M(24,14):  0.00285 M(24,16): 0.0023 M(25,12):  0.0016 
M(25,15): 0.00285 M(25,17):  0.0023 M(26,13): 0.0016 
M(26,14):  0.00285 M(26,18): 0.0023 M(27,13):  0.0016 
M(27,15): 0.00285 M(27,19):  0.0023   
 
! Computation of transition state probabilities  
do k=1,10 
t=(k-1)*dt  
do i=1,27  
do j=1,27 




   P(k+1, i)= P(k+1,i) + q(i) 
end do 
end do 
end do  
! Results  
write(1,*)"Markov model of the benchmark system"  
write(1,*)""  






do i= 1,27  
sum= sum + P(k,i) 
write(1,*)"P(",i,")=", P(k,i) 
end do  
write(1,*)"sum=",sum  
write(1,*)"" 
end do  
write(1,*)""  
write(1,*)"Systematically arrange by system status" 
write(1,*)""  
do i=1,27 
write(1,*)"n=", i  
do k=1,5 
write(1,*) P(k,i) 
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Figure A-III-2: Timed-fault tree for transfer 
gate G14 








Figure A-III-4: Timed-fault tree for transfer 
gate G7 















 APPENDIX IV 
State-space Discretization and computation of cell-to-cell transition probabilities.  
clear all; 
clc; 
% State-Space Discretization Algorithm 
syms VR Vj1 Vj2 Vj3 Vr1 Vr2 Vr3 r Vr x(t) dt f f1 z J1 J2 J3 
VR_L= -3; % Control space lower bound 
VR_U= +3; % Control space upper bound 
VR= [-3:+3]; % Overall Control Space 
VR= [-3:2:+3]; %Discretized control regions: analyst choice 
for VR= -3:2:+3 
      if (VR<=-3) 
         Vr1_L=VR; 
      elseif (VR<=-1) 
           Vr1_U=VR; 
           Vr2_L=Vr1_U; 
      elseif (Vr2_L<VR<1) 
           Vr2_U=VR; 
           Vr3_L=Vr2_U; 
      elseif (VR>=+3) 
           Vr3_U=VR; 
      end 
end 
r=[1 2 3]; %Number of control region 
Vr1= [-3 -1]; % Space for control region-1 
Vr2= [-1 +1]; % Space for control region-2 
Vr3= [+1 +3]; % Space for control region-3 
r1= range(Vr1); %Range of control region-1 
cw1= range(Vr1)/3; %computational cell width in region-1 
r2= range(Vr2); %Range of control region-2 
cw2= range(Vr2)/3; %computational cell width in region-2 
r3= range(Vr3); %Range of control region-3 





% Discretization scheme for Control region-1 
a_bar= -3; % Lower bound of control space Vr1 
alpha_1= -1; % Upper bound of control space Vr1 
J1=3; % Number of sub-cells in control space Vr1 
for j=1:J1 
     delta_x1= ((alpha_1-a_bar)/J1); %sub-cell size/volume 
      a(j)= a_bar + (j-1)*delta_x1; % Lower bound of the sub-cells 
      b(j)= a_bar + j*delta_x1; % Upper bound of the sub-cells 
          dp1(:,j)= ((a(:,j)+b(:,j))/2); %departure points from the sub-cells of control region-1 
     Vd(j)=-3;  
end 
% Discretization scheme for Control region-2 
alpha_1= -1; % Lower bound of control space Vr2 
alpha_2= +1; % Upper bound of control space Vr2 
J2=3; % Number of sub-cells in control space Vr2 
for j=1:J2 
      delta_x2= ((alpha_2-alpha_1)/J2); %sub-cell size/volume 
      a(j)= alpha_1 + (j-1)*delta_x2; % Lower bound of the sub-cells 
      b(j)= alpha_1 + j*delta_x2; % Upper bound of the sub-cells 
      dp2(:,j)= ((a(:,j)+b(:,j))/2); %departure points from the sub-cells of control region-2 
end 
% Discretization scheme for Control region-3 
alpha_2= +1; % Lower bound of control space Vr3 
b_bar= +3; % Upper bound of control space Vr3 
J3=3; % Number of sub-cells in control space Vr3 
for j=1:J3 
delta_x3= ((b_bar-alpha_2)/J3); %sub-cell size/volume 
a(j)= alpha_2 + (j-1)*delta_x3; % Lower bound of the sub-cells 
b(j)= alpha_2 + j*delta_x3; % Upper bound of the sub-cells 
dp3(:, j)= ((a(:,j)+b(:,j))/2); %departure points from the sub-cells of control region-3 






DP= [dp1; dp2; dp3]; %Departure points from all the sub-cells of the three regions  
x(t)=DP; 
%System dynamics is defined by (dx/dt)=f  
x1_bar= 1; %flowrate from unit-1 
x2_bar= 1; %flowrate from unit-2 
x3_bar= 1; %flowrate from unit-3 
N=8; % component state combination  
for n=1:8;  
for dt=1 %the time step  
f= (x1_bar + x2_bar - x3_bar)*dt; %Liquid level evolution as a function of N 
if n==1 % system at component state combination n=1, 4 and 6 
z1=f; %z1 is the "dx" i.e., the small increment in level  
y1=[x(t)+z1]; % y1= x(t+dt) is the liquid level in the next time step  
y11= vpa(y1);  
else if n==2 % system state at n=2 
z2=2*f; %The net flowrate at n=2 
y2=[x(t)+z2]; % y2=x(t+dt) is the liquid level in the next time step  
y22= vpa(y2); %Fraction to decimal  


























J= 5; %number of discretized space 
h=5; % number of groups/control range  
k(J,h)=zeros; % k is a group matrix 
% Each row and column or elements of matrix 'k' represents the number of arrival trajectories in j from j'  
for j=1:J %Number of columns of g(j/j',n',dt) 




if B(i,j)>=-3 && B(i,j)<=-1 
k(i,2)=k(i,2)+1; 
end 
if B(i,j)>-1 && B(i,j)<=+1 
k(i,3)=k(i,3)+1; 
end 













 APPENDIX V 
Sample Results: State Transition Probabilities of the Passive Isolation Condenser Systems 
 
Transition State Probabilities for 𝑘 = 5:  
𝑃1 = 0.997 𝑃2 = 1.37E-03 𝑃3 = 1.59E-07 
𝑃4 = 1.75E-10 𝑃5 = 2.621E-05 𝑃6 = 2.88E-08 
𝑃7 = 3.36E-12 𝑃8 = 2.77E-15 𝑃9 = 2.62E-06 
𝑃10 = 2.87E-09 𝑃11 = 3.36E-13 𝑃12 = 2.77E-16 
𝑃13 = 0.00 𝑃14 = 4.44E-18 𝑃15 = 5.19E-22 
𝑃16 = 5.689E-25 𝑃17 = 8.51E-20 𝑃18 = 9.33E-23 
𝑃19 = 1.09E-26 𝑃20 = 6.73E-30 𝑃21 = 8.51E-21 
𝑃22 = 9.33E-24 𝑃23 = 1.09E-27 𝑃24 = 6.73E-31 
𝑃25 = 6.02E-04 𝑃26 =6.61E-07 𝑃27 = 7.73E-11 
𝑃28 = 6.36E-14 𝑃29 = 1.27E-08 𝑃30 = 1.04E-11 
𝑃31 = 1.22E-15 𝑃32 = 6.68E-19 𝑃33 = 1.27E-09 
𝑃34 = 1.04E-12 𝑃35 = 1.22E-16 𝑃36 = 6.68E-20 
𝑃37 = 6.02E-04 𝑃38 = 6.61E-07 𝑃39 = 7.73E-11 
𝑃40 = 6.36E-14 𝑃41 = 1.27E-08 𝑃42 = 1.04E-11 
𝑃43 = 1.22E-15 𝑃44 = 6.68E-19 𝑃45 = 1.27E-09 
𝑃46 = 1.04E-12 𝑃47 = 1.22E-16 𝑃48 = 6.68E-20 
𝑃49 = 1.95E-18 𝑃50 = 2.14E-21 𝑃51 = 2.51E-25 
𝑃52 = 1.55E-28 𝑃53 = 4.11E-23 𝑃54 = 2.54E-26 
𝑃55 = 2.97E-30 𝑃56 = 8.67E-34 𝑃57 = 4.11E-24 
𝑃58 = 2.54E-27 𝑃59 = 2.97E-31 𝑃60 = 8.67E-35 
𝑃61 = 2.91E-07 𝑃62 = 2.39E-10 𝑃63 = 2.80E-14 
𝑃64 = 1.54E-17 𝑃65 = 4.59E-12 𝑃66 = 2.52E-15 
𝑃67 = 2.95E-19 𝑃68 = 8.07E-23 𝑃69 = 4.59E-13 
𝑃70 = 2.52E-16 𝑃71 = 2.95E-20 𝑃72 = 8.07E-24 






 APPENDIX VI 
Dynamic Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment using Dynamic 
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• Demonstrate the advantages and applicability of dynamic PSA 
methods over classical techniques
• Formulate the coupling of Markov-CCMT model for dynamic PSA 
• Illustrate generation of timed-fault trees from DFM model for its 
integration into an existing classical PSA model
• Development of a novel approach for integrated reliability 
assessment of passive safety system in iPWR-type Small Modular 




• Classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
➢ Event/Fault Tree techniques 
➢Classical Markov chain
• Dynamic PRA
➢Dynamic Flowgraph Method 
➢Coupled Markov/Cell-to-cell Mapping Technique 
• Application and demonstration of methodologies
• Development of an integrated approach for Dynamic Reliability 
Assessment of passive safety systems in iPWR-type SMRs
4
NUREG-6901: “Current State of Reliability Modeling Methodologies for Digital Systems and Their 
Acceptance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Assessments” (2016)
 
Classical PSA techniques
• Well-established techniques, and a systematic and 
comprehensive approach for Risk Assessment 
• Fault/Event Tree Technique (WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, 1975)
• Classical Markov chain (Norris, 1997) 
• Static logic based technique
• Fault trees are series of Boolean Algebraic equations to 
determine the failure probability of an undesired event 
5
• WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, “Reactor Safety Study: An assessment of accident risks in U.S. 
Commercial Nuclear power plants”, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975.
• Norris, J. R., “Continuous-time Markov chains I and II”, 1997. 
 
Limitations of Classical PSA
• Classical PRA techniques lacks the ability to account for 
system dynamics
• Lacks the ability to capture dynamic interactions
– Component failure modes and probability as a function of state 
variables (e.g., interactions of control units through liquid level)
• Classical techniques are neither developed nor intended to 
capture time element 
• States ordering in ET/FT are fixed/no particular ordering index 







• Dynamic PRA techniques enables one to couple system model with 
risk analysis code (as early as 1986)
• Simultaneously accounting for system time-dependent 
phenomenological model and its stochastic behavior
• Explicit consideration and treatment of time-element 
• A better treatment of dynamic interactions and scenario 
development 
➢ For systems with multiple top events, the final state is dependent on 
magnitude of state variables, order and timing of failure events
• Allows for systematic and more complete coverage of possible 
failure scenarios 
• State-space explosion phenomenon, highly time-dependent, 
modelling complexity and computational time requirements 
7
 
Dynamic Flowgraph Method (DFM)
• An integrated approach to modelling system logical and time-
dependent behavior 
• Multi-valued logic model 
• Dynamic behaviors are represented as a series of discrete state 
transitions 
• A single model can analyze arbitrary number of possible system 
conditions (i.e., any top event of interest)
• A three step process:
1. Model development 
2. Model analysis (deductive/inductive)




• A prime implicant is a conjunction of basic events that is sufficient to 
cause a top event, but does not contain any shorter conjunction of 
events that is sufficient to cause the top event
• Analogous to minimal cut-set in FT, but is time-stamped (e.g., Ai @t=-1: 
component ‘A’ is in state “i” at time “t=-1”) 
<Variable A=2 @t=-1 AND Variable A=3 @t=-2>
• Complete base is the set of prime implicants logically equivalent to the 
FT TOP event function 
• Complete base is obtained by evaluation of transition table using 
algebraic laws including: 
• Absorption, Merging, Reduction and Absorption-Merging law (Yau, 1997)
• Generalized Consensus Method (Garribba et al., 1985)
9
 
Timed FT generation from DFM model
• Integration of results obtained from DFM model to an existing 
classical plant PRA model 
• Sequences of static FTs at different time steps representing 
evolution of logical combinations of events leading to a top event
• Consistency Rules: 
– Physical consistency: A process variable with different state cannot 
occur in the same time step. e.g., valve ‘A’ open AND valve ‘A’ closed @t= -1
– Dynamic consistency: A process variable can change its states in a 
certain direction or by amount (dictated by system dynamics) in a single 






Analysis of Type-I 
Interactions
Analysis of Type-II 
Interactions



















• The probability 𝑷𝒏,𝒋 𝒕 of finding a state variable in cell  𝒋 at time 
 = ∆ for a given component state combination ′𝒏′ can be 
recursively found: 
𝑷𝒏,𝒋 𝒌+ 𝟏 =   𝑔 𝑗 𝑗














= 𝑔 𝑗 𝑗′⁄ , 𝑛′, ∆𝑡 . ℎ 𝑛 𝑛′⁄ , 𝑗′ → 𝑗, ∆𝑡
13
   ′,  ′,  ∆ ⁄ : Conditional probability of state variables in cell 𝑗 at time (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡 given that it was in 
cell 𝑗′ at time 𝑡
   ′⁄ ,  ′ →  ,  ∆ : Conditional probability of component state combination in state 𝑛 at time (𝑘 +
1)∆𝑡 given that it was in state 𝑛′ at time 𝑘∆𝑡, and the state variables move from cell 𝑗′ to cell 𝑗 during 
𝑘∆𝑡 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)∆𝑡}
 
Application of Methodologies 
1. Fault Tree 
2. Event Tree 
3. Classical Markov model 









𝑥 > 𝑏 - - -
𝑏1 < 𝑥 OFF OFF ON
𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1 ON OFF ON
𝑥 < 𝑎1 ON ON OFF
𝑥 < 𝑎 - - -
Control Laws






Fault Tree Model: Binary
16
Top Event
MCS  𝟏 𝟐 +  𝟑
Failure Probability 𝟑. 𝟏 𝟏𝟏 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
Ref: Electric Power Research Institute, “CAFTA Fault Tree Analysis System 
Version 6.0”, EPRI Inc., NC, 2013. 
 
Fault Tree Model: Multiple Modes
17
Top Event: Overflow
MCS  𝟏 𝟐 +  𝟏 𝟑 +  𝟐 𝟑
Failure Probability 𝟏. 𝟒   × 𝟏𝟎−𝟎 
Top Event: Dryout
MCS  𝟏 𝟐 𝟑




Ref: Electric Power Research Institute, “CAFTA Fault Tree Analysis System 
Version 6.0”, EPRI Inc., NC, 2013.
System Overflow
𝟐.  𝟏 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟎 
System Dryout
𝟑. 𝟎 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟎 









• Enables one to model a sequence of random variables which 
corresponds to discrete system states
• System state at any point in time is dependent only on the previous 
state, i.e., conditional state probabilities
ℙ( 𝒏+𝟏 = 𝒋  𝒏 = 𝒊,  𝒏−𝟏 = 𝒊𝒏−𝟏, … ,  𝟎 = 𝒊𝟎 = ℙ( 𝒏+𝟏 = 𝒋  𝒏 = 𝒊












• State probabilities can be determined by solving the set of coupled 
ordinary differential equations 
20
 
Enumeration of system states
Individual Unit States System 
States (𝒏)Unit-1 Unit-2 Unit-3
𝑛1 = 0 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑃0(𝑡)
𝑛1 = 1 𝑛2 = 0 𝑛3 = 0 𝑃1(𝑡)
: : : :
: : : :
𝑛1 = 2 𝑛2 = 2 𝑛3 = 2 𝑃26(𝑡)
 = (𝑷   𝒊   ⁡𝒇 𝒊    ⁡     )(𝒏     ⁡ 𝒇⁡ 𝒏𝒊𝒕 )⁡
 = 𝟐                        
21
 
Markov state transition diagram
22
Layer-2Layer-1 Layer-3Layer-0






𝑃(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) = (𝐼 + 𝐴.∆𝑡).𝑃(𝑡) 
Initial conditions:
𝑃𝑛 𝑡 = 0 =  ⁡
1; ⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡⁡𝑛 = 0
0; ⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡⁡𝑛 ≠ 0
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Sample Results 𝑘 = 3
System overflow: 8.6805 × 10−05
System dryout: 6.1155 × 10−08
 
DFM Model of the Benchmark System
24
Discrete states
Transition table captures system dynamics
Process variable node





Transition and Decision Table
25
State Variable DiscretizationDiscrete Unit States
Transition table: System dynamics
 
26
Prime Implicants for ‘system overflow’
# Prime Implicants Time Logic Probability
1. Tank Liquid Level was at +3 meters @t= -1 -
2. Tank Liquid Level was between +1 and +3 meters
Unit-1 stucked-open
Unit-3 stucked-closed
@t= -1 AND 6.5232 × 10−6
@t= -1 AND
@t= -1
3. Tank Liquid Level was between +1 and +3 meters
Unit-2 stucked-open
Unit-3 stucked-closed
@t= -1 AND 4.4643 × 10−6
@t= -1 AND
@t= -1
4. Tank Liquid Level was between +1 and +3 meters
Unit-1 stucked-open
Unit-2 stucked-open
@t= -1 AND 3.5673 × 10−6
@t= -1 AND
@t= -1
Top Event Probability 𝟏. 𝟒  𝟒 × 𝟏𝟎− 
 
PIs for ‘system overflow’: 2 backtracking depth
# Prime Implicants Time Logic
























Generation of timed fault tree
28
 
Final MCS via Backtracking process
For 5 discretized intervals
# Minimal cut-sets Logic
1. TL= +2 @t= –1 OR
2. (TL= +1 AND U1-S= +1 AND U2-S= +1) @t= –1 OR
3. (TL= +1 AND U1-S= +1 AND U3-S= –1) @t= –1 OR
4. (TL= +1 AND U2-S= +1 AND U3-S= –1) @t= –1
29
 
Markov-CCMT Model of the BS
• State space discretized into 5 cells, (𝐽 = 5)
➢3 computational cells 
➢2 sink cells 
• Computational cells are further discretized into 3 sub-cells 
• Total number of system states, (𝑁 = 27)
• 𝑁 × 𝐽 = 135; 𝑞𝑛,𝑗
𝑛′,𝑗′
𝑘∆𝑡 = 135 × 135⁡square matrix 
• Sink cells: 
Top⁡Event =  
𝑗 = 5; ⁡𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤⁡






Predicted system state probabilities
Time step 𝑷𝒏,𝟏 𝒌∆𝒕 𝑷𝒏, 𝒌∆𝒕 𝑷  𝒌∆𝒕
𝒌 = 𝟏 0 0 0
𝒌 = 𝟐 0 1.019 × 10−08 1.019 × 10−08
𝒌 = 𝟑 1.857 × 10−07 9.173 × 10−05 9.192 × 10−05
𝒌 = 𝟒 2.1496 × 10−06 5.114 × 10−04 5.135 × 10−04
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𝒏 = System states/configuration
𝒋 = Number of discretized state variables
  = Total failure probability (Overflow + Dryout)
 
IAEA-UOIT Coordinated Research Project
(iPWR-type Small Modular Reactors)
32
 
IAEA-UOIT Coordinated Research Project
• Presentations made at two (2) IAEA technical meetings:
1. First Technical Meeting (30th Oct.- 2nd Nov. 2017)
- Passive Safety Features in iPWR-type SMRs:
- Overview and Planning of Technical Contract No. 21051
2. Second Technical Meeting (7-10th May 2018) 
- Planning and Progress of the Research Project
33
Research proposal made: 17th October 2016 
Technical contract awarded: 13th October 2017 
Title: Application of DFM and FTA for Reliability and Risk 
Assessments of Passive Safety System in an Integral-
PWR type SMRs 
 
Preliminary CRP Roadmap
2017 2018 2019 2020
2016
• Research proposal 
awarded
• Review of SMR 
technology 
• Review of Passive 
Safety Systems
• Review of Passive 
Safety Systems in 
iPWR SMRs
• Selection of 
Benchmark PSS 
to be analyzed
• Selection of 
methodology
• FMEA
• Development of 
Stochastic and 
Physical model 
• Classical approach 
to system modelling
• Coupling of 
stochastic-physical 
model 
• Reference case 
simulation
• Initial Drafting of 
IAEA-UOIT project 
• Integration of 
draft from all 
participating 
countries 











• System mission 
• Success/failure criteria 
Physical  
Model
• Development of model (best estimate code)
• Reference case simulation
• Validation of model
Classical 
approach
• Reliability analysis using Fault Tree
• Sensitivity and Uncertainty analysis
Stochastic 
model
• Finite state machine
• Time-dependent Reliability analysis using classical Markov model
Dynamic 
approach
• Coupling of Physical model with Stochastic model 
• Integrated Reliability and Uncertainty analysis: Markov-CCMT approach
System 
characteristic
• Operational characteristics 
• System parameter identification
• Identification of failure modes
• Failure data base preparation
 
The Benchmark Isolation Condenser System
36
• Benchmark system is selected in alignment 
with other participating countries
• Enables one to validate the model and 
compare the predicted system reliability 






Dynamic PRA for SMRs
• Dynamic PRA can be more suitable for integral 
pressurized water reactor type SMRs: 
• Simplified Design 
• Reduced number of components (e.g., No reactor 
coolant pumps)
• Reduced number of accident initiators (e.g., No large 
brake loss-of-coolant accident) 




• Primary objectives of the ICS includes: 
▪ Reactor pressure vessel depressurization without the loss of 
primary coolant inventory 
▪ Remove sensible and decay heat from the reactor for 72 hours 
(mission time) 
▪ Maintain fuel peak cladding temperature within design limits 
(1200 oC typically for PWR). 
• Advantages of implementing ICS includes: 
▪ Prevents unnecessary activation of safety relief valves (SRVs)
▪ Eliminate/mitigate potential LOCA that may result from SRVs 
failure












Predicted State Transition Probabilities
• The analysis shows that 𝑃1 𝑡 has the highest state transition 
probability. This implies that the ICS is mostly likely to fail due 
to an envelope failure/pressure boundary being compromised 
• 𝑃1 𝑡 is followed by 𝑃24 𝑡 and 𝑃36 𝑡 which are the vent and 
drain unit failure respectively. This can be due to the 
redundancy provided for the vent and drain unit
• 𝑃36 𝑡 being lower than 𝑃24 𝑡 is due to the diversity provided 
in the drain valves as compared to the identical vent valves.
41
CNSC, REGDOC- 2.5.2: Safety system failure probability requirement: < 𝟏𝟎−𝟎𝟑 (2014)
 
Conclusion
• Dynamic techniques can provide useful insight and significant 
information in risk assessment compared to classical techniques
• Detail analysis of the benchmark system shows that dynamic 
techniques can capture: 
• System dynamics 
• Time element 
• State ordering
• A more realistic treatment of system/components with 
multiple top events and failure modes respectively
• Markov-CCMT model provide a more rigorous treatment of time 
element (real-time) or tightly coupled
• DFM have the advantage of providing a scenario history and 







• The issue of state space explosion can be systematically treated by: 
➢ System state merging 
➢ Hybrid approach (small FT and Large Markov model) 
➢ Re-arranging and solving the matrix in Canonical form
• Classical approach yields conservative results, and is suitable for 
identifying logical correctness and establishing conservative 
relationships between top and basic events
• The integrated approach presented in this research provide a 
framework for dynamic risk assessment of passive safety systems 




• Development of ICS physical model (deterministic model) using 
best-estimate system code RELAP5 
• Mechanized coupling of stochastic and deterministic system model 
through a user-friendly computer code. 
e.g., coupling of stochastic model (Fortran95) and physical model 
(RELAP5) in Python code 
• Integrated modelling of automatic depressurization system (ADS) 
and ICS to capture the dynamic interactions, and their influence on 





“Towards an Integrated Risk Assessment”
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